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Abstract 
This M A thesis focuses on the work of one of the most influential and authoritative 
theologians of the early Church: St Gregory of Nyssa (f396). My topic of research 
consists in the relationship between language and theology, as it shaped in Gregory's 
polemical works against the radical Arians, in particular against Eunomius of Cyzicus 
(1395). 
The first chapter tackles the historical side of the controversy and provides the 
chronology of the dogmatic disputes on the dogma of Trinity following the Council of 
Nicaea (325). The second chapters illustrate the conflict being at stake between two 
theological methodologies: Gregory's grammar of thought is scriptural, whereas 
Eunomius' theology is much more philosophical and inflexible in its terms. Eunomius 
claimed that one can know God by his essence in the concept of 'ingenerate'. On the 
contrary, for Gregory of Nyssa, God 'is above all names'. For him, language and 
sexuality are realitites of the post-lapsarian world, which made human mind opaque 
and the exercise of interpretation indispensable. Gregory included also the episode of 
Babel in the genealogy of our linguistic finitude. 
The third and the fourth chapters focus on the relationship between language and 
theological knowledge in St Gregory's third book Contra Eunomium. A l l words used 
in human language - including Eunomius' concept of agennetos - have 
complementary meanings, since no one can describe the essence of an object or of 
any part of reality. On this basis, Gregory develops his 'theory of relativity' of names, 
which can never befit God's majesty and glory. 
In the last chapter, under the heading 'Pragmatics of Language', I investigate the 
immediate consequences of Gregory's 'theory of relativity'. Speech is treated as a 
sphere, which resembles the creative power of the hypostatic Word. Therefore, 
rhetoric becomes the perfect tool for his pastoral concern in doing theology. By 
choosing rhetoric, Gregory is free to start his theological argument from anywhere, 
since theology is a discourse about God's redemptive economy. 
In conclusion, I try to emphasise the actuality of Gregory's theory of names and its 
importance for the contemporary debates in the Church on thorny issues as Trinitarian 
theology or gender. I also evaluate Gregory of Nyssa's self-consistency in positive 
terms. 
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Introduction. Why Language Matters 
It happens so that a certain usage of language always gives the interpretation 
of the 'divine', and viceversa. Language matters: it substantiates the faith. This was 
true in the past and became even more eloquently so nowadays. Especially within the 
Western Churches, a revisionist trend has already undermined the traditional 
framework of thinking for both the academic and pastoral theology. During the last 
two decades, many alterations occurred in the liturgical prayers and in the 
interpretation of the Scriptures, when they were considered 'offensive', 'unjust' or 
'sexist'. The traditional name of the Holy Trinity was put under question by many 
liberal theologians, ready to 'demythologise' not only Scripture, but also the crucial 
tenets of the Christian dogma and liturgy. No secular challenge should be too hard to 
be taken up by such a discipline as theology. But very often challenges in theology are 
nourished by a depressing oblivion of what the early Christian tradition really said. 
One desolately finds how widespread is the misrepresentation of the linguistic criteria 
for the orthodoxy. It is nothing new, for example, in the attempt to 'emancipate' the 
scriptural formula of the Holy Trinity ('Father, Son and Holy Spirit'), substituting the 
'anthropomorphic' names with more impersonal ones (eg: 'Creator, Redeemer and 
Sanctifier'). One only needs to remember the doctrine of Sabellius or the ideas that 
Eunomius of Cyzicus tried to establish in the second half of the fourth century, in 
order to understand the banality of such reformatory projects. Behind their Trinitarian 
doctrine, there was obviously a certain understanding of the identity of Christ, harshly 
refuted by the Church Fathers. Theology and language is, therefore, a perennial issue 
and to sort out contemporary problems one needs to reflect upon the heritage of the 
past. I f a better knowledge of the Greek philosophy could help the modern scholarship 
to diminish its redundant 'footnotes to Plato' (A. N . Whitehead), the knowledge of the 
Patristic age could discourage false polemics in theology, or wrong pastoral verdicts. 
I decided to illustrate this point by undertaking a research of one of the most 
prominent Christian thinkers of the Church, ever. Hans Urs von Balthasar penned the 
personality of St Gregory of Nyssa in just a few but unmistakable words: 'moins 
brillant et fecond que son grand maitre Origene, moins cultive que son ami Gregoire 
de Nazianze, moins pratique que son frere Basile, i l les depasse neanmoins tous par la 
profondeur de sa pensee, qui mieux qu'aucune autre a su transposer interieurement 
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sur le mode chretien 1'heritage spirituel de l'ancienne Grece.' My interest in Gregory 
of Nyssa was first motivated by his immense prestige within the Byzantine tradition 
of the Church to which I belong. Part of the celebrated triad of the Cappadocian 
Fathers, St Gregory remains an indispensable source of reference for anybody 
interested in the major topics of Christian theology. Secondly, Gregory's extensive 
work against Eunomius, written in the wake of Basil's first polemical treatise, 
contains the first systematic account of the limits and the competence of language. 
Yet, long time before I could know anything about the revolutionary agenda of 
the feminist theology in the West, or even about the heretical theology of Eunomius 
of Cyzicus, I pondered upon matters of more general concern. As a teenager, I was 
continuously amazed and thrilled by the importance given to the power of the name of 
God in the Divine Liturgy of the Orthodox Church. More than once I was perplexed 
by the subtle combination of ritual gestures during the notoriously long services of my 
Church. In particular, I was struck by the fact that every believer is expected to 
venerate the Gospel as much as the icon of Christ. During all the services, the 
Vespers, the Matins or the Midnight Office, the Gospel and the icon of Christ stand 
together on a wooden stave in the middle of the church's nave, being venerated with a 
holy kiss and prostrations by all the believers. Day and night, the Gospel and the icon 
of Christ support and refresh the loving gaze of those who enter the church 'with 
faith, reverence and fear of God {meta pisteos, eulabeias kai phobou Theou)'. Being 
taken from the stave in a solemn procession at the end of the Matins service, before 
the Liturgy starts, the Gospel is laid on the altar, next to the Eucharistic chalice. 
It took me a while to notice that the Divine Liturgy is the only service of the 
Orthodox Church, which starts with the invocation of the Trinitarian name of God2. 
Every Sunday morning, when I was not too late for the service, I could hear and see 
the orthodox priest lifting up the book of the Gospel and making the sign of the Cross 
over the Antimension, saying 'with clear voice' 3: 'Blessed is the Kingdom of the 
Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit'. This is the beginning of the Divine 
Liturgy, regarded by the orthodox tradition as the perfect theological drama, 
actualising in mysterious words and deeds the economy of our salvation in Jesus 
' HANS URS VON BALTHASAR, Presence etpensee (Paris: Beauchesne, 1942), X I V - X V 
2 The Vespers start with the blessing: 'Blessed is our God, always now and forever, and to the ages of 
ages', as well as the Matins. 
3 The Divine Liturgy of our Father among the Saints John Chrysostom (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), 4-5 (in Greek the indication is: lampra te phone). 
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Christ. I am only one among many Christians from the Eastern Europe who were 
baptised without ever being, not for a second, catechumens of the Orthodox Church. 
Yet, this paradox did not prevent me from realising how much of the first part of the 
Liturgy is concentrated on the veneration of Christ as the Word of God. When the 
moment of reading the Scriptures approaches, the deacon exclaims with loud voice 
'Dynamis' ( I Corinthians 1: 24), and he asks for the blessing. The priest answers with 
the words of the Prophet David, saying: 'Blessed is he who comes in the name of the 
Lord' (Psalm 118, 16; John 12: 13). After the first reading from the New Testament, 
usually taken from one of St Paul's epistles, the deacon again proclaims Christ in just 
one word, saying: 'Wisdom' ( I Corinthians 1: 24). Not before another prayer for the 
illumination of those who listen the Word of God, it follows the reading from the 
Gospel, when the believers stand up (or kneel) in sign of veneration. This impressive 
ceremony speaks for itself and shows the living theology to which any person, either 
baptised or only catechumen, can have access. But the emphasis on the sacredness of 
God's name is even more compelling in the Liturgy of the Faithful, which completes 
the Liturgy of the Catechumens. Unfolding a Trinitarian structure and being entirely 
wrapped in the body of the Scriptures, this Liturgy has a special litany for the Lord's 
Prayer (before the Communion of the Holy Mysteries). The priest says: 'grant us 
worthy, Master, with boldness and without condemnation (meta parrhesias, 
akatakritos), to dare to call upon you.' At the end of the Liturgy, the symmetry 
becomes perfect when the people replicate the inaugural blessing of the priest, saying: 
'Glory be to the Father and to the Son and to the Holy Spirit'. 
The very fact that those who are not baptised can listen to the Word of God 
and are allowed to gaze the beauty of the icon of Christ, but are not allowed to take 
part in the Holy Mysteries, since they are not ful l members of the Church, already 
speaks of the orthodox understanding of the relationship between language and 
theology. It shows how, in the Orthodox Church and her Catholic tradition, the 
'divine names' and the icon of Christ receive ful l veneration, but not yet comparable 
with the adoration due to the Holy Mysteries. The names of God are sacred, but are 
they a sacrament? This was the main question, which determined me to tackle St 
Gregory of Nyssa's work in search for further answers. 
The first chapter of this thesis provides the methodological framework in 
which I read St Gregory's writings. It is an attempt to justify why one cannot separate 
Gregory's theological rationales from the more neutral statements he makes with 
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respect to the structure of language, its usage and interpretation. By a short 
presentation of the struggle for orthodoxy during the fourth century, I try to place 
Gregory's polemics with the radical Arians into a historical context. Subsequently, I 
pay attention to Aetius' legacy and Eunomius' biography, which could at least partly 
explain some of the latter's theological options. I envisage Eunomius' theology in her 
breaking points with the former tradition, while in contrast, pointing out the 
importance of Basil and Gregory's doctrinal and spiritual commitments, which I 
regard in continuity with the apostolic confession of Christ as 'Lord and God' (John 
20: 24). I suggest that the Trinitarian controversy, which also sets the issue of the 
'divine names', can be ultimately traced back to the most important question for the 
early Christian Church: the confession of Christ's divinity and lordship. I also show 
that this confession is intimately related to the hermeneutical task of reading the 
Scriptures, which very easily becomes an object of controversy when the 'hypothesis' 
of Christ's natural sonship is lost on the way. Without this 'hypothesis', the texts of 
the Old and the New Testament were open to endless and conflicting interpretations. 
The second chapter reveals the importance of Scripture as a source of 
authority for theology in the fourth century. I try to prove that Gregory's theology 
follows entirely a scriptural grammar, which uses only provisionally foreign concepts, 
inherited from the Greek classical tradition. By doing so, Gregory remained faithful to 
the Nicene Creed and to its methodology, which allowed the usage of concepts such 
as 'homoousios' in order to express (and interpret) some ambiguous scriptural 
formulae. On the contrary, I suggest, that Eunomius's theological thought has an 
eclectic philosophical grammar, which makes use of scriptural references in order to 
support his subordinationist account of the Trinity. Eunomius' decision to change the 
baptismal formula and to substitute the name of 'Father, Son, and Holy Spirit' with 
the more 'neutral' expression 'First Being, the Second Being, and the Third Being' 
has no precedent in the Fathers' tradition and diverges very seriously from Gregory's 
main source inspiration. There was a conflict between two methodologies at stake, 
which tackled the problem of knowledge and language on very different theological 
basis. 
These differences become more obvious in the third chapter, where I compare 
Eunomius' epistemological tenets with Gregory's more fluid assumptions. I also show 
how their understanding of language depends very much on how they read the book 
of Genesis, and especially the narrative of Adam's creation and his endowment with 
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the power of naming. In comparison with the Alexandrian tradition (Philo and 
Origen), Gregory is surprisingly radical, claiming that language is a human invention. 
On the contrary, Eunomius defends the opposite idea, considering the scriptural and 
non-scriptural 'names' as literally 'inspired' and 'divine'. I also give heed to St 
Gregory's most interesting insights from De hominis opificio, where he speaks about 
the correlation between homo faber and homo sapiens. Having free hands, man is able 
to think and to articulate meaningful sounds, which make him a social being. I suggest 
the possibility of drawing some consistent parallels between St Gregory of Nyssa and 
St Augustine of Hippo, starting with their dialogical interpretation of language. Yet, at 
least for Gregory, language is closely related to Adam's fall. Language and sexuality 
are realitites of the post-lapsarian world, which made human mind opaque and the 
exercise of interpretation indispensable. Gregory included also Babel in the genealogy 
of our linguistic finitude. Babel was temporarily restored at Jerusalem, on the day of 
the Pentecost. St Gregory interprets this 'great feast of languages' (Shakespeare) as 
another compelling proof for his eschatological vision, which presents the human 
beings, like the angels, sharing love and joy without any need for semiotics. This 
teleological orientation of Gregory's thought explains, at least partly, his basic 
epistemological pessimism. Gregory emphasises over and again that the human mind 
cannot know the ultimate structure of reality, and even less its Creator. Both in 
theology and epistemology, St Gregory leaves open the possibility to progress, 
although the relationship between these two realms of knowledge is rather 
asymmetrical. The progressive knowledge of God - which first requires purity of 
heart - enfeebles gradually the intellectual commitment to positive knowledge. While 
contemplating God, one takes distance from reality and perceives nature as an 
epiphany. This very doxological attitude makes human being similar to the angels, 
who incessantly adore God in wonder and praise. 
The fourth chapter of my thesis focuses more systematically on what Gregory 
says about the connection between language and thinking. Gregory integrates the 
basic Stoic distinction between logos endiathetos and logos prophorikos into a 
theological framework which, in Oratio Catechetica, helps him to present the dogma 
of Trinity. As with man the multiple intellectual faculties do not affect the unity of 
mind, God can be three in persons and one in nature. (As usually, Gregory limits the 
value of this analogy by making an apophatic correction, saying that Christians 
worship the divine Trinity that is not numeral, but essentially beyond comprehension.) 
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Furthermore, I present St Gregory's philosophical and theological premises of his 
defence of language as human invention. Basically, language is defective and, 
therefore, it cannot be ascribed to God. What we were given, repeats Gregory in CE 
I I I , is just the power to articulate thoughts in meaningful words and phrases. Epinoia 
is the intellectual faculty in charge of the production of language; it performs the 
analytic examination of what the empirical intuition brought as 'nourishment' to the 
mind. Epinoia is an act of thinking in the second instance and the source of 
intellectual and practical creativity. I presume that Gregory's presentation of epinoia 
as the intellectual faculty for the production of language as well as for the natural 
sciences (mathematics or physics), would be of interest for the continental debates in 
the contemporary hermeneutics (I think, in particular, of P. Ricoeur's work). I also 
suggest that Gregory perceived scientific knowledge as a kind of narrative discourse, 
and that reasoning is similar, in some ways, to the act of translating words from one 
language into another. (The latter points recalls H.-G. Gadamer's dialogic 
hermeneutics.) A l l words used in the human language - including Eunomius' concept 
of agennetos - have complementary meanings, since no one can describe the essence 
of an object or of any part of reality. On this basis, Gregory develops his 'theory of 
relativity' of names, which can never befit God's majesty and glory. Al l words are 
tentative and, their meaning contextualised. In Wittgenstein's terms, St Gregory of 
Nyssa treats language as a 'form of life ' and 'game', having its specific grammar and 
rules of play, which have to be learned properly in order to acquire the right 
understanding. The importance of this theological 'grammar' becomes obvious in the 
hermeneutics of the Scriptures, which can be extremely misleading i f it is undertaken 
in the absence of such commanding rules. Yet, since it is all about 'forms of life ' and 
'language games', one cannot prescribe a definite rule of reading the Scriptures: 
allegory is just one possibility among many others, and Christian pupils can learn how 
to use it properly ex silentio, from a living tradition. It is the effective silence of 
tradition under the guidance of the Spirit. With respect to what God is in se, silence is 
even more important, and the only honourable dictum. Since Eunomius' harshly 
disagreed with this statement, in the last part of this chapter, I situated him on the long 
historical line of what M . Heidegger described as 'die onto-theologische Metaphysik'. 
There are two reasons for reading Eunomius in this grid: first, his foundational 
approach in theology, which marries dialectics in order to establish an extremely 
'ontologised' idea about God. Secondly, I counted his rationalistic thrust, which 
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allows him to make very radical epistemological claims, refreshed only in the early 
modern age, as with Spinoza and Hegel. 
In contrast, Gregory is less happy to employ dialectics and more comfortable 
to do so with rhetoric, in a sui-generis manner. I analyse the rationales of his decision 
to do so in the last chapter of my thesis. Under the heading 'Pragmatics of Language', 
I investigate the immediate consequences of Gregory's 'theory of relativity'. Speech 
is treated as a sphere, which resembles the creative power of the hypostatic Word. 
Therefore, rhetoric becomes the perfect tool for his pastoral concern in doing 
theology. By choosing rhetoric, Gregory is free to start his theological argument from 
anywhere, since theology is a discourse about God's redemptive economy. 
Nevertheless, the model for his spiritual rhetoric is not Libanius, whom he sincerely 
admired, but Basil of Caesarea and, even more so, St Paul, the apostle of the Gentiles. 
Gregory is in search for words of life, and for a knowledge affected and perfected by 
love. Therefore, his main source of inspiration remained the Scriptures and the 
monastic spirituality. At their best, they teach us how to pray and to praise. This is the 
final word of Gregory about the usage of language. Doxology transforms words into 
noetic icons of the invisible God, while our mind becomes a musical instrument 
designed to sing the 'Song of the Songs'. God's unfathomable infinity is the supreme 
pledge for this poetic usage of innumerable 'divine names'. Yet, they can never go 
beyond the 'cloud of darkness' and the 'margins of silence', in which God abides 
forever. 
Let the argument begin. 
7 
I . P R E - T E X T S 
Nicene Aftermath 
The fourth century is widely regarded as the inaugural period of Christianity. 
For any modern reader, the vast complexity and the apparent violence of the 
theological confrontations during the fourth century is, at the first sight, stunning. It is 
probably the most researched period in the history of the early Church, and attempts to 
understand what happened between Nicaea 325 and Constantinople 381 have 
increased the amount exegetical literature to an unexpected degree of minutiae and 
precision. The reasons for this almost unique concentration of scholarly efforts do not 
even need to be mentioned: the perennial discussion about, respectively, the 
Hellenistic and the Jewish heritage of Christianity, the definitive setting of the 
scriptural canon of the early Church, the irrepressible rise of monasticism and other 
ascetic forms of life, the beginning of the end of paganism in the Roman Empire, the 
elevation of Christianity as religion of state under Constantine the Great, the first 
schisms in the Church, the missionary developments, the establishment of the 
Christian forms of art and, above all, the theological foundation of orthodoxy. A l l are 
interconnected issues, which deserve particular attention. 
One has to meet these expectations also when the focus of research is 
restricted to a much narrower topic like 'Theology and Language in St Gregory of 
Nyssa'. It would be simply wrong to think that 'language' was for any of the Christian 
theologians of the fourth century a separate issue from their constant effort to 
understand the heritage of the already established doctrine, spirituality and liturgy of 
the Church. Therefore, one has to bear in mind that, Gregory's discussion of the 
competence of language is tacitly determined by his particular understanding of 
Scripture, tradition, sacraments, and anthropology. Gregory's approach towards 
theology was holistic and needs to be read as such. Consequently, I have tried to place 
his analytic debate of the structure and function of language (CE HI) on a larger map, 
which includes references to the historical events of the fourth century1, and a quite 
1 For a detailed picture, see B. S T U D E R , 'Der Geschichtliche Hintergrund des Ersten Buches Contra 
Eunomium Gregors von Nyssa' in L. F. M A T E O - S E C O & J. L. B A S T E R O (Eds.), El » Contra Eunomium I 
« en la production literaria de Grigorio de Msa(Pamplona, 1988), 139-172 
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detailed account of the theological presuppositions and claims of Gregory's foes: 
Aetius and Eunomius of Cyzicus. 
One of the most distinctive features of the fourth century is probably the 
dramatic search for truth by the theologians, contrasting with the interest in political 
unity, of the emperors2. Although both the theologians and the emperors claimed to be 
Christians, this was not a sufficient incentive to assure simultaneously freedom, unity 
and tolerance within a deeply religious society. Nicaea I (325) did not exhaust all the 
problems raised by Arius and his followers, at the beginning of the same century . The 
condemnation of Arius' teaching, solemnly pronounced by the Emperor Constantine, 
was accepted by most of the bishops, who rejected in fact a theology with no great 
antecedents in the acknowledged doctrines of the Church. Many bishops did regard 
Nicaea as an authoritative ecumenical council4, preferring to draw other lines of 
continuity with the past. It is noteworthy that 'tradition' (paradosis) was not an 
authoritative concept only for the 'orthodox', and the mere recourse to an ambiguous 
past functioned as a foundational argument for both the Nicene and anti-Nicene 
parties5. It is very clear that the establishment of the Creed did not sort out all the 
problems, which needed additional interpretation. On the side of the orthodox, 
Athanasius had to justify formulae like 'homoousios'' and 'ek tes ousias tou patros\ 
Arius' theology of the transcendent God (who remained unknowable even to his Son) 
still fascinated many theologians who regarded the Nicene 'metaphysical' expressions 
as problematic. But the options left by Arius' theology were twofold: some could 
accept the similarity of essence between the Father and the Son (the 'Homoians'), 
while others could exacerbate the ontological gulf between the Father and the Son, 
and make them 'dissimilar' (the 'Anomeans'). 
Arius' supporters were located outside his homeland (Libya, Palestine, Asia 
Minor), while Athanasius' enjoyed great sympathy among the simple Christians of 
Alexandria. Neither the condemnation, nor the deportation of Arius meant the final 
2 T. D. BARNES, 'Emperor and Bishops, AD 324-344: Some Problems', American Journal of Ancient 
History 3 (1978) 53-75; H. CHADWICK, 'The Role of the Christian Bishop in Ancient Society', in 
Heresy and Orthodoxy in the Early Church (Hampshire: Variorum, 1991), ch. III. 
3 ROBERT M. GRANT, 'Religion and Politics at the Council of Nicaea', Journal of Religion 55 (1975) 1-
12 
4 H. CHADWICK, 'The Origin of the Title "Oecumenical Council'", JTS 23 (1972), 132-135; For the 
contemporary understanding of the Orthodox theologians of the authority of the ecumenical synods, see 
BISHOP BASIL (KRIVOCHEINE), 'Authority and Infallibility of the Ecumenical Councils', ECR 7 (1975) 
1,2-8 
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defeat of his heresy. Alius' revival was easily accomplished after a member of the 
orthodox group, Eustathius of Antioch, committed the sin of lese-majeste against the 
Emperor. Already received by Constantine the Great at his court, in 327 Arius was 
vindicated by a local synod of Bithynia at 328, when Athanasius became bishop of 
Alexandria. Arius gained support in Libya, while in November 335 the emperor 
himself sent Athanasius 'for disciplinary reasons' into his first exile (out of five) in 
Gaul, where he wrote Contra Gentes and, probably, De Incarnatione. Eventually, 
sensing the perils of a new schism in the Church (wounded already by the Donatist 
split in North Africa 6), Constantine compelled Arius to declare his agreement with the 
Nicene Creed. Surprisingly, as both Socrates and Sozomen say, Arius did not refuse; 
but Athanasius reports he privately maintained his earlier convictions. As R. Williams 
concluded, 'Arius may have been a genuine repentant; but it sounds as though he was, 
rather, struggling to find a peaceful compromise'7. Yet, Arius died without being in 
communion with the Church, and this very fact determined for a long time the 
perception of his doctrine as the 'archetypal heresy' during the whole fourth century. 
Constantine's attitude towards Arius remained fairly ambiguous, being himself 
baptised by an Arian bishop (Eusebius of Nicomedia) at the hour of his death, on 22 
May 337. It would be reductive to claim that the 'Catholic model' sprang univocally 
from the political agenda of the Emperor, who obviously wanted a unifying religion 
for his people. However, Nicaea was far from bringing a monochrome religious 
identity and in fact Athanasius' victory over Arius was to be short-lived. Yet, it is 
significant that Arius never won great audience in the monastic circles of Egypt, while 
Origen remained, until the end of the fourth century, highly esteemed among both 
cultivated and uncultivated monks. And since monasticism was not yet subjected, in 
the middle of the fourth century, to any great episcopal or imperial pressure, one 
should probably understand the final eviction of Arius' doctrine as something deeper 
than a result of Constantine's merely arbitrary political decision. Arius' doctrine 
remained, at first, an internal matter of the Church, the theological autonomy of which 
was only protected, but not necessarily decided, by the secular institutions of the 
Roman Empire. In 335, Athanasius was deposed at the council of Tyra, while in 336, 
a congregation of pro-Arian bishops gathered at Constantinople and led by Eusebius 
5 See W . A . LOHR, ' A Sense of Tradition: The Homoiousian Church Party', in M . R. BARNES and D . H . 
WILLIAMS (eds.), Arianism after Arius, (Edinburgh : T & T Clark, 1993), 81-100 
6 T. D. BARNES, 'The Beginnings of Donatism', JTS 26 (1975), 13-22 
10 
of Caesarea (the author of Contra Marcellum) condemned his friend, Marcellus of 
Ancyra on the basis of his alleged monarchian doctrine. Marcellus' authority over his 
see in Cappadocia was replaced by Basil of Ancyra, the future leader of the 
'homoiousians' in the late '350s. Constantine I I re-established Athanasius in his rights 
in November 337 at Alexandria. Next summer (338), the patriarch of the Egyptian 
desert visited Athanasius at Alexandria and assured him of the support of the monks 
(including the Pachomian monasteries). Meanwhile, the East still resisted the orthodox 
doctrine and in January 339, an Antiochene synod deposed Athanasius. Anti-Nicene 
uprisings determined Athanasius and Marcellus to flee to Rome, where they found 
support in the person of Julius I , the pope who later invoked the authority of Peter in 
his defence of the Nicene Creed8. 
Forty Years of Uncertainty (341-381) 
In 341 at Antioch, a council presided over by Constantius I I replied to Julius' 
vindication of Marcellus with two credal documents, extremely scriptural in content, 
explicitly refuting Arius so that the Nicene theologian Hilary of Poitiers (who was 
considered sometimes 'the Athanasius of the West') could call Antioch 341 a 
'sanctorum synodus' and used it in the Latin West as an orthodox manifesto. The 
prospects for ecclesiastical unity between the East and the West were encouraging, but 
the personal animosities were probably prevailing against the dogmatic differences. 
The bishops convened at Sardica (Sofia) in 343 did not accept Athanasius especially 
because of his alliance with Marcellus, and their strong attachment to the concept of 
homoousios9. In Sardica, the Westerners bishops (led by the orthodox Ossius of 
Cordoba) showed in their doctrinal statement that their understanding of ousia and 
hypostasis was far from being clarified. 'We have received and been taught, and we 
hold the catholic and apostolic tradition and faith and confession which teach, that the 
Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit have one hypostasis, which is termed "essence" 
(ousia) by the heretics. I f we were asked, "What is the hypostasis of the Son?" we 
confess that it is the same as the sole hypostasis of the Father; the Father has never 
7 R. W I L L I A M S , Arius. Heresy and Tradition (London: S C M Press, 2001 2), 80 
8 C f J . S T E V E N S O N (ed.), Creeds, Councils and Controversies. Documents illustrative of the history of 
the Church A. D. 337-461 (London: S P C K , 1966), 8-9 
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been without the Son, nor the Son without the Father, nor is it possible that what is 
Word is Spirit. ' 1 0 The Arian position was identified with the proclamation of three 
hypostases in God, which is exactly what the orthodox Council of Constantinople I 
(381 AD) did. Obviously, the Latin orthodox theologians could not make a difference 
between 'ousia' and 'hypostasis', which could be both rendered happily through 
substantia^. In 345, the Easterners composed the so-called Ekthesis Macrostichos, 
which was meant to explain in depth to the Western audience the reasons for their 
resistance against both, respectively, the Arian (lato sensu) and the Nicene (stricto 
12 
sensu) theology . 'The Creed of the Long Lines' explicitly condemned the Arian 
phrase 'there was once when he [the Logos] was not', and the possible implications of 
the teaching about the Son's generation 'from nothing'; it also rejected the heresy of 
Tritheism and the adoptive Christology of Paul of Samosata; it threw anathemas also 
against Marcellus' teaching about the ending reign of Christ, against the Patripassians 
(who claimed that in Christ's passion the Father suffered), the Sabellians (the other 
name for the modalists). While rejecting all the inchoative Arian doctrines and many 
other heresies faced by the Catholic Church during the third century, the Ekthesis 
avoided carefully to mention anything about homoousios, replacing it with another 
expression: 'Christ has taken no recent dignity, but - the Eastern bishops said - we 
have believed him to be perfect from the first, and like in all things to the Father.' (§8) 
Despite its most reverential manner of speaking about the Son as 'God before ages', 
unseparated from the Father and whose generation cannot be compared to any 
extrinsic act of creation, and regardless of the open veneration of 'the all-perfect 
Triad', the Ekthesis of the Eastern bishops (led probably by Basil of Ancyra) did not 
touch the ecumenical sense of the Westerners. It was a situation similar to the painful 
experience of separation between the Roman Catholic and the Orthodox Church, over 
to the presence of filioque in the Latin Creed. The explicit subordinationism of the 
Ekthesis did not convince Athanasius about the orthodoxy of the Easterners, though it 
is likely that their sincere search for unity made him cool the relationship with 
Marcellus. In 346, Athanasius returned to Alexandria while Leontius of Antioch, one 
of Alius' pupils, made Aetius deacon. For his part, Aetius envisaged the possibility of 
9 S O C R A T E S , HE I I . 2 0 . 7 - 1 1 
1 0 T H E O D O R E T U S , HE I I . 8. 3 8 - 4 1 
" J . T. LlENHARD, 'Ousia and Hypostasis: The Cappadocian Settlement and the Theology of "One 
Hypostasis'", in S. T. D A V I E S , D. K E N D A L L and G . O ' C O L L I N S (eds.), The Trinity (Oxford: OUP, 
1 9 9 9 ) , 9 9 - 1 2 1 
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raising a more radical movement of opposition against Nicaea I , which could take 
profit from the disagreement between Athanasius of Alexandria and Basil of Ancyra. 
Consequently, Aetius entered into conflict with some of the most faithful supporters 
of Nicaea in Antioch, two ascetics called Flavian and Theodoret, who coined for the 
first time in the East the doxological formula 'Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, 
and to the Holy Spirit' (instead of 'through the Son, in the Holy Spirit '). 1 3 In spite of 
his Arian convictions, Leontius of Antioch tried to calm the imminent theological 
controversy, the dogmatic side of which was initially marked, nota bene, by a 
discussion over the liturgical forms of Trinitarian worship. 
In the late 340's, Aetius very probably met Eunomius in Alexandria, where he 
stayed until 351 1 4 . By the same time, Aetius and Eunomius distinguished themselves 
from the moderate Arians, among whom the most important figures were Basil of 
Ancyra and the great ascetic Eusthatius of Sebaste. Gallus Caesar knew Aetius very 
well and even appointed him to convert the future emperor Julian from paganism to 
Christianity. In 353, the Bishop Serapion of Thmuis visited the Emperor Constantius 
and expressed again the support of the Egyptian monks for Athanasius and the Nicene 
doctrine. They were probably the best entitled to confirm that theosis was the 
immediate and most important of the orthodox doctrines of incarnation. By the late 
340s, Cyril, bishop of Jerusalem, started to defend the Nicene Creed in his famous 
Catechetical Lectures, while in North Africa the Church was torn apart by the 
Donatist controversy. The exuberant poet and ascetic theologian Ephraim1 5 (f373) 
was conspicuously active on behalf of Nicaea in Syria, glorifying in innumerable 
hymns Christ's majestic glory. Though very seldom taken into account by scholars 
who specialise in the Arian controversies16, Ephrem's theology is probably the perfect 
antithesis of the kind of theology promoted by Aetius and Eunomius, which was 
1 2 S O C R A T E S , HE I I . 19.7-28 
1 3 1 follow here T . K O P E C E K , History of Neo-Arianism vol I (Cambridge Mass., 1979), 100; for a brief 
account, see D A V I D R A N K I N , 'Arianism', in P H I L I P E . E S L E R (ed.), The Early Christian World, vol I I 
(Routledge: London and New York, 2000), 975-1004 
1 4 K O P E C E K , History of Neo-Arianism I , 111 
1 5 S. B R O C K , The Luminous Eye (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1992) 
1 6 In a volume of more than eight hundred pages (The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, 
Edinburgh, 1988), R. P. C . Hanson never mentions his name or his contribution to the victory of the 
Nicene Creed. Important reparations were made by P. B R U N S , 'Arius Hellenizans? Ephraem der Syrer 
und die neoarianischen Kontroversen seiner Zeit', ZKG 101 (1990/91), 21-57; also P A U L S. R U S S E L L , 
St Ephrem the Syrian and St Gregory the Theologian Confront the Arians (Kottayam: St Ephrem 
Ecumenical Research Center, 1994). 
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paralleled only by Gregory of Nyssa's Homilies to the Song of the Songs and by 
Gregory of Nazianzus' Theological Orations. 
Between 350-361, Constantius was the sole emperor and searched to find the 
middle ground between the Nicene position and the radicalism of the Anomeans. In 
356, Constantius sacked Alexandria in search for Athanasius, who found his refuge 
within the monastic caves of Upper Egypt. In the wake of the decisions taken at 
Sardica in 343, Ursacius of Singidunum and Valens of Mursa (both from Illyria), 'and 
the rest of their comrades in crime (a splendid lot of Christian bishops!)', as Jerome 
described the friends of Constantius the Emperor17, composed in 357 at Sirmium a 
Creed that starkly refuted any ontological language about God (both homoousion and 
homoiousion), claiming that ' i t is not contained in the divine Scriptures and it is above 
18 
man's understanding.' In 358, at Ancyra, another non-Nicene body of bishops put 
under question the contentions of Aetius, who 'was extremely addicted to contention, 
very bold in his assertions on theological subjects, and prone to have recourse to a 
very subtle mode of argumentation.'19 They persuaded Constantius about the radical 
intention of Eudoxius, Aetius and Eunomius, and the immediate result was the 
condemnation of their 'innovations' on the 22 n d of May, 359 at Sirmium. There, the 
Synod presided over by 'the most religious and gloriously victorious Emperor 
Constantius Augustus', decided that the term 'essence' (pusia) 'gives offence as being 
unknown to the people', and suggests its removal, despite the Nicene formula. The 
Creed of Sirmium 359 concluded that 'the Son is like the Father in all things' 
(recalling the Ekthesis Macrostichos).20 But another council held at Ariminum, 
gathering more than 400 bishops, invalidated the decisions taken at Sirmium, 
supporting Nicaea. Meanwhile, during the winter of 359 at Seleucia21, the Emperor 
along with 180 moderate Arian bishops imposed again the doctrine of similarity 
between the Father and the Son. 
This is precisely the moment when the radical Arians became more visible in 
their theological activity. There are important historical clues22, which suggest that 
Eunomius could have published his First Apology (an attack on the Homoians) in late 
1 7 J E R O M E , Dial. Contra Lucif, 19 (PL 23, 181b) 
1 8 H I L A R Y , De Synodis, I I ; A T H A N A S I U S , De Synodis, 28; S O C R A T E S , HE I I . 30-31-41 
1 9 S O Z O M E N , HE I V . 12. 1-2. 
2 0 A T H A N A S I U S , De Synodis 8; S O C R A T E S , HE I I . 37. 18-24 
2 1 S O Z O M E N , HE I V . 22.6-10 
2 2 L . R . W I C K H A M , 'The Date of Eunomius' Apology of Eunomius: a reconsideration', JTS 20 (1969) 
231-240; K O P E C E K , History vol II , 299-306. 
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359, almost simultaneously with Aetius' Syntagmation, while some indications favour 
another chronology, which dates it two years later23. What is sure is that, in January 
360, the second session of a council started at Seleucia in late 359 took place at 
Constantinople. It is very likely, though not for sure, that Eunomius and Basil (both 
deacons at that time) met there tete-a-tete for the first time. The radical neo-Arians 
were not entirely successful, and the minority faithful to Athanasius desperately 
needed to join forces with the moderate wing of the Arians. The latter shored up the 
idea of similarity of essence between the Father and the Son, and were led by Basil of 
Ancyra and Eustathius of Sebasta (friend, for a while, of Basil of Caesarea24). In 361, 
Julian the Apostate took power and censored any public debate on theological matters, 
setting up in fact some favourable circumstances for the adversaries of Nicaea. From 
that year, Aetius (former instructor in religion of Gallus, half-brother of Julian the 
25 
Emperor ) was no longer persona grata, and there are hints that he was anointed 
bishop somewhere in Libya 2 6 . Sozomen27 also tells us about a council held around 
time in Antioch, having an explicit Anomean agenda. After a short pro-Nicene 
intermezzo (under Jovian, 363-364), political support for the Neo-Arians (now with 
preference for the Homoians) was strongly given by Valens (364-378), the Emperor of 
the Eastern Roman Empire. From Valens' stiff opposition to the Nicene Creed, many 
orthodox Christians suffered exile, while the activity of the neo-Arians flourished. 
Between 360-70, Eudoxius, an associate of Aetius and Eunomius, ruled over the 
Archbishopric of Constantinople (already the most influential see in the Middle East), 
eliciting the venom of the Orthodox writers. For them, this was 'a time out of joint', in 
which - as St Jerome put it - the whole world 'groaned to find itself Arian' 2 8 . Though 
it is true that under Valens' administration, both Eunomius and Gregory spent a long 
time in exile, and were therefore unable to engage one another in theological polemic. 
V A G G I O N E , Eunomius of Cyzicus, 302: '[the first Apology] was probably worked up into publishable 
form during the summer of 361' 
2 4 At least one side of the history of their relationship is documented in Basil's letters [Ep. 79, 119, 125, 
244 and 263); more on this, see M. SlMONETTl, La crisi ariana, 411-418 
2 5 P H I L O S T O R G I U S HE V I . 7; S O Z O M E N HE V . 5. 9 
2 6 H A N S O N , Doctrine of God, 602 
2 7 S O Z O M E N , HE I V . 29.1-4 
2 8 J E R O M E , Dial. Contra Lucif, 19. P L 23, 181b 
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The Emergence of the Cappadocians 
Gregory started his literary career in the early '370s, probably before his wife 
was dead , and by the same time, he was made bishop. Gregory's favourite topic was 
ascetic theology, of which a paramount example is his disquisition On Virginity. Later 
on, Gregory composed other homiletic and exegetic works (like De oratione 
dominica, In inscriptiones Psalmorum, Orationes de beatitudinibus). He probably 
began his dogmatic composition Contra Eunomium in 381, finishing the last book in 
383 3 0. The most famous and long-lasting of all Gregory's books were written after 
379, i f one counts Vita Macrinae, De Vita Moysis and also Orationes in Canticum 
Canticorum. Only the ascension of Theodosius (379) as new emperor of the Oriens 
gave the promise of success to the ecclesiastical representatives of the Nicene party, 
among whom the best theologians were Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzus. 
Peter Brown has concisely described these political circumstances in the Eastern 
Roman Empire: 'From Theodosius I onwards, pagans and heretics were increasingly 
deprived of civic rights and forced to conform the Catholic Church. The sense of an 
otherworldly mission affected the Roman state. The Christian emperor, too, would 
have to answer to Christ for the souls of his subjects'31. 
In 381, at least theoretically, the heresy of Aetius and his followers was 
officially rejected by the majority of the Church bishops gathered at the Emperor's 
call, and who, in the first synodal canon, repudiated all the heretics by name: 'the 
Eunomians, the Anomeans, the Arians or the Eudoxians, the Semi-Arians or the 
Pneumatomachi, the Sabellians, the Marcellians, the Photinians or the 
Apollinarians' . Practically, as we are told by the Byzantine historians Sozomen 
and Socrates34, Eunomius' defence was not complete. Large areas of Asia Minor were 
still influenced by his teaching. Because of the civil disturbances caused by the 
longest religious 'war' (Orthodoxy versus Arianism) of the fourth century, Theodosius 
J . D A N I E L O U , 'Le mariage de Gregoire de Nysse et la chronologie de sa vie', REA 2 (1956), 71-78 
3 0 1 follow here M . C A N E V E T ' S dating from Gregoire de Nysse et I'hertneneutique biblique. Etude des 
rapports entre le langage et la connaissance de Dieu (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1983), 10 
3 1 P E T E R B R O W N , The World of Late Antiquity (London: Thames and Hudson Ltd., 1971), 108 
3 2 Canon 1 in N O R M A N P. T A N N E R SJ (ed.), Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, vol. 1 (Sheed&Ward: 
Georgetown University Press, 1990), 31 
3 3 HE V I , 29 
3*HEV, 10 
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the Great thought of different conciliatory stratagems, finally to establish Orthodoxy 
by consent and not by means of coercion35. The Emperor received in the late days of 
383 a new doctrinal exposition (ekthesis tes pisteos) of Eunomius36, a fact that 
triggered Gregory's prompt reaction. It might well have happened that Gregory 
attended in person Eunomius' address at the 'conference of the heresiarchs', which 
Theodosius set up in June 383 at Constantinople. In front of the assembly severely 
supervised by Nectarios, the Archbishop of Constantinople, Eunomius presented a 
compendium of his teaching divided into four short parts, and framed by an 
introduction and a conclusion. As R. P. Vaggione characterised it, Eunomius' work 
'is chiefly notable for what it does not say'37, suiting at best his missionary activities. 
But since omitting is by far more blameworthy than committing, Gregory had every 
reason to worry about the propagandists potential of Eunomius' ekthesis, and decided 
to cross swords with him again. Thus, he wrote a short treatise named in W. Jaeger's 
edition Refutatio Confessionis Eunomii, which in the collection of J. P. Migne (PG 44) 
has been published as the second among the twelve books Contra Eunomium3*. 
Probably three or four seasons before writing his Refutatio (winter 383-384), St 
Gregory composed his 'Answer to Eunomius' Second Book' (identified as CE LI in 
Jaeger's edition). There are clear indications that Gregory composed this theological 
masterpiece in the wake of the second council of Constantinople, when he was 
relatively old 3 9 , and enjoyed a good reputation at the imperial court4 0. CE LTJ, which 
obviously grapples with Eunomius' Apologia Apologiae (written, respectively, in 
378/9 and 382/3), represents the major source of documentation for Gregory's 
doctrine of the 'divine names'. Once again, it is noteworthy that Gregory felt obliged 
to refute systematically Eunomius' works written immediately after the death of St 
Basil of Caesarea (f379). It is very important to keep in mind the fact that the first 
clash between the Nicene orthodoxy and the radical Arian doctrine of God becomes 
Retaliations against the heretics will be taken late in 390. 
3 6 For a detailed presentation of the historical context of the emergence of Eunomius' last writing, see 
V A G G I O N E (1987), 131 sq 
3 7 V A G G I O N E (1987), 133 
3 8 The only existing English translation of CE follows this division. Thus, Gregory's Refutatio, 
published under the title 'Book I F , can be found in NPNF V , pp. 101-134. Details about the tradition of 
the manuscripts of Contra Eunomium can be found in Jaeger's presentation (finely synthesised by R. 
Vaggione in his introduction to Eunomius' Expositio Fidei, op. c i t , 138-140). 
3 9 N P N F V , 311b (GNO I. 403. 6-7). 
4 0 G . M A Y , 'Die Chronologie des Lebens und der Werke des Gregor von Nyssa', 63; also G . M A Y , 
'Gregor von Nyssa in der Kirchenpolitik seiner Zeit', Jahrbuch der bsterreischischen byzantinischen 
Gesellschaft 15 (1966), 105-132 
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public in St Basil's answer to Eunomius' first Apologia. St Basil wrote his rejection of 
Eunomius' ideas sometime between 363/4, 'during his years of monastic solitude at 
Annesoi' 4 1). In his first Liber Apologeticus (359), 'the logic-chopper' (ho 
technologos) in the neo-Arian party (synagoge), bishop of Cyzicus for approximately 
two years (360/2-64), had made some extremist theological assertions, to which even 
Arius probably never hoped to bear witness42. Following his mentor Aetius, Eunomius 
made the central claim that 'ungeneracy' is the proper name of God which gives us 
ful l knowledge of God's essence, and that such appellation 'is based neither on 
invention, nor on privation (mete kat' epinoian mete kata steresin)'43. In CE I , 
Gregory of Nyssa works out the presuppositions of his Trinitarian theology with an 
elaborate epistemology, and a correlative theory of language. Gregory only refreshes 
the questions already tackled by St Basil in his two-fold treatise Adversus Eunomium, 
bringing forth new arguments and dealing at length, especially in his third book, with 
the problem of theological language and knowledge. But i f the genealogy of 
Gregory's ideas can be, at least in part, traced back to Basil, the much-loathed 
Eunomius has to be understood in close connection with his not less notorious teacher 
from Antioch, Aetius. 
Aetius' Legacy 
Most of the contemporary testimonies, save for Philostorgius' biased 
ecclesiastical history, portrayed Aetius as an important but very controversial figure of 
the Church of Antioch. There is a major consensus among Sozomen and Socrates 
Scholasticus, confirmed by Gregory of Nyssa and Theodoret of Mopseustia, who used 
in their depiction of Aetius a rich palette of colours. Born some time at the beginning 
of the fourth century, Aetius came from a plebeian background and had to struggle 
with the social barriers of his time. Having an unmitigated careerist agenda, Aetius 
became very early the protege of a long row of more or less Arian bishops: Paulinus, 
Eusebius of Caesarea, Leontius of Antioch, Eustathius of Sebaste and, in the event, 
Eudoxius of Constantinople. His ambition was paralleled by his intelligence, which 
4 1 V A G G I O N E ( 1 9 8 7 ) , 5 
4 2 On Arius' posterity among the so-called neo-Arians circles, see M . W I L E S , 'Attitudes to Arius in the 
Arian Controversy', in M . R . B A R N E S and D . H . W I L L I A M S (eds.), Arianism after Arius, (Edinburgh : T 
& T Clark, 1 9 9 3 ) , 3 1 - 4 4 
4 3 A 8, 14 
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was naturally inclined towards 'logical studies (epi tas logikas matheseis)' By 
coincidence or not, Aetius developed the same organic empathy towards Arius' 
theological ideas, as for the syllogistic exercises, in which he started training himself 
as a very young student. Looking ahead for success and reputation, Aetius found early 
in his life that theological innovations could bring him an easy notoriety. Therefore, 
he engaged in public disputations, through which he could impress some landlords in 
search of cheap pedagogues. In Kopecek's own words, 'he tended throughout his life 
to be both enthusiastically aggressive and outspoken.'45 In the early 330s, he learned 
theology from Leontius of Antioch, a priest who followed very faithfully the canon 
established by the famous Lucian, the biblical exegete. Afterwards, Aetius went to 
Alexandria, where he enriched his knowledge of practical arts by studying medicine, 
logic, and rhetoric. Having all these credentials, it is no wonder that Aetius fulfilled 
Eunomius' gullible search for mastership over his own ideas. Apart from his secular 
skills, like Arius himself, Aetius claimed to have inherited spiritual authority from the 
sacred tradition of the saints (alluding to the martyric death of Lucian 4 6). Yet, as 
Sozomen assures us, 'many gave him the name of "atheist."'47 
By the early 350s, Aetius had already made himself acquainted Athanasius' 
report in De Decretis, which emphasised the immovability of the Nicene formulae. He 
maintained that neither 'homoousios' nor 'ingenerate' were scriptural, and that the 
sonship of Christ (confessed by the Gospel) can only be expressed but in two ways: 
either natural, or adoptive. Any third option was inconsistent, since 'similarity' 
(preferred by Basil of Ancyra et alii) between two terms can be established only 
within a class of congeneric elements. Only the natural sonship of Christ preserved his 
scriptural designation as 'icon of the invisible God' (Colossians 1: 15), or 'Word of 
God' (John 1: 1). Th. Kopecek considers that there is much evidence which 'suggests 
that Aetius reacted to Athanasius' championing of homoousios ca. AD 350 by putting 
in response the formula "unlikeness."'48 In short, by the late 350's, Aetius started 
professing his 'Heterousian gospel'4 9 (to heterousion kerygma) on the basis of a 
monotheist model with clear precedent in the Arian theology. For Aetius, God could 
only be one, self-sufficient entity, while within the Deity no process of generation was 
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imaginable. He claimed that 'the ingenerate is his own essence (autoousia)' . Yet, 
Aetius differed from Arius by maintaining between the Father and the Son not only an 
ontological gulf, but also a gnoseological difference. Following the philosophical 
principle (which, somehow, recapitulates the structure of the Cartesian 'ontological 
argument'), which says that any active cause is greater in being than the passively 
caused product51, Aetius refused to the Son any equality with the Father. To Christ is 
acknowledged just a moral perfection, since he 'preserves the pure wi l l of God' 5 2 . It is 
interesting to see how, claiming that only the ingenerate is God, Aetius had to 
conclude, that the Son of Mary was certainly not dual-willed.' 5 3 In the f if th sentence 
of the Syntagmation (which originally included 300 statements, out of which only 47 
were preserved), Aetius explicitly says that 'his nature must be one (mid)', and so 
must his human wil l . Holding to the hard line of Jewish monotheism, Aetius 
consequently supported Christological monothelism, which was three centuries later 
was condemned by the Church at the Council of Constantinople (680). 
As a consequence of his ineffective soteriology and adoptive Christology, 
Aetius also held particular ideas about the scriptural language about God. The sonship 
of Christ being adoptive, the relationship Father/Son was understood in terms of a 
providential act of carefulness, which God shows in the economy of creation. Among 
Christ's titles, no one could discern, in Aetius' eyes, any relationship of 
consubstantiality. In a memorandum issued by Basil of Ancyra in order to defend the 
scriptural language Father/Son (against any substitution with abstract terms), many of 
the statements made by the radical Arians are recorded verbatim. We learn that they 
were happy with the doctrine of likeness i f it was to bear this emendation: 'not in 
essence, but in the relation of wi l l (ou kata ten ousian, alia kata ton tes theleseos 
logon).''54 The radical Arians, headed by Aetius and Eudoxius, were also against the 
ascription of 'infinity' to the Son, and claimed that 'the name "Father" is not 
revelatory of essence (ousia), but of power (exousia), which made the Son to exist as a 
hypostasis before the ages as God the Word {hypostases ton hyon pro aionon theon 
logon).55 The argument was that: ' I f they [ie the Orthodox] wish that "Father" be 
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revelatory of essence (pusias), but not of power (exousias), let them address also the 
hypostasis of the Uniquely-Generated by the name Father.'56 In short, Aetius refused 
to understand that the Father and the Son could have the same essence, while they 
bear different and not interchangeable names. There is an obvious inconsistency in 
saying that one name (ie: 'ingenerate') defines essence, while the rest of the others (ie: 
Father, Son) express relations of activity or passivity (to beget, to be begotten). This 
criticism becomes even more acute when one considers that 'ingenerate' (agennetos) 
is not a scriptural name for God, as it is the case with the names of Father and Son. 
But, as has been already noted5 7, Aetius, despite his claims5 8, had little concern to 
ground his theological doctrine on a scriptural basis, while he preferred to set in 
motion ideas more close to the Aristotelian canon of thinking. Aetius' metaphysical 
model was regarded as mandatory by his direct disciple Eunomius. In order to 
understand the roots of his conflict with the Cappadocian Fathers, a closer look at 
Eunomius' biography and ideas is essential. 
Eunomius of Cyzicus 
Eunomius is well known as the bete noire of the neo-Arian movement, against 
whom more famous authors - from Basil the Great to Theodore of Mopsuestia - wrote 
long polemical treatises. R. P. Vaggione is the author of Eunomius' most detailed 
picture, which in fact is based on much of the sympathetic account given by 
Philostorgius' in Historia Ecclesiastica. From Vaggione's monograph, we learn that 
he was born 'toward the middle of the second decade of the fourth century'5 9 in the 
north-west region of the province of Cappadocia. Born into a family of modest 
condition (unjustly patronized in the prose of his enemies), Eunomius, who enjoyed a 
Christian background, served as a pedagogue at a quite young age. By the early '340s, 
it is very likely that Eunomius looked for a better education in the new city of 
Constantine the Great. There, Eunomius might have got to know about the passionate 
theological disputes over the nature of Christ, which after the death of the emperor 
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had been suddenly refreshed. In the capital of the Empire, the results of Nicaea were 
largely contested. In terms of private matters, Eunomius' stay on the Bosphoros was 
not very successful, so that by 346 he was in Antioch. Having a population of almost 
200 000, this polls of Asia Minor could compete fairly well by that time with the 
imperial cities of Rome, Alexandria, and Constantinople. Antioch could provide the 
best opportunities for students willing to pursue a course in rhetoric, the prestige of 
which was still undisputed among philosophers and theologians alike. There, 
Eunomius found first Aetius. Eunomius' fate was determined by this decisive 
encounter with Aetius, whose disciple he remained up to the end of his life. 
By the late 340s, Eunomius encountered the Alexandrine theological milieu, 
from which both the presbyter Arius and the bishop Athanasius emerged as major 
opponents, much earlier. Eunomius became a more important figure in the late 350s. 
In the eyes of Contantius, who died by 361, Eunomius and Aetius were two 
undesirable troublemakers who obstructed the emergence of the moderate Arian 
compromise. On the feast of Epiphany January 6 by 361, Eunomius scandalised his 
congregation from Cyzicus, when he mentioned that Theotokos had borne children to 
Joseph after Christ's nativity. Since told by Philostorgius60 (ally of Eunomius' 
doctrine), this story satisfies all the criteria of credibility. By maintaining this position, 
Eunomius confirms that, in general, the understanding of Christ's incarnation dictates 
the formulation of the dogma of Trinity. Carefully analysing this episode, one can 
catch a glimpse of Eunomius' concept of holiness, in contrast with the defenders of 
Nicaea61 (who ultimately invoked deification as the last consequence of Christ's 
incarnation62). For Gregory, the narrative of Christ included as a natural stage the 
moment of virginal birth 6 3 , whereas Eunomius was ready to acknowledge it only as a 
miraculous event64, which after Jesus' birth ceased. This story shows Eunomius very 
prone to doubt, having a sectarian reading of the Scriptures, trying to find rationalistic 
explanation for crucial elements of the revelation. 
The leaders of the Anomeans suffered exile for more than a year, and only the 
reign of Julian the Apostate brought them back onto the ecclesiastical scene. It took 
very little for Aetius and Eunomius to recover from the disgrace suffered under 
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Constantius: the first one became bishop without see somewhere in Libya, while the 
latter was appointed bishop of Cyzicus. Vaggione tells us that their teaching did not 
satisfy the interests of some prestigious Arian leaders in the West (e.g.: Wulfila), who 
were spreading the Gospel without paying too much attention to Eunomius' celebrated 
akribeia. (Vaggione pointed out that one of the constant leit-motifs in Eunomius' 
writings is 'precision' (akribeia), which means not only doctrinal correctness, but also 
fidelity towards what, allegedly, the former teachers of the Church believed). After the 
death of Julian (361-363), Jovian (363-364) took power. A defender of Nicaea, he did 
not pursue any violent policy adversus haereses. His successor Valens railed, for not 
less than fourteen years (364-378), against Nicaea. But political intrigues and the lack 
of support of the Homoians (Basil of Ancyra and Eusthatius), brought Eunomius again 
into trouble. Though exiled in Naxos, he managed to write his second Apologia, in a 
comprehensive refutation of Basil's treatise contra Eunomium. The accession of the 
Spanish officer Theodosius to the imperial throne ensured that Eunomius' days were 
numbered. Theodosius' reign records a theological offensive against neo-Arianism, 
conducted in first instance by Gregory of Nyssa (Basil's youngest brother) and 
Gregory of Nazianzus ('the Theologian'). After the decisions taken at Constantinople 
in 381 confirming the documents of Nicaea, little hope remained for Eunomius. The 
seventh canon of this second ecumenical council required a new baptism of every 
member of the Eunomian community who wanted to be reconciled with the Catholic 
Church. This was an extremely severe measure which, interestingly enough, did not 
apply to the genuine Arians (admitted to the Church provided that they had accepted 
the orthodox Creed). 
In June 383, Eunomius was given the last chance to be admitted to 'the great 
Church'. The Emperor, who used to 'speak loudly and carry a big stick' 6 5, wanted a 
peaceful extinction of all the ecclesiastical and civil clamours around Nicaea's creed. 
Though dressed in finical biblical language, omitting completely agennetos, 
Eunomius' Expositio Fidei did not convince the Emperor. It seemed that Eunomius' 
fate was 'neither to die a martyr like Lucian, nor receive burial like Arius ' 6 6 . He could 
not even die like a Roman poet (ie: Ovid) in the remote province of Scythia Minor. 
Vaggione inspiringly tells us the story: 'during the summer of 389 Eunomius was 
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arrested at Chalcedon and exiled at Halmyris, an appropriately named fortress on the 
salt-flats of Danube delta. Unfortunately (or perhaps fortunately), before Eunomius 
could actually arrive the river froze and the barbarians crossed over and captured the 
fort ' 6 7 . In the spring of the next year, Eunomius was sent to Caesarea in Asia Minor, 
and in the meantime, the implacable process of the extinction of all the non-Nicene 
ecclesiastical factions started. In 396, consumed with rage over his bitter past, 
Eunomius died like an old 'troglodyte', hoping probably only for heavenly 
consolations. 
Eunomius' Double Apologies 
According to Th. Kopecek's arguments, Eunomius' First Apology was 
probably delivered in public at Constantinople (359), when the moderate Arians 
('homoians') met the radical wing of the 'Anomeans'. The first Apologia sets out the 
whole premise of Eunomius' thinking, displaying his passionate conviction that by his 
arguments, he only 'honours the teaching of our Saviour Jesus Christ' 6 8, kept in the 
'governing tradition of the fathers'. In not more than three sentences, Eunomius made 
known the tenets of his faith, which, though different from what Nicaea had 
established in 325, looked, at least at the first glance, very biblical and unproblematic. 
Speaking on behalf of his community, Eunomius said: 
We believe in one God, Father almighty, from whom are all things 
{ex ou ta panta) 
And in one only-begotten (eis hena monogene) Son of God, God 
the Word (theon logon), our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all 
things (di' ou ta panta) 
And in one Holy Spirit, the Counsellor (ton parakleton), in whom 
is given to each of the saints an apportionment of every grace according to 
measure for the common good 6 9 
Yet, the real meaning of this confession of faith comes in the subsequent lines, 
where Eunomius explained his understanding of such expressions as 'all things', or 
'the Only-begotten'. Apparently, in Eunomius' phrase, the 'fatherhood' ascribed to 
6 7 V A G G I O N E , Eunomius of Cyzicus, 3 5 6 
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the one God is the generic attribute of his providence over the creation. Yet, Eunomius 
disclosed his thinking when he said: 
Anything which can be said to come into existence by the action of 
another (hyph' heterou) - granted that this is in fact the case - has itself to 
be placed among created beings, and must properly be ranked among 
things which have come into existence by the action of God 7 0 
For him, the criterion for this analytic judgement is 'the innate knowledge' 
(kata te physiken ennoian). I f the Scriptures speak about Christ being begotten, this 
process is to be understood, in Eunomius' eyes, just as another way of bringing 
something (i.e.: the Logos) into being. It is not the only place where Eunomius' makes 
of 'being' or 'existence' the ultimate category of thought. He could not possibly 
imagine in God any activity that prevails over the concept existence, as was the case 
with, respectively, the Only-begotten Son, and the Holy Spirit who proceeded from 
the Father. On the contrary, for the Nicene theologians, 'to be' was not the last 
attribute for God. The Son could be born and yet, not brought into being from (real or 
notional) non-existence; the Holy Spirit could be proceeded, and yet, not brought into 
life from (real or notional) nothingness. For Eunomius, since the Son is begotten, he 
must had been non-existent once upon a time 7 1. God himself can only be 'the 
unbegotten essence' (pusia agennetos), an appellation by which he thinks he 
acknowledges God as 'the one who is' (ten tou einai ho estin homologiari)?2 Very 
obviously, Eunomius changes here the tonality and talks about the Trinity not as about 
the awe-inspiring and great mystery of the Christian faith, but of a sequential Triad, 
which he described dialectically, rather than prayerfully. Eunomius wants to bring 
Trinity into the realm of evidence, and his best image of God is that of a supreme 
Monad. In fact, Eunomius does not speak at all, in any of his writings, about the Holy 
Trinity, while suggesting that the assessment of consubstantiality cannot avoid the 
heresy of Sabellius and Marcellus of Ancyra, who 'have been excluded from the 
priestly assemblies, fellowship of the sacraments (koindnias mysterion).''13 (No reader 
should be mislead by this statement, since, by the early 350s, the Anomeans 
themselves cut off any liturgical relationship with the Nicene communities. Aetius and 
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Eunomius shared the same situation with the Sabellians and the followers of 
Marcellus.) 
Eunomius' major problem was with the appellation of God as Father, which 
was justified by Jesus' own teaching about prayer. To accept fatherhood as a natural 
attribute of God meant for Eunomius that God was somehow involved in 'the passion 
of a communication of essence (to tes metousias pathos epi theou dia ten tou patros 
prosegoriany74. Therefore, he could explain the generation of the Son only as an act 
of creation, which from the philosophical viewpoint remained problematic. In his CE 
I , Gregory repeatedly reproached Eunomius for having introduced a double causality 
in God, as was suggested by loose expressions such as: 'he [the Only-Begotten] alone 
was begotten and created [gennetheis kai ktistheis] by the power of the Unbegotten 
[monos gar te tou agennetou dunamei].'' 7 5 Gregory claimed that, instead of 
simplifying the scheme, Eunomius made it more complicated, introducing between 
God and the Only-Begotten another mediating structure, namely 'the divine power'; 
after God begot his Son, Eunomius presumes that the Son is charged with second-
hand demiurgic responsibilities, like that of creating the angels76. Yet, he remains 
'offspring' (gennema) and 'thing made' (poiema), essentially different from God. 
As we have seen, Eunomius introduces already in the first Apologia some 
stark statements about the nature of language. In paragraph 18, we learn that 'since the 
names are different, the essences are different as well [parellagmenon ton onomaton 
77 
parellagmenas homologein kai tas ousias]' . In other words, 'the designations in fact 
indicate the very essences [einai ton ousion semantikas tasprosegorias].,n Eunomius 
had to answer the problem raised by the indiscriminate scriptural usage of words like 
' l ife ' , 'power', or 'light' about God and the Only-Begotten, respectively. His answer 
is that there is a specific light to God the Father, distinct from the one the Son reveals. 
It is obvious that Eunomius thinks the begetting of the Son in analogy with the other 
demiurgic actions, about which he says that they are 'neither without beginning (ouk 
anarchon), nor without ending (out' ateleuteton).''19 An 'eternal begetting' of the Son 
is beyond Eunomius' power of comprehension. He prefers, therefore, to compare the 
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begetting to the process of mirroring . Christ is the 'image of the invisible God' 
(Colossians 15: 15), a definition which, read in Platonic terms, could very easily imply 
an ontological degradation. In short, for Eunomius, the name Father designates the 
activity of God, which has a beginning and an end, while 'agennetos' designates what 
God is in se. 
Eunomius' first Apology was thoroughly refuted by Gregory of Nyssa in his 
CE I . In this book Gregory introduces for the first time his famous argument about the 
Son's eternal generation by reference to the divine infinity. Gregory had to defend 
what could be called the asymmetrical relationship between the Father and the Son 
and the Holy Spirit, respectively. He had to show that this asymmetry of relation does 
not entail any form of subordinationism or emanationism. In the wake of Basil the 
Great, Gregory undertook the difficult task of speaking about the fellowship or the 
Q 1 
community of substance {to koinon tes ousias) within the Holy Trinity and, in the 
meantime, of dismissing any intellectual enquiry into the nature of God. How this 
affected the use of the scriptural language became clearer only in CE HI. 
In his second Apologia, Eunomius reiterated Aetius's general opinions about 
God, in particular the idea that the divine essence is encapsulated by the concept of 
'ungeneracy'. This statement was the laughing stock of Gregory's third book CE m , 
and the object of an impressive philosophical deconstruction, framed by stark 
theological references to the Scriptures and tradition (the latter being for Gregory 
paradigmatically incarnated in the person of Basil). At the very beginning of CE HI, 
Gregory identifies the conundrum: 'Our opponents [scii: Aetius and Eunomius], with 
an eye to the evil object, that of establishing their denial of the Godhead of the Only-
begotten, do not say that the essence of the Father is ingenerate, but, conversely, they 
declare ungeneracy to be his essence, in order that by this distinction in regard to 
generation, they may establish, by the verbal opposition, a diversity of natures.'82 In 
other words, Eunomius tried to find an attribute of the Father which, eo ipso, could not 
be assigned to the Son. This was, of course, ungeneracy, which for Eunomius, as well 
as for Gregory, meant 'without origin'. I f Gregory - along with the previous Church 
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Fathers - had no problems in admitting it as one of the names ascribable to the 
Father, he objects to Eunomius' readiness to transform this qualification into the only 
legitimate one, on behalf of God. One has to admit that Gregory's claim was not 
easily understandable: for him, as for Basil, God could be called 'agennetos' but his 
essence should not be identified with 'ungenneracy' since the Son - 'gennetos' per se 
- was homoousios with the 'ingenerate Deity'. The only possibility of understanding 
this dogmatic statement was through what S. Kierkegaard would have called 'the 
jump into paradox'. But why, among divine names, should 'ungeneracy' have priority 
over other attributes like 'simplicity', 'infinitude', 'righteousness', etc.? On the one 
hand, Eunomius seems to specify an essential attribute that could unfold all the other 
attributes of God. What Gregory is concerned about is that Eunomius professes 
'ungeneracy' as the divine attribute, precisely because it cannot be ascribed to the 
Son. As one can easily see, Eunomius' trick was not to plainly reject Christ's divinity 
on the basis of scriptural evidence - an impossible task since Scriptures are always to 
be interpreted - but to do it from a different angle. Pretending to proceed 
methodically, starting from a low level of philosophical reflection, in fact Eunomius 
excluded ab initio from his deductive scheme the full participation of the Son in God's 
essence. 
A Search not for Doctrine, but for Truth 
The above-sketched overview shows the quite discouraging complexity of the 
theological controversies of the fourth century in which Gregory of Nyssa took part. 
Even the little information provided shows that, pace A. von Harnack, it is no more 
possible to regard the Nicene Creed as an expression of Hellenistic culture triumphing 
over the Jewish scriptural heritage. This thesis can be easily contradicted i f one thinks 
how deeply Hellenised was the philosophical culture of Aetius and Eunomius, and 
how, on the side of the Nicaea, the non-philosophical, poetic theology of Ephrem the 
Syrian could defend the orthodox Creed. It would probably be insufficient to say, as 
R. Williams does , that 'orthodoxy' was made possible only by the Emperor 
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Constantine's decision to put the ecclesiastical disputes on his political agenda. One 
can hardly imagine any circumstance in which Church representatives could avoid 
dealing with the subjective idiosyncrasies of one or another Caesar, Christian or not. 
One of the consequences of the Incarnation is that separation from the political realm 
is not possible for a Christian Church which professes 'orthodoxy' and 'catholicity'. 
Even less convincing is the argument of F. Young who claims that 'orthodoxy entails 
O f 
violence' . To say that is a way of deploring the idea of truth, which is by definition 
correlated with the notion of error. It is also incorrect, since the history of Christianity 
provides examples of tolerant and orthodox emperors (like Jovian), as well as non-
orthodox (Julian the Apostate). Within the social sphere, the Christian idea of 
'orthodoxy' no more entails violence anymore than the political idea of 'monarchy' in 
the contemporary world. 
Before even thinking of establishing a doctrine of God, Gregory and Eunomius 
were searching for truth. They thought that theological ideas could therefore be either 
right or wrong. But the postmodernist allergy against concepts as 'truth' and 'error' 
make us very often unable to understand appropriately the passionate struggle of the 
ancients to defend their position: though hard enemies, Gregory of Nyssa and 
Eunomius of Cyzicus shared the same vision about the compulsive need to know the 
truth. It is hard to understand the patronising attitude of some contemporary scholars 
who believe that this search for truth entails violence, as i f the Church was not born 
through Christ's crucifixion. It is even less comprehensible how one can envisage the 
achievement of orthodoxy as the irrational or, at best, the hazardous result of an 
indefinite number of causalities. Since Nietzsche wrote his (false) genealogy of 
morals, far too many theologians refuse to acknowledge the existence of facts, and not 
only of interpretations. The conviction that we know more than the actors in the 
events of the fourth century, makes possible the presentation of the 'development of 
Christian doctrine' in terms of intellectual emancipation. It is quite perplexing to see 
the confidence of so many contemporary scholars who depict the fourth century 
controversies as a mere fruit of mutual misunderstanding. 
R. P. Vaggione, for example, is sympathetic to Eunomius just because he was 
the loser, and this very fact prevents him from questioning the value of his theology. 
Vaggione found the sustained activities of the heretics to be afelix culpa, since they 
8 5 F . Y O U N G , The Making of the Creeds (London: S C M , 2002) , 15: 'the "idea" of orthodoxy cannot but 
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stimulated the creativity of the orthodox theologians. This means forcing an answer to 
the question of theodicy, which goes far beyond the competence of modern Patristic 
scholarship. To spell out the Arian controversies as a fruit of reciprocal 
misapprehension is to suggest that historical distance and theological neutrality allows 
us to understand better the true rationales of their disputes. Yet, distance is not only 
the condition of visibility, but also a test for myopia. Vaggione also tried to explain 
the success of the Nicene Creed by emphasising two elements. First, was the relative 
flexibility of language practised by Athanasius and his followers (contrary to 
Eunomius' obsession with akribeia), and second, the capacity of the Nicene 
theologians to capture the imagination of simple people. Sociologically, both points 
are valid, but they still need a deeper analysis of the conditions of possibility for the 
Nicene success. Let us weigh up what stands behind Vaggione's insightful remarks. 
The first clue referring to the idiomatic flexibility is best seen in the 
transformation of the concepts of ousia and hypostasis from Athanasius' writing into 
the Cappadocian theology. The instatement of homoousios at Nicaea as the watchword 
of orthodoxy lacked the appropriate hermeneutic package, which could deter any 
suspicion of modalism in Athanasius' Trinitarian theology. In other words, the context 
of the emergence for homoousios was not identical with the context of its final 
justification. The long and necessary period between 325-350 AD unfolded and 
articulated the potential typologies of the non-orthodox Trinitarian theology. In the 
350s, the moderate Arians (Homoians) showed interest in the theology of Nicaea and 
the Emperor blustered against Aetius and Eunomius, who were even more innovative 
in their language and conceptions. In between 361-378, 'the Nicenes seized the 
initiative by distinguishing between ousia and hypostasis,,86 while the Anomeans 
adopted a more defensive position. When Theodosius the Great (who, unlike 
Constantine, was baptised by an orthodox bishop, Ascholius) took power, the church 
of Eunomius could be regarded only as a sectarian movement, which had to be 
disciplined in the interests of peace within the Empire. Vaggione's second point could 
make even clearer the already emphasised efficacy of rhetoric (masterly handled by 
the Cappadocian Fathers) against dialectics (stubbornly wasted in the writings of 
Aetius and Eunomius). Still, the methodologies of persuasion used by the fourth 
century competitors cannot be separated from the substance of their argument and, 
breed intolerance' 
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moreover, from the question of authority. Whence did the Nicene theologians gain the 
immensely influential power of their discourse? To say 'from the Scriptures' would be 
simply too easy, though it is obvious that Basil and Gregory were better versed in the 
Scriptures, and were therefore better placed to talk about their letter and Spirit. In 
principle, but not always in exegetical practice, Eunomius and the Nicene theologians 
shared the same belief in the unity of the Scriptures (the Old and the New Testament) 
so that, in this respect, 'their problem was neither canonical, nor textual' 8 7. It is very 
likely that, at Antioch, Aetius initiated Eunomius into the study of the Scriptures, 
though he never showed the same comprehensive knowledge of it as the Cappadocian 
Fathers. Eunomius genuinely willed to buttress his theological and philosophical 
statements with biblical references. However, his interpretation of some key passages 
regarding the divine Logos in relationship to God was substantially different from that 
of the Nicene theologians. Lack of congruence in biblical hermeneutics reflected ( i f 
did not derive from) huge disagreements on other theological or philosophical issues. 
Yet, I think it would be wrong to believe that, i f Aetius and Eunomius too had 
a more elastic language, and used more abundantly scriptural images, the Nicene 
theologians would have failed. Beyond this narrative embodiment of theology, there 
was at stake something to do with real life. I would use here Max Weber's terms to 
describe the 'charismatic' authority that Athanasius and Basil in particular enjoyed 
within the vast majority of lay and monastic circles. In the person of these leaders, 
who were both monks and bishops, the potential 'anarchism' of any exclusive 
'charismatic' determination of the Church authority was balanced by the doctrinal 
'routine', which had to remain always a visible sign of orthodoxy. The solidarity 
between monasticism and the Nicene theologians lies in something deeper than these 
sociological categories can express. The reasons for the success of orthodoxy are 
simply theological. When Athanasius and the Cappadocians defended the orthodox 
doctrine of incarnation, they appealed to the concept of deification (theosis), which 
was already the supreme goal of the monastic life. The hermits of the desert could 
recognise the 'orthodox' doctrine about Christ by detecting this crucial concept of 
deification, which was at work in their daily life. Only transfiguration 
(metamorphosis) in Christ made meaningful the orthodox soteriology, and not the 
mere talk about participation in God. Vaggione tries to situate Eunomius in the 
8 6 VAGGIONE, Eunomius of Cyzicus, 377 
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context of the urban forms of monasticism, but one thing remains sure: neither 
Eunomius, nor Aetius, had such a genuine interest in the contemplative life as St Basil 
or anybody in his natural and spiritual family. Perhaps Vaggione could have drawn 
more conclusions from such a comparison: not only the hermeneutics of Scripture and 
their outlook on philosophy divided the neo-Arians and the Cappadocian Fathers, but 
also their understanding of prayer, asceticism and mystical theology, which all 
enjoyed huge respect in the countryside , where the simple Christians lived and 
worshipped God. I f Gregory of Nyssa professed a 'gnoseological pessimism' (VI. 
Lossky), it was because, as we shall see, he understood the doctrine of God's infinity 
as a call for continual spiritual progression (epektasis). Nothing about 'union with 
God through prayer' can be found in any of Eunomius' writings, which, as we shall 
see, resemble rather strikingly the arrogance of the epistemological claims of some 
modern metaphysicians, like Spinoza or Hegel. 
Vaggione is certainly right in saying that Eunomius' fall (along with the 
oblivion of Aetius) in the late '370s was the result of his incapacity to address issues 
of potential popularity. 'Aetius and Eunomius were looking to shock, and they 
o n 
succeeded' . Not even in front of the Emperor Constantius (who had no sympathy for 
the Nicene theologians) did Eunomius gain credibility, due to his essentialist jargon 
(regarded by the conciliators as the seed of discord)90. Contrarily, Gregory of Nyssa 
proved to have an immense knowledge of the Scriptures, which probably represented 
the nucleus of the religious imagination of the Christian people by the end of the 
fourth century. Comparatively, Aetius' or Eunomius' dry and very speculative prose, 
in which Christ was hardly mentioned, and which resembled Aristotle's style9 1, could 
hardly convince or capture any religious imagination. Yet, one still needs to 
emphasise that the reasons for their failure were not accidental, rooted in their wrong 
strategies of persuasion, but substantial, having to do with the gist of their theology. 
Apart from his artificial manipulation of the Scriptures, there were two other major 
points in which Eunomius broke with the former tradition. First, it was his very denial 
of Christ' essential divinity (confessed by the apostolic Church), and second, his 
8 7 VAGGIONE, Eunomius of Cyzicus, 79 
8 8 W. H. C. F R E M D , 'The Winning of the Countryside', JEH 18 (1967), 1-14 
8 9 VAGGIONE, Eunomius of Cyzicus, 256 
9 0 On Eunomius' vocabulary, see F. MANN, 'Das Vokabular des Eunomius im Kontext Gregors', in L . 
F. M A T E O - S E C O and J . L . B A S T E R O (ed.), El 'Contra Eunomium I' en la produccion literaria de 
Grigorio de Nisa (Pamplona, 1988), 173-202 
9 1 NPNF V, 313b (GNO I. 407. 25-26) 
32 
contempt towards the long-lasting apophatic tradition within Christian theology . 
Since Clement of Alexandria's time, apophatism was an undisputed conviction shared 
by virtually all the Christian theologians93. No one before Aetius and Eunomius 
imagined a way of knowledge of God parallel to worship and prayer. Moreover, the 
doctrine of Trinity was not a simple matter of 'imagination', be it for 'experts', or 
'pastors'. As I have suggested above, Vaggione could have gained more by taking into 
consideration another crucial element in the social fabric of Late Antiquity, namely, 
the commanding function of the 'holy man' 9 4 . Peter Brown's ideas, worked out by D. 
Brakke in his research on Athanasius95, could help us to understand why Nicaea was 
predestined for victory (nike). Nicaea received not only the support of the Egyptian 
desert Fathers, but also the assistance of the Syrian convents led by Ephrem (much 
esteemed by Basil the Great), and of the monasteries of Asia Minor. The Cappadocian 
Fathers were representatives of a kind of 'experiential theology' (J. Romanides96), to 
which Eunomius - as defender of dialectics - did not want to have access. In the 
Latin-speaking world, Hilary of Poitiers resumed this orthodox exigency in his 
arresting appeal: 'we must believe, must apprehend, must worship; and such acts of 
devotion must stand in lieu of definition {credendus est; intelligendus est; et his 
officiis eloquendusY .97 
Summa summarum, it is very likely that the facts of the second half of the 
fourth century were much simpler: the battle between Neo-Arianism and Nicene 
Orthodoxy was conducted by two categories of people, holding two different 
understandings about how the revelation of God in Christ can be effective. Pace 
Vaggione, the radical Arians and the orthodox Nicene disagreed both on theological 
propositions and on the forms of life that could make these propositions real. The 
Nicene theologians, while espousing the 'maximalist' spirituality of the Desert 
Fathers, found deification to be the last consequence of the Incarnation. For them 
A. L O U T H , 'Apophatic Theology: Before and After The Areopagite', Bogosloveni Vestnik 56 (1996) 
3,297-310 
9 3 JUSTIN T H E M A R T Y R , Apologia I . 61 (PG 6, 421b); ATHENAGORAS, Ad Autolycos I . 3 (PG 6, 1028c); 
C L E M E N T OF A L E X A N D R I A , Stromates V. 11. 71. 5 (SC 275, 144 sq); ORIGEN, Peri archon I. 1. 5 (PG 
11, 124 b-c); ATHANASIUS, Contra gentes 36 (PG 25, 69). 
9 4 See especially, P. BROWN, 'The Rise and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity', Journal of 
Roman Studies 61 (1971), 80-101 
9 5 D. B R A K K E , Athanasius and the Politics of Asceticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 
9 6 J . S. ROMANIDIS, 'Critical Examination of the Application of Theology', Proces Verbaux du 
deuxieme Congres de Theologie orthodoxe a Athenes (19-29 Aout, 1976), ed. S. C. AGOURIDES 
(Athens, 1978), 413-441. 
9 7 H I L A R Y , De Trinitate II. 7 (PL 10. 57a; NPNF IX, 54b) 
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salvation meant deification in the perspective of eternal progress in God's eternal 
love. Contrarily, the radical Arians considered any discourse about Incarnation as 
conflicting, so that their spirituality could find salvation effective on the moral level of 
agreement between the human wi l l and God's commandments. Those living the 
monastic life probably knew first that Christ is more than a model of moral perfection. 
Gregory of Nyssa's insistent description of life in God being infinite is the perfect 
proof for the 'maximalist' understanding of salvation. In short, the motives of the 
success of Nicene orthodoxy are first theological and only secondarily political or 
sociological. And since the reasons for this achievement are theological and not 
secular, it would be simply wrong to envisage the fourth century as an epoch in which 
the Church bishops found themselves in search of the doctrine of Christian God. 
(Very probably, this is the pious consequence of the inner conviction of so many 
Protestant scholars that Jesus Christ was, above all, a teacher professing his doctrine 
in widely-accepted parables.) It would be even worse to consider the achievement of 
'orthodoxy' as an experiment of 'trial and error' 9 8. Like Christ's apostles and their 
immediate heirs, martyred within the first three centuries, the Christian theologians 
were not in search of a doctrine, but in search of truth. To spread the Gospel to the 
Gentiles meant for St Paul to present the image of Christ in different cultural idioms, 
which despite their peculiarity were meant to preserve the universality of the unique 
proclamation. This explains why the elements of Christian doctrine of God stemmed 
from the earliest times of the Church and could acquire new connotations even one 
thousand years after Nicaea. The search for truth is perennial and therefore the 
Christian doctrine receives new valences in every age of the Church. 'Development of 
doctrine', within and beyond the fourth century, represents not the evolution from a 
primitive stage (of the primitive Church) towards more recent and more intelligent 
levels of understanding, but the spontaneous process of unfolding of what it is already 
given in the apostolic confession of Christ as 'God and Lord'. 
With these methodological presuppositions, I shall embark on my research of 
St Gregory of Nyssa's doctrine of language, analysed first in the light of the scriptural 
and ecclesiastical authority (always bearing in mind his debts towards Basil of 
Caesarea). I hope to substantiate the claims made in advance through a close reading 
R . P. C. HANSON, "The Achievement of Orthodoxy' in R . W I L L I A M S (ed.), The Making of Orthodoxy, 
153 
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of Gregory's most commanding writings, which made him being praised as 'teacher 
of the world {ho tes oikoumenes didaskalosy" and 'Father of the Fathers.'100 
9 9 MAXIMUS CONFESSOR, Op. theol. ( P G 9 1 , 1 6 1 ) 
1 0 0 M A N S I 1 3 , 2 9 3 . 
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I I . T H E A U T H O R I T Y O F SCRIPTURE 
Background 
Unlike Denys the Areopagite, who in the fifth-sixth century wrote the short but 
prominent treatise on the Divine Names, or St Augustine, who is the first Christian 
author who worked out systematically the principles of semiotics inherited from the 
Stoic philosophy1, Gregory of Nyssa dealt rather circumstantially with this subject, in 
an oblique way. Like all his predecessors, Gregory spelt out his ideas about the nature 
of language in direct relation to the hermeneutics of the Scriptures, which shaped all 
the theological debates of their age. Since Gregory was not a philosopher, language 
could not have been a self-standing issue for him. His references to Babel's story 
(Genesis 11: 1-9), or to Adam's endowment with the power of naming the creatures 
(Genesis 1: 26-31; 2: 15-25)2 emerge in a context primarily loaded by doctrinal, and 
not strictly exegetical interests. Especially with the Alexandrine thinkers (like Philo of 
Alexandria3, or Origen4), exegesis gave way for deeper theological consideration. 
Instead, Gregory tackled the problem of language and develops its correlative 
epistemology in the context of the elaboration of his Trinitarian theology. 
Nevertheless, his contributions represent a milestone in the history of Christian 
thinking. As it happens with almost every important theologian of the early Church, 
Gregory's theological ideas are sown throughout all of his hermeneutical work on the 
Scriptures. The modern reader is struck by Gregory's immense knowledge of the 
Scriptures, which shape his theological thought from alpha to omega. Whether he had 
to build up the orthodox principles of dogmatic theology - especially in his CEI - , or 
compose ascetic homilies for the Cappadocian (lay or monastic) congregations, 
Gregory drew heavily on the words of the Scriptures. In this respect, more than Basil 
of Caesarea and Gregory of Nazianzus - who in 358 edited the famous Philokalia -
Gregory of Nyssa seems to be the true heir of Origen in Cappadocia. It is significant 
that he started his career in theology writing commentaries on various texts of the 
1 For a brief and elucidating exposition, see A. L O U T H , 'Augustine on language', Journal of Literature 
and Theology 3 (1989) 2, 151-158 
2 Useful references (except for Gregory's work) are given in A. L O U T H and M. CONTI (ed.), Genesis 1-
11. Ancient Commentaries of Scripture (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2001). 
3 PHILO, Quaestiones in Genesim et in Exodum. Fragm. Graeca; De confusione linguarum, passim 
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Gospel {The Beatitudes came among the first), ending his life by composing the 
exquisite homilies on the Song of the Songs (with explicit reference to Origen). What 
the Scriptures offered to him was the possibility of contemplating God's glory, 
brought to fulfilment in Jesus Christ. One can catch the same glimpse by reading even 
the most speculative books of Gregory, such as the bulky, three-fold treatise Contra 
Eunomium. CE has the strongest philosophical input among Gregory's writings, 
laying down weighty epistemological arguments against the doctrine of the 
Anomeans. Yet, it would be a mistake to isolate its content and purpose from 
Gregory's previous works, which prove a decisive interest in ascetic theology and 
biblical hermeneutics. To speak about Gregory's Trinitarian theology without 
understanding first the place which confession of Christ took in his life, would be 
simply wrong. Though born in a pious family - his grandmother Macrina the Elder 
being a Christian ascetic - , and having a brother like Basil of Caesarea and a sister 
like Macrina the Younger, Gregory did not embrace Church life from the very 
beginning5. Only after he spent much of his youth in the tiny town of Nyssa6 as a 
lawyer , did Gregory convert to Christ. The date of his baptism is unknown, but we at 
least can be sure that he was consecrated bishop of Nyssa in the early '370s (by then, 
Gregory was in his late '30s). 
One has to bear in mind that, as with all the apostolic fathers, Christ is at the 
heart of Gregory's theology, which centrality is beyond any of his more or less 
systematic philosophical commitments. Christ's divinity is the hypothesis of 
Gregory's theology, worked out through a myriad of Scriptural references8. It might 
be useful to recall that in the fourth century Scripture received its canonical and 
definitive form for the Christian Church, remaining unquestioned until the dawn of 
Reformation in the West. By 'the Scriptures' Gregory understood not only the corpus 
of the Old Testament, but also, the unmistakable Gospel of Jesus Christ, in whom God 
has revealed himself to us as Father. 
4 Contra Celsum IV, 33-34; V, 45 
5 J. DANIELOU, 'Le mariage de Gregoire de Nysse et la chronologie de sa vie', REA 2 (1956) 71-78; J. 
DANIELOU also wrote about Gregory's life in the introduction to H. MUSURILLO (ed.), From Glory to 
Glory. Texts from Gregory of Nyssa's Mystical Writings E T by H. Musurillo SJ (Crestwood, NY: St 
Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1995), 3-10; see T. K O P E C E K , 'The Social Class of the Cappadocian 
Fathers', Church History 42 (1973) , 453-66 
6 P. M A R A V A L , 'Nysse en Cappadoce', Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophic Religieuses 55 (1975) 2, 
237-247 
7 G R E G O R Y OF NAZIANZUS, Ep. 11 .4 (ed. Gallay, 1 . 1 7 ) 
8 JAMES A. BROOKS, The New Testament Text of Gregory of Nyssa (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1991). 
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The Scriptural Grammar 
During the first three centuries, the Scriptures raised many questions, for 
which the theologians hoped to find answers in the same Scriptures. It was not easy to 
harmonise many contradictory passages from the Scriptures. Allegorical exegesis was, 
of course, a general solution to solve textual conflicts, but it remained only a neutral 
tool ready to serve any theological purpose. Before proceeding to any form of biblical 
exegesis, one had to answer a single question: was Christ's lordship given in time, by 
adoption, or by nature, before all ages? 
With this question, one touches the heart of the theological discussions 
surrounding the council of Nicaea and the condemnation of Arius' theology. 
Ironically, there was no ground for discord between the Nicene and the Arian 
theologians when they referred to the inspired character of the Scriptures. Being very 
much against the subversive approach of the Gnostics, both ecclesiastical parties 
regarded the Scriptures to be right in their form. The unity of the Old and the New 
Testament was undisputed among them, and, in general, the canon the New Testament 
was mutually accepted. The Arian crisis stands for the most eloquent evidence of the 
general agreement existing on the foundational role of Scripture and tradition in the 
early Church. Arius was described as 'a teacher of ideas and an interpreter of 
Scripture'9 and even, in certain respects (like his apophatic approach in theology and 
epistemology), as a 'traditionalist' theologian. In 359, Eunomius of Cyzicus could also 
claim that his teaching was guided by nothing else than the 'pious and governing 
tradition which has come down from the fathers (ten de kratousan andthen ek ton 
pateron eusebe paradosin),l°. Obviously, for the Cappadocian fathers and for the 
mditre penseur of the Anomean party, tradition meant something different, but this 
misrepresentation is not very surprising. The 'right' interpretation of Scripture was at 
stake in the polemics between the Arians theologians and the defenders of Nicaea. 
Rowan Williams appreciated that the Arian controversy 'began in the discussion of a 
disputed passage in the 'divine law" 1 1 , which obviously put under question the 
identity of Jesus Christ. In the long decades of the fourth century, struggle for 
9 R . W I L L I A M S , Arius, 89 
1 0 A 4. 6-7 
" Ibidem., 107; at stake was the reading of the Proverbs 8:22, Psalm 45:7-8, Isaiah 1:2, etc. 
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dogmatic orthodoxy epitomised deep hermeneutical divergences: the problem was not 
the divine origin of Scripture, but her single 'mind' that could explain the undivided 
meaning of the Old and the New Testament. In their reading of the Scriptures, the 
Nicene theologians seemed more flexible, since they would admit that texts of the Old 
Testament could be referred (as prophetic) to events recorded only in the Gospels. For 
the non-Nicene, such freedom of interpretation was unacceptable. The Nicene Creed 
established two major points: that Christ is the Only Begotten One 'before all ages' 
and that the Christ preached by the Church is 'according to the Scriptures'. 
What could this possibly mean? The Church confronted again the conundrum 
of her beginnings: who performed all the deeds ascribed to God in the Old Testament? 
Who was the subject of the ancient epiphanies recorded in the books of the prophets? 
Could someone speak about a transcendental continuum between the Law of Moses 
and the Gospel of Christ? I f so, does this scriptural unity disclose a peculiar doctrine 
about God? And, once again, was Christ's lordship adoptive, or of the same nature 
with the Father? To answer these questions became increasingly important since 
Christ was addressed as God in the liturgical prayers from the earliest times of the 
Church. It was, therefore, not merely a theoretical question, but first a practical one, 
touching the daily life of every Christian believer. Christ's divinity and lordship was a 
puzzling question for also the Pharisees of the Synagogue in Jerusalem in Jesus' time. 
An excerpt from the Gospel according to Matthew is extremely telling: 
Now, while the Pharisees were gathered together, Jesus asked them a 
question saying: 'What do you think of Christ? Whose son is he?' They 
said to him, 'The son of David.' 
He said to them, 'How is it then that David, inspired by the Spirit, calls 
him Lord, saying, 
"The Lord said to my Lord, sit at my right hand, t i l l I put thy enemies 
under thy feet? [Ps 110: 11]" 
I f David thus calls him Lord, how is he his son?' 
And no one was able to answer him a word, nor from that day did any one 
dare to ask him any more questions (Matthew 22: 41-46) 
Though Nicaea held together two fundamental sentences (that Christ is 'Lord 
and God', according to the Scriptures), the way it expressed the doctrine about the 
unity of God was problematic. The terminology used in order to express the 
mysterious words of the Prologue of John, had a very strong philosophical flavour. 
One of the constant objections against the Nicene Creed was the usage of the 
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ontological language having no almost biblical precedent. For both Athanasius and 
Basil, at least in the 350s, 'homoousios' became the crucial and indispensable 
theological concept, which could define appropriately Christ's natural sonship. Later 
on, with the establishment of the Trinitarian formula lmia ousia, treis hypostasis', the 
famous adjective homoousios became 'the watchword of true orthodoxy in the 
12 
Church"\ Of course, this notion has a very complex prehistory in the Greek 
philosophy and theology, stemming from the semantic field of a metaphysically 
charged word, namely ousia13. As a theological concept, homoousios had an almost 
modalist connotation for many of the members of the first ecumenical council, who 
thought it might express a Trinitarian doctrine similarly to Paul of Samosata's 
thought, condemned by the Church in 268/91 4 but likewise revived by Marcellus of 
Ancyra in 340's. Significantly enough, an early controversy in the second half of the 
third century shows bishop Dionysius of Alexandria (200-265) - a disciple of Origen 1 5 
- being very reluctant to accept the usage of homoousios (with reference to the Father 
and the Son) 'perche non scritturistico'16. Where Origen was concerned, he eschewed 
any conceptualisation of the unity between the Father and the Son by using ousia, 
whilst being afraid of the materialistic connotation of this word in the Greek 
language.17 By coining this word (homoousios) in the Nicene Creed, the orthodox 
were employing a theological semantics only later clarified by subtle dogmatic 
distinctions as the one between ousia and hypostasis (treated thoroughly in Gregory's 
famous letters to his brother Peter, formerly attributed to Basil). At the beginning, the 
advocates of Nicaea had the explicit purpose of stressing Christ's ful l participation in 
God's divinity, in contrast to Arius' teaching. By doing so, the Orthodox majority also 
set an important precedent for the history of Christian doctrine. For their foes, the 
Greek formula lhomoousion to PatrV only proved the insufficiency of the 
1 2 H. LlETZMANN, A History of the Early Church (vol. Ill), E T by B. L . Woolf (Meridian Books: 
Cleveland & New York, 1964), 99 
1 3 F. RlCKEN, 'Nikaia als Krisis des altchrislichen Platonismus', Theol. und Phil. 44 (1969), 321-341; 
HANSON, Search for the Christian Doctrine, 181-207; C. STEAD, Divine Substance (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1977), 190-222 
1 4 M. SlMONETTl, La crisi ariana nel IVsecolo (Roma: Institutum Patristicum 'Augustinianum', 1975), 
92 
1 5 EUSEBIUS, Historia Ecclesiastica 6. 29. 4; 6. 35 
1 6 SlMONETTl, 92 
1 7 In his Commentary of John (13. 149), Origen criticises Gnostic ideas (maintained by Heracleon) 
about the consubstantiality between elected spirits and God, which might imply identical attributes for 
both subjects. J . R E B E C C A LYMANN, 'Substance Language in Origen and Eusebius' in R O B E R T C. 
G R E G G (ed.), Arianism. Historical and Theological Reassessments. Papers From the Nineth 
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hermeneutical principle of interpretation of Scripture by Scripture, and the need for a 
speculative complement at every stage of theological reflection. Of course, from the 
orthodox viewpoint, homoousios was designed to interpret philosophically and 
theologically what the metaphorical language of the Scriptures left in obscurity for 
some Christian believers. No depreciation of the authority of Scripture stands behind 
Athanasius' usage of homoousios, and yet his enemies could read this decision as 
potentially downgrading the Scriptures18. As R. P. C. Hanson noted, 'Athanasius in 
his De Synodis had to meet the objection to the use of the word that the fathers of the 
Council of Antioch which had condemned Paul of Samosata had also condemned 
homoousios.'1,9 Still, Athanasius thought that homoousios, while following 'the mind 
(dianoid) of the Scriptures'20, could succinctly express the ontological status of the 
Son, who should never be regarded as a creature. We know that the Cappadocian 
Fathers - St Basil of Caesarea and St Gregory of Nyssa, especially - were not so 
much keen on using Athanasius' key concept of divine unity 2 1. The reason for that 
might have been a lack of communication between two distant regions of the 
Byzantine Empire at that time, but also their awareness of the heretical precedents in 
using this concept. St Basil, for example, suspected that Sabellius used homoousios in 
a false Trinitarian framework of thought, which explains Dionysius of Alexandria's 
reluctance to use i t 2 2 . 
While being non-scriptural, homoousios was intrinsically controversial, 
facilitating misunderstanding on both sides of the orthodox mainstream (eg: Marcellus 
of Ancyra vs. Eunomius of Cyzicus). Some evidence of this is provided by the fact 
that almost all non-Nicene factions clarified their position almost exclusively in 
relationship with to this term (the paternity of which remains mysterious up to now). 
The Homoeans represented the middle-way of the so-called 'neo-Arianism' stream in 
the fourth century; followers of Acacius of Caesarea - like Eustathius of Sebaste and 
Basil of Ancyra - coined 'homoiousios' just to affirm the subordination in ful l 
International Conference on Patristic Studies, September 5-10, 1983, Oxford (The Philadelphia 
Patristic Foundation Ltd., 1985), 257-266 
1 8 There is evidence for that in ATHANASIUS De decretis 18; B A S I L , On the Holy Spirit, 10. 25, 
G R E G O R Y OF NAZIANZUS, Orat 31. 18 ,21 
1 9 HANSON, Doctrine of God, 193 
2 0 ATHANASIUS, De Decretis Nicceanae Synodi 2 1 . 2 ( 1 8 ) . 
2 1 M . R. BARNES, 'The Fourth Century as Trinitarian Canon' in L . A Y R E S and G . JONES, Christian 
Origins. Theology, Rhetoric and Community (London: Routledge, 1998), 47-67; J . T. LlENHARD, 
'Ousia and Hypostasis: The Cappadocian Settlement and the Theology of "One Hypostasis'", in S. T. 
D A V I E S , D . K E N D A L L and G . O ' C O L L I N S (eds.), The Trinity (Oxford: OUP, 1999), 99-121 
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likeness of the Son to the Father. In their turn, the Anomoeans wanted to take 
Nicaea's ontological formulae as a precedent that could legitimise their own 
philosophical jargon, in which 'First Essence, Second Essence, and the Third Essence' 
substituted the Trinitarian name of the 'Father, Son, and Holy Spirit'. In Gregory's 
eyes, this was abusive, since the intention of Nicaea was to make clear a scriptural 
idiom, which without 'homoousios' could have remained open to loose interpretation. 
Athanasius insisted that the rejection of the Son's consubstantiality with the Father 
entails no third choice, apart from the radical solution of the Anomeans. 
'Homoousios' was meant to defend not only the metaphor of 'sonship', but also the 
image of Christ as 'the icon of the Father'. For Athanasius and the Cappadocians, the 
philosophical vocabulary was used to express the scriptural grammar of the Christian 
theology (which eventually was an appeal to deification), whereas for the radical 
Arians the Scriptures provided only some elements for philosophical speculation 
within a strange grammar, not entirely baptised in Christian waters. 
Gregory's Panoply 
From the first, right up to the last chapter of his treatises, Gregory refutes 
Eunomius' theology with solid arguments from the Scripture. Indeed, what makes 
Eunomius vulnerable to the accusation of heresy is, in the first instance, his attempt to 
challenge the biblical doctrine of the names of God with a private philosophy, which 
transpires to be not only theologically perilous, but also intrinsically contradictory. In 
principle, for Gregory (as well as for John the Evangelist) 'he who presumes to 
pervert the Divine utterance (ten theian phoneri) by dishonest quibbling (dia 
kakourgias sophistikes paratrepein), the same is "of his father the devil", who leaves 
the words of truth and "speaks of his own" [John 8: 44] . ' 2 3 Whether in dispute with 
the Macedonians or with the neo-Arians, Gregory detects one rule: the heretics 
conceive wrong opinions because they reject the Scriptures. Speaking about the sacred 
tablets (hieras plakkas) received by Moses on the mountain of Sinai, Gregory 
considers them 'a divine invention and a gift, which did not need any human 
cooperation (synergias) in order to be made'. Furthermore, 'both the matter and the 
B A S I L , Epist. 9. 3. 1-18 
'NPNFV, 101b (Ref.Eun. in GNO II. 313. 17-21) 
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characters (charagmata) were God's deed' . On the other hand, this immediacy of 
God's presence in the text of the Scriptures is not obvious, since divine meanings are 
hidden under a protecting veil ( I I Corinthians 3: 15) of a semantic obscurity25. 
Scriptures still need spiritual illumination in order to be properly read and interpreted, 
and therefore, to become an invaluable nourishment for the believers of the Church. 
Such an intrepid position is of no wonder, i f we take into consideration the great 
amount of scriptural exegesis provided by Gregory during his lifetime. The emphasis 
put on the Scriptures also reveals a very important characteristic of Gregory's 
theological epistemology. Allegiance to Scripture acknowledges the primacy of God's 
revelation, and its active role in shaping our understanding of his infinite mystery. 
This is the raison d 'etre of the experience of faith within tradition2 6 and Gregory fully 
supports this position, grounding it in at least two reasons. 
The first is his philosophical commitment to what Vladimir Lossky once called 
the 'pessimistic gnoseology' , generally ascribed to the Cappadocian fathers. This is 
due to Gregory's conviction that the entire creation is marked - at least in its post-
lapsarian history - by corruption, perfectly seized in the experience of temporality. 
Our epistemological incapacity28 to enjoy the experience of a full self-understanding 
and even less the comprehension of any other being mirrors perfectly this ontological 
gap - called diastema - within the creation itself 2 9. Our knowledge is obfuscated not 
only by the opaque materiality of the biological body metaphorically called 'the 
garments of skin' (dermatinoi kitones) , but because of the generally finite 
constitution of human being. Though not naturally corrupted, human being is limited 
24 Vit. Moys 1.57.1-4 (PG 45, 321 A5-9; ed. J. Danielou, SClbis, 24) 
2 5 NPNF V, 192a (GNO II. 163, 5-25) 
2 6 A. L O U T H , Discerning the Mystery. On the Nature of Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1983) offers a fruitful description of this process. 
2 7 V. L O S S K Y , The Vision of God translated into English by A. Moorhouse (Crestwood, NY: St 
Vladimir's Press, 1983), 77; The point was not missed by A. M E R E D I T H , The Cappadocians 
(Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir's Press, 1995), passim 
2 8 A comprehensive debate of this topic is given by T. P A U L V E R G H E S E , 'Diastema and Diastasis in 
Gregory of Nyssa. Introduction to a Concept and the Posing of a Problem', in H. D O E R R I E , M. 
A L T E N B U R G E R & U. SCHRAMM (ed.), Gregor von Nyssa und die Philosophic Zweites Internationales 
Kolloquium iiber Gregor von Nyssa (Munster 18-23 September 1972) (Leiden: Brill, 1976), 243-259. 
2 9 Gregory's doctrine of creation (which has at its core the concept of diastasis) was brilliantly echoed 
in St Maximus the Confessor's theology of Incarnation, depicted in Ambigua 41; cf A. L O U T H , 
Maximus the Confessor (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 155-162 
3 0 J . DANIELOU, 'Les tuniques de peau chez Gregoire de Nysse', Glaube, Geist, Geschichte. Fest. E. 
Benz, Leiden, 1967, 355-367, reprinted in a modified version in Temps et etre chez Gregoire de Nysse 
(Leiden: Brill, 1972), 154-185. An important reassessment of Gregory's anthropology was recently 
made by JOHN B E H R , "The Rational Animal: A Rereading of Gregory of Nyssa's De hominis opificio', 
JECS 17 (1999) 2,219-247. 
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per se, and embedded in the experience of temporality, at least in a post-lapsarian 
history. Under these circumstances, human intellect runs the risk always of building 
up a simulacrum of knowledge, which consists in making conjectures about the 
unconceivable. Because of this natural tendency of the human mind, which is bent 
towards noetic idolatry, God elected Moses and gave him the commandments (i.e.: the 
core of the Scriptures). Here we meet the second reason for Gregory's assessments of 
the value of Scripture. God, who does not have the inner experience of diastasis 
though is a Trinity of Persons (but not in the numerical sense), gave us the 
commandments, which lead to real knowledge, surpassing the dramatic consequences 
of the fall and initiating us into the divine mysteries of the age to come. 
Commandments are to be taken not merely in a moral sense, as Gregory makes clear 
in The Life of Moses: 
[The commandments] were doctrines about virtues, among which 
the first was the piety ieusebeia) and having a true judgement of the divine 
nature, namely that it transcends (hyperkreitai) every cognitive notion 
(gnoristikou noematos) and representation, not being similar to whatever 
cognoscible. In fact, he [Moses] is asked not to regard any thoughts about 
God conceived by [human] mind, and not to make similar (homoion) the 
Nature which surpasses all to something conceptually known, but to 
believe in His existence, without searching for its quality, quantity, mode, 
and origin, letting it [be] inaccessible.31 
In other words, Scripture does not act as an epistemological supplement to 
natural reasoning. For Gregory, Scripture rather introduces a fracture, forcing the 
theologian to abandon idle speculation about God. In discursive or prayerful 
knowledge, 'any concept made in order to touch or to circumscribe the divine nature 
does not succeed but to form an idol of God, without making him known' 3 2 . Unlike 
Eunomius, Gregory does not see any complementary rapport between philosophy and 
theology, not even a dialectical one. Of course, in talking about God from inside, 
theology surpasses 'the profane education' (he exothen paideusis), although she 
makes use of it. Yet, true theology is for Gregory only a form of conversation: with 
God and with his people. The former instance takes the form of a dialogue with the 
31 Vit. Moys I. 47. 1-8 (PG 45, 317 B8-16; ed. J. Danielou, SClbis, 21) 
32 Vit. Moys. II. 165 (PG 44, 337B; ed. J. Danielou, SC Ibis, Paris: Cerf, 1955, 82) 
43 
divine Word, which teaches us the virtues of theology, and assesses the transcendental 
conditions for a true dialogue within a community.33 
Gregory's Scriptural Mind 
Theology must find its foundational 'rock' in Christ. In the Scriptures, 
Gregory finds Christ being Word of God descended from heaven in order to 
communicate to us his 'divine mysteries by words and names that are intelligible to 
us' 3 4. This intelligibility becomes effective only when it is rooted in a firm liturgical 
ethos . Theology presupposes a vital connection to God through prayer and an 
active engagement in the ascetic life, as taught by the Scriptures. Gregory still 
belonged to a non-equalitarian spiritual universe, which regarded knowledge as a 
virtue on a pyramidal scale. Therefore, Scripture was supposed to be read following 
its goal (skopos) and rational sequence (akolouthia)3'', divinely foreseen by God. Only 
this goal - which was Christ - could provide the right interpretative framework, which 
could exempt anybody from confusion about the words of the Scriptures. For Gregory, 
pursuing the 'mind' of the Scriptures is not privileged job of the intellect. The 
initiation of the Christian neophyte in the mystery of God's revelation urges the 
acquirement of the basic rules for moral life (set out in the book Proverbs). 'Natural 
contemplation' follows, and this unfolds a double process. On the one hand, it means 
recognition of worldly vanities, but on the other hand commands the praising of God's 
glory on heaven and earth (as the Ecclesiastes puts it). After it had passed through the 
gates of moral and natural knowledge, the Scriptures could only open their divine 
mysteries to the mind purified in the Song of the Songs.n Gregory compares the 
gradual revelation of the divine name - which is 'above any name' (Philippians 2: 9) -
with the ongoing achievement of the Christian virtues. God's attributes are revealed 
only proportionally to the accomplishment of Christ's commandments given in 
3 3 See, for example, St Gregory's reading of the Beatitudes, E T by Hilda C. Graef (New York/Mahwah: 
Paulist Press, col. "Ancient Christian Writers", 1954), 85-176 
34 Beatitudes 2 (ET, 98) 
3 5 JOSEF A. JUNGMANN, The Early Liturgy. To the Time of Gregory the Great E T by Francis A. Bunner 
(London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1959), 197 
3 6 For prayer as an eminent way of union with God, see G R E G O R Y OF N Y S S A , The Lord's Prayer, E T by 
Hilda C. Graef (New York/Mahwah: Paulist Press, col. "Ancient Christian Writers", 1954), 24 sq 
3 7 J . D A N I E L O U , '«Akolouthia» chez Gregoire de Nysse', VC7 (1953), 154-170 (reprinted in a modified 
form in Temps et etre chez Gregoire de Nysse, 1972,18-50) 
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Scripture: otherwise, theology becomes a barren exercise of thought and imagination, 
i f not an open blasphemy. This analogy between practical performance and noetic 
scrutiny is more profound than one might appreciate at first sight. For Gregory, the 
Christian virtues are deduced one from another, just as for Immanuel Kant the 
analytical predicates illuminate a single logical subject; this process is very much 
similar to the way Scripture can be understood, because the nature of both Christ's 
virtues and words is iconic 3 9. After all, it was St Paul first who warned that, without 
having the 'mind of Christ' ( I Corinthians 2: 16), an untrained reader can easily blur 
the meaning of Scriptures. Like almost all the apostolic Church Fathers, Gregory was 
ready to accept only the 'scriptural Christ' and, conversely, just the 'Christian 
Scriptures', including 'the Law and the Prophets'. Christ was not an external object to 
the Scriptures, whom some clever theologians were expected to talk about. On the 
contrary, Christ's relation to the Scriptures is firstly not accusative, but genitival. 
Christ is not only 'according to the Scriptures', but also 'abiding in the Scriptures'. 
Gregory of Nyssa, like other advocates of Nicaea, was persuaded by the large 
extent of the Scriptures' polysemy, which required different levels of interpretation. 
Even a superficial examination of Gregory's writings reveals the impressive 
complexity of his biblical commentaries. He never denies the difficulty of some 
scriptural fragments, but rejects Eunomius' unilateral (and even univocal) reading of 
such passages. In this respect, perhaps one of the most illuminating examples is 
Gregory's differential treatment of the biblical term of 'Son'. One should first recall 
the dialogue between Jesus and Peter, recorded in Gospel according to Matthew: 
Now when Jesus came into the district of Caesarea Philippi, he 
asked his disciples, "Who do men say that the Son of man is?" 
And they said, "Some say John the Baptist, others say Elijah, and 
others Jeremiah or one of the prophets." 
He said to them, "But who do you say that I am?" 
Simon Peter replied, "You are the Christ, the Son of the living 
God." 
And Jesus answered him, "Blessed are you, Simon Barjona! For 
flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father who is in 
heaven" 
(Matthew 16: 13-17). 
For this typology of the biblical hermeneutics, see In Cant. I, GNO VI, 17 (PG 44, 767), E T by 
Casimir McCambley (Brookline: Hellenic College Press, 1987), 44 
3 9 B. SALMONA, 'Logos come transparenza in Gregorio di Nissa', in H. R. DROBNER (ed.), Studien zu 
Gregor von Nyssa unci der christiichen Spdtanthike (Leiden: Brill, 1990) 165-171 
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The fragment has a perplexing structure, since Jesus calls himself 'the Son of 
man' (Matthew 16: 13) - which, in fact, is a prophetic appellation (Daniel 7) - but 
also acknowledges himself to be 'the Son of the living God' (Matthew 16: 16), of his 
Father 'who is in heaven'. For Eunomius40, this double appellation - corroborated 
with references given in the book of Proverbs 8: 22 4 1 , I Corinthians 1: 24 4 2 and 
Colossians 1: 154 3 - proves finally that Jesus' sonship in respect of the Unbegotten 
God is only adoptive. For Gregory it is the other way round: 
As he is called called the Son of Man by reason of the kindred of his 
flesh to her of whom he was born, so also he is conceived, surely, as the 
Son of God, by reason of the connection of his essence with that from 
which he has his existence, and this argument is the greatest weapon of the 
truth. For nothing so clearly points to him who is the "mediator between 
God and man" (I Tim 2: 5) - as the great apostle called him - as the name 
of 'Son', equally applicable to either nature, divine or human. For the 
same person is Son of God, and was made, in the incarnation, Son of Man, 
that, by His communion with each, he might link together by himself what 
were divided by nature. Now if, in becoming Son of Man, he were without 
participation in human nature, it would be logical to say that neither does 
he share in the divine essence, though he is Son of God. But i f the whole 
compound nature of man was in him - for he was "in all points tempted 
like as we are, yet without sin" (Heb 4: 15) - it is surely necessary to 
believe that every property of the transcendent essence is also in him, as 
the word 'son' claims for him both alike - the human in the man, but 
divine in the God 4 4. 
The riddle consists in the power of the analogy. For Gregory, Christ's double 
sonship is the perfect proof of his double consubstantiality, but Eunomius is stubborn 
in understanding it differently. For him, human generation coincides with the act of 
giving birth, bringing to life, or, more philosophically, to existence. The insistence of 
the Nicene theologians on Son's eternal generation makes no sense for Eunomius45 
because for him existence has a logic priority against begetting. I f he agrees that, 
4 U A A I I . 35.2-5 
4 1 Proverbs 8: 22-23: 'The Lord created me [the Wisdom] at the beginning of his work, the first of his 
acts of old; I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was.' 
4 2 1 Corinthians 1: 24: 'Christ the power and the wisdom of God' 
4 3 Colossians 1: 16-17: 'He [Christ] is the image of the invisible God, the first-born (prototokos) of all 
creation; for in him all things were created, in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether 
thrones or dominions or principalities or authorities - all things were created through him and for him. 
He is before all things, and in him all things hold together.' 
44 NPNF V, 145b (GNOII. 35, 16-27) 
4 5 A 13 
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while begetting the Logos, God had no need of supportive material (except his own 
will), Eunomius cannot accept the idea of 'eternal begetting'. He reads the analogy of 
sonship only partially. On the one hand, Eunomius agrees that, unlike in human 
circumstances, for God there is no need to beget the Logos from anything, except his 
wil l . On the other hand, Eunomius expects that 'begetting' (or 'creating') univocally 
means to 'come into being' at a definite time. For Gregory, on the other hand, is clear 
that, i f Jesus was the 'Son of Man' from the Virgin Mary (i.e. not begotten), then 
Christ could be 'Only-Begotten God' from eternity, thus theologia perfecting the 
symmetry with the divine oikonomia. Gregory goes on presenting the paradoxes of 
Christ's appellation: 
He is called God and man, Son of God and Son of Man, — for he 
has the form of God (Philippians 2: 6) and the form of a servant 
(Philippians 2: 5), being some things according to his supreme nature, 
becoming other things in his dispensation of love (kata ten philanthropon 
oikonomiari) to man (I John 3: 1) — so too, being the Only-begotten God, 
he becomes the first-born of all creation (Colossians 1: 15), — the Only-
begotten he that is in the bosom of the Father (en to patroo kolpo), yet, 
among those who are saved by the new creation ( I I Corinthians 5: 17), 
both becoming and being called (genomenos kai legomenos) the first-bora 
of the creation (Colossians 1:16) 6 
Apart from the important theological aspects of his argument, one cannot miss 
noticing how rich in biblical phrases it is, contrasting starkly with what Eunomius 
usually makes of the Scriptures. One has to emphasise again Gregory's holistic 
approach towards the Scriptures47, which can only guarantee the understanding of 
their general meaning. Where Eunomius interpolates scriptural quotations with 
dialectical deductions, Gregory's usage of the Bible is organic, substantial, and 
comprehensive. 
Conflict Between Methodologies 
In Eunomius' first writings, references to Scripture fu l f i l an almost decorative 
role, and intentionally so. The heresiarch posits his starting point in theology at the 
level of natural, inductive and almost Cartesian reasoning: 
46 NPNF V, 158b (GNOII. 70. 22-71. 2) 
47 NPNF V, 293b (GNO I. 352. 9-10): 'the Word, teaching the whole from the part (apo merous to pan 
ekdidaskon ho logos)' 
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Thus, to begin with, it seems to us that those who presume to 
compare the essence which is unmastered, superior to all cause, and 
unbound by any law to that which is begotten and serves the law of the 
Father, have neither really examined the nature of the universe, nor made 
judgements about these things with clear minds. There are two roads 
marked out to us for the discovery of what we seek: one is that by which 
we examine the actual essences, and with clear and unadulterated 
reasoning about them make a judgement on each, the other is an enquiry 
by means of the actions, whereby we distinguish the essence on the basis 
of its products and completed works - and neither of the ways mentioned 
is able to bring out any apparent similarity of essence. 
Taking o f f from this platform of thought - which in modern context could be 
labelled as natural theology49 - it is no wonder that Eunomius' ignorance of the 
Scriptures becomes a leitmotif in Gregory's writings, very often exerting a remarkable 
rhetorical force. Apparently, for Eunomius Scripture does not count as an eminent 
source for the knowledge of the divine mysteries. Although he does not explicitly 
touch upon this subject, Eunomius seems to place Scripture in a line of contiguity with 
the data offered by the positive inquiry in the structure of reality. With his 
unmistakable expressionist touch, Pavel Florensky described Eunomius' theological 
methodology as 'a cry of the flesh, a cry of rationality, a rationality that wanders about 
the elements of the world and egotistically trembles in fear for its integrity, a 
rationality that is self-satisfied despite its total inner disintegration, a rationality that 
dares, in its infinite fear of the smallest pain, to adapt very Truth to itself, to its blind 
and meaningless norms' 5 0. Surely, Gregory of Nyssa and Eunomius of Cyzicus were 
looking for two different types of theological rationality, but their starting point was 
different. For Eunomius, the inquiry in the structure of reality was the premise for the 
conceptual determination of God as the 'ungenerate essence', while for Gregory the 
contemplation of God through Scripture was the premise of any theological 
deliberation. It is very telling that, one thousand years later, Eunomius reappeared in 
the memory of the orthodox Byzantium as the prototype of the intellectual arrogance, 
4 * A I , 20. 1-12 
4 9 D. STANILOAE, The Experience of God ET by I. Ioni^ a and R. Barringer (Brookline, Mass.: Holy 
Cross Orthodox Press, 1994), 1: "The Orthodox Church makes no separation between natural and 
supernatural revelation.' 
5 0 P. F L O R E N S K Y , The Pillar and Ground of Truth, E T by B. Jakim (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1997), 46 
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denounced by St Gregory Palamas51. These two different methodologies made 
strongly incompatible the understanding of the Scriptures, and consequently, their 
Christological and Trinitarian assumptions. 
It is surprising to notice the general scarcity of scriptural commentaries on the 
side of the neo-Arians. Except for his Commentary on Romans, which was lost, 
Eunomius did not show, apparently, any serious interest in the exegetical and pastoral 
theology. Right from the beginning of his ecclesiastic career, Eunomius had a very 
controversial image, so that the first book he wrote had to be pro domo sua. His 
theology is neither homiletic, nor scriptural, but only justificative. Eunomius is 
deemed a 'sophist' or a 'technologist' because of his weird method of argumentation, 
but also an 'innovator', an epithet, which at that time could hardly flatter any 
theologian. In Eunomius Gregory could not see even the farthest shadow of Basil's 
incarnation of theology. Not only Gregory had reasons to employ such qualifications. 
Socrates Scholasticus tells us that Eunomius 'had a very slender knowledge of the 
letter of Scripture: he was wholly unable to enter into the spirit of it. Yet, he abounded 
in words, and was accustomed to repeat the same thoughts in different terms without 
ever arriving at a clear explanation of what he had proposed to himself 5 2 . 
Yet, one cannot say that Eunomius is unaware of the importance of Scripture for 
building up a theological system. The quotations he selected from the Scriptures, 
though redundant, proved to be very challenging. His skilful manipulation of biblical 
verses may have an explanation in his tactics. One knows that in 383, when his case 
was virtually lost, Eunomius delivered at the request of the Emperor Theodosius the 
Great an Expositio Fidei, which, while packed with scriptural quotations, failed to 
improve the image of his well-known theology. 'We find no mention of gennema or 
anomoios at all, and even agennetos is played down in favour of the less suspect ho 
pantokrator.'53 In the first glosses of his Apologia Apologiae (2. 5), Aetius' disciple 
piously invoked Jesus Christ as 'our Saviour', which still does not clarify his 
understanding of Christ's nature. Apparently, Eunomius stuck to the golden rule of the 
early Church, who considered Christ 'Lord and Saviour', and the Scriptures to be 
God-inspired. Yet, Christ's divinity and lordship were, in Eunomius' viewpoint, of an 
5 1 G R E G O R Y PALAMAS, Topics of Natural and Theological Science 82, in The Philokalia E T by G . E . H. 
Palmer, P. Sherrard and Kallistos Ware (London: Faber and Faber, 1995), 384-85 
5 2 SOCRATES, HE IV. 7 
5 3 R. VAGGIONE, 'Introduction' to "The Confession of Eunomius' in EUNOMIUS, The Extant Works, 
Text and translation by Richard Paul Vaggione (Oxford: Clarendon University Press, 1987), 133 
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adoptive kind, given presumably because of the merits of Jesus' deeds during his life. 
What makes Eunomius suspect in his enemies' eyes is, therefore, not a different 
understanding of the formal importance of Scripture in building theological 
arguments, but the way he reads the mystery of Christ and how he relates the 
scriptural revelation to other sources of authority for knowledge (ie: philosophy). 
Eunomius reads the Scriptures through some kaleidoscopic philosophical lens, which 
he wears with much less freedom (and, therefore, intelligence) than Gregory. 
Eunomius does not discover Christ's eternal glory while for Gregory and the whole 
tradition of Nicaea, the Scriptures have in their centre the image of the redeeming 
King. The whole difference between these two assessments consists in their sources of 
authority. That Christ cannot be the eternal God, Eunomius is convinced through 
dialectical reasoning. Somehow, he was right to say that for the natural thinking, 
Christ's eternal divinity and pre-existence is simply inconceivable. St Paul said even 
more, knowing that the preaching of the crucified and resurrected Christ - our 'God 
and Lord' - was 'a stumbling rock to Jews and folly to Gentiles' ( I Corinthians 1: 22). 
Gregory of Nyssa would not have denied that what the Greek philosophers taught 
about the principles of knowledge was turned up side down by the proclamation of 
Christ. Yet, for Gregory, the Greek logos was not normative, and the Scriptures 
always enjoyed more appraisal and affection than any source of authority. 
Eunomius is only able to accommodate his dogmatic statements to some of the 
biblical verses referring to Christ's apparent inferiority by following the canon 
bequeathed by Alius. 5 4 Unsurprisingly, Eunomius' quotations from the Scriptures 
used to portray Jesus Christ are selected in such a way that 'the passages describing 
his glory were played down at the expense of those describing his humiliation.' 5 5 As 
usual, the problem was the right understanding of Jesus Christ's identity. For the 
Arians of all sorts, it was impossible to conceive one subject sharing simultaneously a 
divine and human nature, something that could only make him two subjects {i.e. two 
Christs). The non-Nicene model of incarnation followed a very simple anthropological 
model of birth: divine Logos took flesh (John 1: 14) exactly as the soul is incorporated 
or, to put it differently, as the body is ensouled. This is a non-sophisticated 
anthropological model of segregation between body and soul, adopted by Lucian of 
5 4 M . V A N PARYS, 'Exegese et theologie dans les livres contre Eunome de Saint Gregoire de Nysse', in 
M . H A R L (ed.), Ecriture et culture philosophique dans la pensee de Gregoire de Nysse (Leiden: Brill, 
1971), 170 
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Antioch who, together with the partisans of Arius, refused to ascribe Christ any 
human soul, its place being taken by the Logos5 6. Subsequently, Eunomius found 
support for this anthropology in a literal reading of the text of Genesis, where Adam's 
creation presupposes first the shaping of body from dust and secondly God's pouring 
divine breathe into his flesh (i.e. ensouling). From this mixture of philosophical 
speculation and exegetical manoeuvring, Eunomius had to hand a depreciative image 
of Jesus Christ, which resisted all the theological paradoxes of which the Nicene 
partisans were so fond. I f God did not take flesh because he is per definitione 
impassible, then the narrative of incarnation had to be changed. Its subject, in order to 
keep his integrity, had to be a creature (Proverbs 8: 22; Col 1: 15), like the flesh (sarx) 
that he took. For Eunomius, there is no difference between the non-incarnated and the 
incarnated Son of God, and i f Christ is the one who speaks in both the Old and the 
New Testaments, he does so only as a messenger of the only true God, the Unbegotten 
essence. Being a skilful rhetorician, Eunomius wraps his theology in sonorous 
quotation from Scripture, but the way he does it is patently different from Gregory. 
Their starting points are poles apart, i f one considers Eunomius' reliance on deductive, 
a priori reasoning, the outcome of which he looked to validate by the Scriptures only 
retrospectively. 
Gregory's approach to the Scriptures was, both chronologically and 
methodologically, a way of prospecting the grounds of the Christian theology. 
Scripture was the only framework in which theological arguments could stand without 
great risks. Gregory started as a theologian by writing commentaries on the Scriptures, 
while Eunomius emerged in debates by defending Aetius' speculations about the 
Nicene Creed. In dealing with the Scriptures, Gregory is genuinely prospective, while 
Eunomius seems to provide only a retrospective usage of it. Eunomius does not strive 
for mystical, and prayerful inspiration from the Scriptures, but only for a formal 
confirmation of his former ideas. Hence, Eunomius' lack of flexibility in theologising 
became notorious. As Michel von Parys has pointed out, Eunomius' reading of the 
Gospel did not progress beyond that of Arius, which demonstrates that he elaborated 
his theological scheme independently of a true, dynamic and fruitful engagement with 
the Scriptures. One might present Eunomius' strategic approach to Scripture in the 
VAGGIONE, Eunomius, 107 
5 6 VAGGIONE, Eunomius, 114; HANSON, Doctrine of God, 604: '[It is] the universal Arian supposition 
that the Logos took the place of the psyche in Jesus Christ'. 
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following way: first, the heresiarch employed a highly selective hermeneutics , then 
he chose a suitable anthropological model which, consequently, prescribed a 
diminished Christology. Ultimately, this option outlined the whole scheme of his 
Trinitarian theology, which appeared to be, in the eyes of the Cappadocian fathers, 
merely a product of a bookish technologia.58 Gregory accused Eunomius of having 
abused the constitutive ambivalence of the Scriptural texts, which read without the 
'mind of Christ', could serve any corrupted intention5 9. 
Obviously, Gregory looked for a model of theological rationality which did not 
match at all Eunomius' own criteria. I would say that Gregory's reading of the 
Scriptures is teleological, not only in that he reads the Old Testament as prophecy of 
the New Testament, but in the very fact of presenting eschatology or the kingdom of 
the Spirit (basileus) as the measure of all understanding. The Scriptures are for 
Gregory the unsealed revelation of the bountiful in mercy God, who calls people 
through his divine Word to share ad infinitum the eternal life. We are called to read 
the Scriptures in the same way we step on a ladder, never looking backwards but 
gazing at the supreme goal. Akolouthia deciphered in the Scriptures and in the 
structure of reality has, in a fact, a futurist design. God is Providence (pronoia) and, 
therefore, what makes the Scriptures so authoritative is not their blind letter, but the 
unction of their words by the Holy Spirit. Gregory's model of rationality is pneumatic 
and teleological: always the future is the key for what happened in the past. In this 
respect, allegory is not an arbitrary and optional method of reading the Scriptures, but 
a disposition of mind begged by the Spirit and freely adopted by those who bear the 
name of Christ. One cannot acquire a right understanding of the Scriptures while still 
misrepresenting the Holy Trinity, for the following reason. As in God the Word is not 
separated from the Spirit, one cannot make the right interpretation of any scriptural 
paragraph without having purchased, before anything else, this right balance between 
5 7 V A G G I O N E (op. cit., 383-395) lists the following passages of Scripture used by non-Nicene: Genesis 
1: 26; 18: 1-33; 19: 24; 32: 23-31; Exodus 3: 1-15; Psalm 44 (45): 7-8; Psalm 109 (110): 1, 3, 4; 
Proverbs 8: 22-5; Job 38: 17; Joel 2: 25; Isaiah 1: 2; Matthew 4: 2 = Luke 4: 2; Matthew 20: 23 (cf. 
Mark 10: 40); Matthew 22: 43-45; Mark 12: 35-7; Luke 20: 41-4; Matthew 24: 3 6 (cf. Mark 13: 32); 
Matthew 36: 3 7 (cf. Mark 14: 33); Matthew 26: 38 (cf. Mark 14: 34); Matthew 26: 39; Matthew 27: 4 6 
(cf. Mark 15: 34); Matthew 28: 19; Mark 10: 18 (cf. Luke 18: 19); Luke 6: 12; Luke 22: 44; Luke 23: 
46; John 4: 6; John 4: 22-24; John 5: 19; John 14: 14-17; John 14: 28; John 20: 17; Acts 2: 36; Romans 
8: 29; Romans 16: 27; I Corinthians 1: 24; I Corinthians 11: 12; I Corinthians 15: 24-8; Philippians 2: 
6-11; Colossians 1: 15; I Timothy 1: 17. 
5 8 JOSEPH D E G H E L L I N C K , 'Quelques appreciations de la dialectique et d'Aristote durant les conflits 
trinitaires du IVe siecle', RHE 2 6 (1930), 5-42 ; E . VANDENUSSHE, 'La part de la dialectique dans la 
theologie d'Eunomius le technologue', RHE 4 0 (1944/1945) , 47-72 
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Word and Spirit, which is required by the orthodox teaching of God. Having the 
Spirit, one cannot miss the distinction between contradiction and paradoxes60, for 
example, which sometimes appears to be crucial. Unlike Eunomius' dialectic 
foundational approach, Gregory accepts circularity as an image of the divine nature, 
which in hermeneutical terms, make you refer the parts to the whole, and viceversa. 
This hermeneutical effort to accommodate the words with the Spirit has virtually no 
end, being just one way of contemplating God in his infinity. 
What Makes the Difference? 
It is exceptionally important to highlight the presence of the scriptural elements 
in the theological disputations between Gregory of Nyssa and Eunomius, and, more 
generally, among all the participants in the second generation of the Arian 
controversy. I f contemporary scholars are aware of this important source of 
divergences, they nevertheless regard it with an irresistible feeling of superiority. R. P. 
C. Hanson put it in this way: 
It was much more the presuppositions with which they approached the 
Biblical text that clouded their perceptions, the tendency to treat the Bible in 
an "atomic" way as i f each verse or set of verses was capable of giving direct 
information about Christian doctrine apart from its context, the "oracular" 
concept of the nature of the Bible, the incapacity with a few exceptions to 
take serious account of the background and circumstances and period of the 
writers. The very reverence with which they honoured the Bible as a sacred 
book stood in the way of their understanding i t 6 1 . 
In his turn, R. Vaggione assumes that only the lack of a historical and critical 
approach of the Scriptures left both Nicene and non-Nicene parties unable to achieve 
mutual understanding of any dogmatic topic 6 2. In a gloss on the Arian controversy, 
Frances M . Young also finds a source of conflict in the fact that 'texts from what had 
become the Old Testament continued to be anachronistically read as referring to 
Christ' 6 3 (my emphasis). But this very modern way of reading the controversy is 
anachronistic itself, because it contemptuously regards the actors of those theological 
59 In Cant, 'Prologue', GNO VI, 12 (PG 44, 764) 
6 0 De homin. Opif. prologue (PG 44, 128) 
6 1 HANSON, Doctrine of God, 848-49 
6 2 VAGGIONE, Eunomius of Cyzicus, 138 
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debates as being misled by 'naive assumptions' about the nature of Scripture, which 
nowadays seem to be for so many of us completely untenable. But this is to forget 
several important hermeneutical rules. First, i f the modern reader has the right to be 
suspicious about the authority of the biblical writings, he wi l l never be able to discern 
the true story standing behind any text, not to mention the Scriptures, contextualised 
by style, composition, historical background, etc. As Hans-Georg Gadamer64 has 
definitively demonstrated from a phenomenological standpoint, one cannot possibly 
operate sound distinctions like those between, respectively: intentio auctoris, intentio 
operis, and intentio lectoris. Because of our continual immersion in the world of 
language, mediated by tradition and lived from inside historical consciousness, one 
cannot claim to have a better insight over the meaning of a work of art than the author 
himself. On the contrary, due to the constant process of subjective temporalisation 
(which Gregory calls diastasis), the ful l auctorial intention remains hidden to the 
author himself. Pace Schleiermacher, modern consciousness simply cannot break with 
the continual historical determination of subjectivity and therefore, is not allowed to 
judge {i.e. guess) what, for example, Scripture could really mean in its own time. One 
important conclusion of Gadamer's brilliant demonstration reinforces the patristic 
understanding of Scriptures as a Lebenswelt, with its own rules of constitution. It was 
from the very beginning a nonnegotiable article of faith for the entire Christian 
community to consider Scripture an undivided corpus of more or less patent 
meanings. Therefore, it would be simply wrong to maintain that participants in 
dogmatic controversies in the fourth century were not aware - on both sides, pro and 
contra Nicaea - of the possibility of reading the Scripture in absence of their own 
hypothesis (i.e.: Jesus Christ as the Word of God): the Jews or the Gnostics publicly 
criticised their assessments. As we have seen, figures like Arius and Athanasius, 
Eunomius and Gregory, whether good or bad theologians, were all ready to quarrel 
over the meaning of one or another biblical verse, with a lack of irony which no 
modern historian or even theologian would be ready to praise. Yet, they were not as 
blind as we sometimes think. Like his brother Basil, St Gregory of Nyssa shows that 
he was acutely aware about the multi-dimensional structure of the Scriptures, whose 
6 3 Y O U N G , Biblical Exegesis, 34-35 
6 4 H . - G . G A D A M E R , Wahrheit una" Methode (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1960), E T by G . Barden and J. 
Cumming (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975). 
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understanding he never considered an easy task65. In one of his last homilies on the 
Song of the Songs, Gregory lays down this hermeneutic principle of extrinsic 
inspiration: 'Because the Song's divine words contain some difficult, veiled ideas 
concealed in obscurity, we need to apply greater attention to the text; rather, we need 
greater help through prayer and guidance from the Holy Spirit'. In contrast to the 
opinions of some modern authors (and, partly, to some of his contemporaries, like 
Aetius and Eunomius), Gregory was sure that no discursive intellect is capable of 
resolving the difficulties found in the Scriptures. For him, it was a matter of respect 
and self-consistency to read the Scriptures within a subjective context closest as 
possible to the original situation in which the 'divine authors' wrote them, namely 
under the inspiration of the Spirit. There was no objective method available to St 
Gregory, that could lead to the truth of the Scriptures66. Christ is simultaneously the 
way leading towards, and the truth emerging from, the Scriptures (John 14: 6; Luke 
24). The enigmatic scriptural statements are not to be avoided, but appropriately 
approached from their genetic and teleological perspective, which was, is and wi l l be 
that of edifying the body of Christ. 
At this point, the Nicene and Arians largely diverged in their opinions. I f 
indeed, it is hard to imagine Gregory and Eunomius talking over the theological 
authority of the biblical narrative, one finds, as we have seen, a significant gap 
between their scriptural hermeneutics , which only enhanced the conflict between 
two theological methodologies. Albeit remaining guilty of not being modern in their 
'non-suspicious' way of reading the Scriptures, Eunomius and Gregory undertook the 
Gospel from two radically different standpoints. Gregory's success against Eunomius 
resides in his generous, largely imaginative and powerfully spiritual consideration of 
Scripture. Gregory's usage of the Scriptures is far more profound and subtle than any 
of the Anomean theologians, which, on the whole, can explain the popularity of 
Nicene theologians. This has little to do, I suspect, with the Antiochian background of 
Eunomius and the Alexandrine theological formation of St Gregory of Nyssa. The 
battle is between two theological grammars, having not so much to do with the usage 
of allegorical or literal exegesis. Gregory's appeal to the Scriptures is both traditional 
and creative, imposing new standards for the orthodox biblical heremeneutics over the 
65 In Cant. Cantic. X (ET 187; GNO VI. 294.25-295.1-2) 
6 6 It is important to notice that for Gadamer himself, comprehension of truth has a definite liturgical 
character {Truth and Method, op. cit., 108-114) 
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centuries. With more relevance to the debate over orthodoxy, nobody should miss one 
of the most important images that emerge from St Gregory's writings: that of a teacher 
unconditionally obedient to the divine Word. This attitude enforced new criteria of 
rationality within the orthodox theology, and severe limitation for any possible 
prospect of natural theology. Syllogistic demonstration (on which Eunomius could bet 
without hesitation) was left far behind the project of spiritual persuasion. Thinking of 
Max Weber's concept of 'charismatic leader', one could easily imagine the immense 
popularity of bishop Basil of Caesarea, whose icons the two Gregorys depicted and 
their best. Having a sober and scriptural theology, the Cappadocians could impose 
themselves in front of their communities as charismatic leaders of the Catholic 
Church, found under threat. 
By reading and proclaiming the Scriptures under genuine spiritual inspiration, 
Gregory and his fellows succeeded in capturing the imagination of the Christian 
people much better than Eunomius. The 'ontologist' jargon of the latter could never 
fulf i l the simplest task of the Christian theologian: the need to be being simple and 
yet, not simplistic, and popular but not populist. The Scriptures did not lose their 
intrinsic complexity in the hands of Gregory. He called for reading divided in multiple 
degrees of comprehension, taking into consideration also the vast diversity of biblical 
genres, their linguistic peculiarities, and even historical settings. Gregory knew that 
read without any spiritual preparation, scriptural excerpts could be misleading, 
triggering vicious consequences. On a hermeneutical level, the literary war between 
Gregory of Nyssa and Eunomius of Cyzicus had a common ground in the authority of 
the inspired Scriptures, equally respected on both sides of the battlefield. It is an irony, 
and quite bitter, that this engagement with the Church's most sacred texts only 
amplified the hostility among the ecclesiastical parties of the fourth century. Yet, this 
is not surprising: the Scriptures were firstly very urgent and authoritative (while being 
of sacred inspiration) and, secondly, they were polyphonic, like any other collection of 
texts. The whole problem was to make of this polyphony an organic and cohesive 
body of meanings; in short, to perform a symphony. The Nicene and non-Nicene 
representatives could agree that, in principle, the only conductor able to produce the 
necessary harmony was Jesus Christ. Perhaps it is right to say that not only for the 
orthodox authors, ' i t is Christ who is being explained through the medium of 
VAGGIONE, Eunomius, 129-147 
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Scripture, not Scripture itself that is being exegeted.' Yet, instead of bringing a 
solution, this reference to Christ made all the difference. The way the fourth century 
theologians regarded Jesus Christ was fundamentally different: for the Nicene Fathers, 
he was 'truly God from truly God', while for Aetius and Eunomius, he was lacking 
even in similarity with God the Father. Neither Scripture, nor philosophy, but Christ 
was first - for Eunomius and his forebears - 'the stumbling block' in the long disputes 
with St Basil of Caesarea and St Gregory of Nyssa. This crucial difference in 
understanding the person of Jesus Christ elucidates their relationship towards 
Scripture and the other divergences between Eunomius and Gregory, such as for 
example, their usage of philosophy. With Christ as creature, one could only pluck - as 
Eunomius of Cyzicus did - the fruits of the wisdom from outside, which 'are aborted 
before reaching the light of the knowledge of God' 6 9 . Without a truly divine Christ, 
Eunomius could not share neither Gregory's scepticism towards the autonomous 
intelligence of human being, nor his enduring trust in God's power to 'make foolish 
the wisdom of this world' (I Corinthians 1: 20). 
JOHN B E H R , 'The Paschal Foundation of Christian Theology', STVQ 45 (2001) 2, 115-36, here 123 
Vit. Moys. H. 165 (PG 44, 337 B 14-16; ed. J. Danielou, SC Ibis, 34) 
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III. PROTOLOGY OF LANGUAGE 
The Ministry of Hands 
Gregory's anthropological considerations are determinative for what nowadays 
one might call a 'theological theory of language'. Obviously, man's power of 
reasoning governs his linguistic performance. Nothing speaks so clearly about this 
human vocation (to think, to speak, and to write) than the physical attributes of man, 
which make him not a 'microcosmos' (an appellation against which Gregory protests 
explicitly), but a sure candidate for divinisation. The bodily constitution of man has 
two distinctive traits, which even the most developed animals cannot share: standing 
vertically and having free hands. The eighth chapter of his famous treatise 'On the 
Making of Man' (written, like his CE, in Basil's memory) bears witness to Gregory's 
outstanding insight. To begin with, Gregory plays upon a false etymology, assuming 
that anthropos is a composite noun, merging the preposition ana- ('upward') with the 
verb tropein ('to orient, to direct'). Then, he stresses the connection between the 
vertical physical constitution (which already speaks of man's creation 'in the image 
and the likeness of God') and our intellectual abilities, namely the capacity to think, to 
speak, and to write. 
Especially do these ministering hand adapt themselves to the requirements 
of the reason: indeed, if one were to say that the ministration of hands is a 
special property of the rational nature, he would not be entirely wrong; 
and that not only because his thought turns to the common and obvious 
fact that we signify our reasoning by means of natural employment of our 
hands in written characters. It is true that this fact, that we speak by 
writing, and, in a certain way, converse by the aid of our hands, preserving 
sounds by the forms of the alphabet, is not unconnected with the 
endowment of reason; but I am referring to something else when I say that 
the hand co-operate with the bidding of reason1. 
One cannot miss the allusion made by Gregory to the ministry of priesthood in 
which hands and mind go and work together. Man is called to be not only minister at 
the altar of God, but also priest and deacon of all creation. But Gregory also points the 
importance of the order in creation, which somehow is repeated in human's own 
constitution. Stars are created first, as protectors of life on the earth; grassland comes 
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after, as Heimat for the wild beasts; eventually, man is made out of earth (which 
inherits the mineral, the vegetal and the animal life) and spirit, poured in the sleeping 
body of Adam. If man is expected to reign over the creatures (tamed only by the 
human reason), it is because spirit should rule man's senses. There is a certain 
progress and teleology in God's creation, and as in Aristotle's cosmology, causa 
efficiens determines causa finalis. One could even speak about a doctrine of continual 
creation, since Gregory explicitly declares that 'no single thing existing, whether an 
object of sense or of thought, is formed spontaneously or fortuitously, but that 
everything discoverable in the world is linked to the Being Who transcends all 
existences (tes panton ton onton hyperkeimenes physeds), and possesses there the 
source of its continuance {ten aitian tes hyparxeds echei).' The progress is given from 
above and affects the material structure of the universe, as it happened in the first days 
of the creation. 'We may suppose that nature makes an ascent as it were by steps (per 
gradum) -1 mean the various properties of life - from the lower to the perfect form'3. 
This order is respected at all the levels of creation, and echoed also in the Scriptures, 
which have their narrative bodies (the historical one being the 'garment of skin') and 
yet, just a single spiritual skopos4. 
This sequential order reflected in God's creation, and above all in man's dual 
constitution, has a musical beauty5. The balance between intellectual proclivities and 
physical aptitudes is shown at best in man's capacity of correlating his mind's 
decisional acts with the extraordinary mobility of his hands. The instruments used by 
musicians are designed not only for the sounds that man likes hearing, but, says 
Gregory, they befit first our manual intelligence. Gregory of Nyssa is aware that 
musical instruments - like the technological products6 - are only the projection (by 
prolongation) of our organs. Not before noting en passant that, in the 20 t h century, this 
1 'On the Making of Man' (VIII. 2), NPNF V, 393a (PG 44, 144 B12-C9) 
2 NPNF V, 309a (GNO I. 396. 19-20) 
3 'On the Making of Man' (VIII. 7), NPNF V, 394b (PG 44, 148 B10-C1) 
4 J. DANIELOU, '«Akolouthia» chez Gregoire de Nysse', VC 7 (1953), 154-170 (reprinted in a modified 
version in Temps et etre chez Gregoire de Nysse, 18-50) 
5 H. I. M A R R O U , 'Une theologie de la musique chez Gregoire de Nysse', in J. FONTAINE & CH. 
KANNENGIESER (ed.), Epektasis. Melanges patristiques offerts au Cardinal J. Danielou, Paris, 1972, 
500-509; Marrou's references are restricted mainly to St Gregory's commentaries In Ps. 
6 'On the Making of Man' (VIII. 8), NPNF V, 394b (PG 148 C-D): 'As you may see musicians 
producing their music according to the form of their instruments, and not piping with harps nor harping 
upon flutes, so it must needs be that the organisation of these instruments of ours should be adapted for 
reason, that when struck by vocal instruments it might be able to sound properly for the use of words'. 
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case was made convincingly by the prominent Russian theologian Pavel Florensky7, 
let us read again Gregory's extensive description, in the most vivid images, of man's 
gifts: 
For this reason the hands were attached to the body: for though we can 
count up very many uses in daily life for which these skilfully contrived 
and helpful instruments, our hands, that easily follow every art and every 
operation, alike in war and peace, are serviceable, yet nature added them 
to our reason body pre-eminently for the sake of reason. For if man were 
destitute of hands, the various parts of his face would certainly have been 
arranged like those of the quadrupeds, to suit the purpose of his feeding: 
so that its form would have been lengthened out and pointed towards the 
nostrils, and his lips would have projected from his mouth, lumpy, and ' 
stiff, and thick, fitted for taking up the grass, and his tongue would either 
have lain between his teeth, of a kind to match his lips, fleshly, and hard, 
and rough, assisting his teeth to deal with what came under his grinder, or 
it would have been moist and hanging out at the side like that of dogs and 
other carnivorous beasts, projecting through the gaps in his jagged row of 
teeth. If, then, our body had no hand, how could articulate sound have 
been implanted in it, seeing that the form of the parts of the mouth would 
not have had the configuration proper for the use of speech, so that man 
must of necessity have either bleated, or "baaed", or barked, or neighed, or 
bellowed like oxen, or asses, or uttered some bestial sounds (e theriode 
mukethmon aphienai)!* 
In other words, homo faber is the proof for homo sapiens, and some 
contemporary evolutionist thinkers did not miss Gregory's contribution to the history 
of scientific ideas9. Gregory's perceptive description of the complementary role 
played by hands in their dialogue with the mind must have been entirely novel to his 
contemporaries. However, it is very important to understand that Gregory's praise of 
man is not justified only by the latter's intellectual capacity. It is not the size of the 
7 I was able to read Florenksy's essay only in Romanian translation, cfP. F L O R E N S K Y , Perspectiva 
inversa si alte scrieri, trad. Tariana Nicolescu, Alexandra Nicolescu si Ana Maria Brezuleanu 
(Bucure§ti: Humanitas, 1997) 140 etsq. 
8 De horn. op.VWi (PG 44, 148 D3-149A9) 
9 The above fragment from De Hominis Opificio is included as motto of the famous book of the French 
ethnologist A. L E R O I - G O U R H A N , Le Geste et la parole vol I&II (Paris: Albin Michel, 1964-1965); in 
the orthodox area, see A L E X A N D E R KALOMIROS, 'God's Breath in Ape's Body', Epiphany 10 (Fall 
1989-Wint 1990), 10-23; "The Eternal Will: Some Thoughts Concerning the Scriptural and Patristic 
Understanding of the Creation of Man and the World', Christian Activist 11 (1997). Dr. Kalomiros 
defended the theory of evolution with reference to Basil the Great and Gregory of Nyssa, but he was 
harshly refuted by Hieromonk SERAPHIM R O S E and D A M A S C E N E CHRISTENSEN, Genesis, Creation and 
Early Man (Saint Herman of Alaska Brotherhood, 2000), 514-515, 522-27, 540-544; Indications 
against an evolutionist interpretation of Gregory are given in NPNF V, 305b (GNO I. 387. 13-16): 'our 
humanity is preserved continually, from first to last, within the same circle of qualities, losing none 
which it had at the beginning, any more than it acquires any which it had not then.' 
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brain that makes man superior to other creatures, but his linguistic capacities, and the 
iconic structure of his being. The linguistic abilities were, strictly, inconceivable in the 
absence of some exceptional physiological aptitudes. Verticality gives man not only a 
deeper horizon and more profound visual perception, but also manual freedom and the 
capacity of articulating a very complex bodily and vocal language. Gregory is aware 
that hands are not only for writing, but can articulate a bodily language, to which he 
clearly alludes when saying: 'we speak by writing, and, in a certain way, converse by 
the aid of our hands'10. There is a mutual correlation between the intellectual capacity 
of the human brain and the manual skills, and yet, Gregory avoids a materialist 
account of man's creation. What makes man remarkable is his capacity to illustrate all 
the gifts of the wild nature, imitating and surpassing them. Man is the crown of God's 
creation not only because he performs unrivalled intellectual exercises (in 
mathematics or other theoretical arts), but also due to his capacity to shape forms of 
beauty11. The human mind is for Gregory 'a skilled musician (hosper tis mousikes 
12 
empeiros on)' able to conduct the 'animated instruments' of his body. Human 
language does not signify a brute state of affairs, in the way that animals react by 
various screams while they sense fear, hunger or sexual desire. Man contemplates 
perfection, since God 'did not give, but imparted him (ouk dedoken all'oti 
metedoken)' mind and reason. Since tonality, syntax and harmony are crucial in the 
performance of human language, Gregory carries out his musical metaphor in 
imagining the human body as the scene of an invisible concert performed by 
innumerable organs. He compares 'breath' with a 'flute' and the 'mouth' with a 
'lyre', which strings are invisibly played and attuned at the request of the mind. 
Being given in the Garden of Eden, the gift of language is expected to perform 
a musical symphony. Yet, because the biblical idea of paradise does not cover only the 
rustic Eden, and is paralleled also by the heavenly Jerusalem, Gregory compares the 
map of our mind with the complexity of a polis, in which different buildings and 
avenues satisfy the need for beauty and diversity14. On 'the spacious territory of our 
1U De horn. opif. VIII. 2 (PG 44, 144B12-C9) 
1 1 A. M E R E D I T H , 'The good and the beautiful in Gregory of Nyssa', in ERMENEUMATA (Heidelberg: 
Carl Winter Universitatsverlag, 1990), 133-145 
1 2 'On the Making of Man' (IX. 2), NPNF V, 395a (PG 44, 149 CI-2) 
1 3 'On the Making of Man' (IX. 1), NPNF V, 395a (PG 44, 149 B4-5) 
1 4 'On the Making of Man' (X. 4), NPNF V, 396a (PG 44, 152 C12-D6). For an excellent research in 
Gregory of Nyssa's psychology, see M. R. BARNES, "The Polemical Context and Content of Gregory of 
Nyssa's Psychology', Journal of Medieval Theology and Philosophy 4 (1994), 1-24 
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mind', knowledge gathers impressions coming through various sensible canals, and 
yet, what makes a unity of this diversity, is beyond the bodily senses. There is no 
physiological organ - not even the brain - which in Gregory's anthropology could be 
identified with the residence of human thought, which is linguistically determined. 
The miracle of thought is not more arresting that the miracle of musical performance, 
since at stake, in both cases, is the power of unifying the multiplicity and the ability of 
discerning one telos (and, therefore, the akolouthia) amidst the profligate diversity of 
sensation or emotions. Both thought and musical performances resemble the mystery 
of God's simplicity, which does not exclude difference. Our triune God cannot be 
grasped in the logic of binary propositions, but only through the submission to 
darkness of all the senses. To express the ultimate mystery of the triune God requires a 
sacrificium intellectus, since it integrates multiplicity into unity15. Stressing the 
parallel existing between God and man made in the divine image, Gregory celebrates 
incomprehensibility as the reverse of our call for the infinite resemblance to God. 
For Gregory of Nyssa, symphony is not only the archetype of scriptural 
hermeneutics, but also that of the linguistic performances. This is not only because 
language, like music, is learned and practised as a skill. There is not only a structural 
connivance, but also a shared finality in musical and linguistic performances. 
Thinking, speaking or writing should convey harmony and beauty, if they are to be 
regarded as revelation of one truth. Contemplating truth means for Gregory to grasp 
the beauty of the creation (Wisdom 13:5), which is better expressed by the non-verbal 
art of music. Grasping the truth is not a matter of objective validation of one statement 
against one fact, but the poetic intuition of the dynamic process of the self-disclosure 
of truth. Knowing truly the truth implies rigour and charity, which ultimately needs 
ascetic struggle with the chaotic forces dwelling in our body, mind and imagination. 
'Tuning' the wild passions of the body is not a goal per se, and is meant to open the 
horizons of limpid, unified, all-inclusive perceptions. It is no surprise that Gregory can 
hold a strong admiration, simultaneously, for mathematics and for the musical arts16, 
both related to what he calls 'epinoia1 (imaginative faculty). And it so happens that 
both arts imply a process of abstraction or, in other words, the taming of our arbitrary 
1 5 'On the Making of Man' (XI. 2): 'How is there diversity in unity? How is unity maintained in 
diversity (pos en poikilia ton en)?' (NPNF V, 396b, PG 44, 156 A9-10) 
1 6 M. POLANYI, Personal Knowledge. Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1958), 193: 'like mathematics, music articulates a vast range of rational relationships for 
the mere pleasure of understanding them' 
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imagination. Symphony means diversity, but requires rules of constituting the unity, 
the meaning, and everything beyond ('the sublime'). 
Ultimately, language's eminent pattern is that of a melody, to which the beauty 
of all parts of the body and faculties of the mind must contribute. This explains why 
prayerful doxology best befits the vocation of the human mind. We are at our best 
when we sing, suggests Gregory, and it becomes apparent why the Old Testament 
calls its mystical book par excellence 'the Song of Songs'. But the song is not of an 
ordinary kind, comforting the sensual desires of the broken heart, 'for the heart is 
deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked'17. It is the nuptial song of the 
purified heart, which longs for God's secret beauty and his infinite love. 
Conversion and Conversation 
In the light of the scriptural account of creation, Gregory is ready to accept that 
Adam has been given the right to call the creatures 'upon their names' after the 
fulfilment of all of God's demiurgic acts. If man was made the crown of the whole 
creation, then the gift of language can be regarded as the last of Adam's endowments 
(which pre-existed Eve's conception). Without being put in relationship with the 
living world (and, afterwards, in close relation to his wife), Adam would not have 
needed language18, not even to address God 1 9. Presumably, Adam was addressing God 
in thoughts that needed no vocal utterance whatsoever. Since Gregory considers the 
sexual determination of the human being (in contrast with the immaterial reproduction 
of the angels) as a post-lapsarian reality, one can imagine that Adam had access to a 
passive knowledge of God, which did not need any discursive articulation. 
Confirmation is given in the book of Genesis, which presents language as a 
thoroughly human instrument. Language seems to fulfil the vital need for interaction 
1 7 T. S. E L I O T , 'Choruses from "The Rock", V , in Collected Poems 1909-1962 (London: Faber&Faber, 
1963), 173 
1 8 NPNF V, 266b (GNO I. 273. 5-8) 
1 9 Though not explicitly expressed by Gregory of Nyssa, the idea occurs in JOHN CHRYSOSTOMOS, 
Homilies to Matthew (prologue), NPNF X. I, la (PG 67, 13A 1-8): 'It were indeed meet for us not at all 
to require the aid of the written Word, but to exhibit a life so pure, that the grace of the Spirit should be 
instead of books to our souls, and that as these are inscribed with ink, even so should our hearts be with 
the Spirit. But, since we have utterly put away from us this grace, come, let us at any rate embrace the 
second best course.' 
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and dialogue that characterised human beings ab initio. If God called upon Adam, 
then Adam had to speak to the creatures. Giving names to the beasts, Adam made the 
first step to tame them. Yet, the goal of this act does not reside, apparently, in the 
utilitarian plan of domesticating the animals. Read metaphorically, the biblical scene 
shows Adam consecrating, almost in an Eucharistic way, the gifts given to him by 
God. One cannot forget that some of the animals were, later on, components of the 
sacrifices requested by God (and which, above all, was to test man's gratefulness). 
Linguistic performance appears to be from the beginning an act of improvisation, and 
therefore, of improving somehow what has been already given. Usage of words 
reveals not only authority, but also opens an intermediary territory, where the subtle 
art of dialogue can be played in sounds and silence (the latter being, again, 
indispensable in musical performance21). To carry on Gregory's thoughts, one could 
say that language is ambivalent and manifests not only the potential of dominion, but 
also the virtue of recognition, valuing silence as the privileged space of hospitality. To 
call upon somebody requires already the preparation for attentive silence. Any 
responsible speech promises a time of listening, which again means hope, faith, and 
love. Adam received the gift of language in order to apprehend better the wonders of 
God's creation, and yet, was still unable to perceive their essence. This structural 
incomprehensibility of creation, emphasised on many occasions by Gregory, outlines 
the need for conversation, and for conversion. Called to dialogue, Adam could grow in 
his innocent sense of wonder and praise, learning new things and still not being guilty 
of curiosity. While talking to Adam, Eve could have explored the inexhaustibility of a 
person made in the 'image of God'. It is the image of God that makes human being a 
mystery, and, in the modern sense of the word, a person. Hosted before anything else 
I follow here the interpretation of AUGUSTINE, De Gen. Ad litt. IX, v, 9 (PL 34, 396): 'Quanto enim 
congruentius ad convivendum et colloquendum duo amici pariter quam vir et mulier habitarent?'. 
Language socialises, opens new worlds, and becomes a measure of the human generosity. On this, 
many modern thinkers, both Jewish and Christians, point in their commentaries that Adam's gift of 
language encapsulate the premises of a dialogical philosophy. H.-G. GADAMER, Truth and Method, E T 
by Garrett Barden and John Cumming (New York: Seabury Press, 1975). E . LEVIN AS, Totalite et infini 
(Paris, 1963), J. DERRIDA, De I'hospitalite (Paris: Caiman Levy, 1997), J.-L. CHRETIEN, L 'arche de la 
parole (Paris: PUF, 1999), and also RUB EM ALVES, The Warrior, the Prophet and the Poet (London: 
SCM Press, 2002). 
2 1 The adoption of an impoverished style in painting (Malevich, Rothko), sculpture (Giaccometti, 
Brancusi) and music (the minimalists), during the whole 20 t h century, is very telling. In music, this 
kenotic usage of silence is most striking in Arvo Part's work. Cf. P A U L H I L L I A R D , Arvo Part (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), 1 
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by the language , which emulated the Edenic gardens, Adam and Eve's conversations 
must have been unparalleled, and they remain so. The words of their language 
conveyed their thoughts in transparency, and only freedom of choice shifted their 
minds from the marvellous experience of incomprehensibility (which was poetic, 
resembling God) to the dramatic, pitiable and corrupted experience of 
misunderstanding. Ambiguity became real only when Adam's freedom chose 
autonomy (which is, actually, self-love and lack of faith)23. Then, the darkening of 
thought collapsed the previous luminosity of human language, and hermeneutics was 
instituted as, at least, an 'art of divination'24. Since Adam's fall, life itself became a 
foreign language to be endlessly learnt. If before his alienation from Eden, Adam 
enjoyed the spiritual pleasure of peaceful conversation, afterwards he had to undergo 
conversion. Mind lost its limpidity and words need to be restored to their former 
iconic purports. In the post-lapsarian condition of humankind, uttering word runs 
always a risk, that of openness and generosity, which can succumb to garrulity. Too 
easily and too often words become like 'waterless clouds, carried along by winds, and 
fruitless trees in late autumn, twice dead, uprooted' (Jude 1: 13). This uprooted 
character of words Martin Heidegger alludes to, in his famous critique of daily gossip 
(das Gerede),25 by which one talks about everything and nothing, falsely pledging our 
needs to live in the present, and to have everything at hand. Talking, 'we are like 
sailors who must rebuild their ship on the open sea'26. Words are exposed to 
misapprehension because our language is ambiguous and our identity unstable. With 
the same tongue, 'we bless the Lord and Father, and with it we curse men, who are 
made in the likeness of God; from the same mouth come blessing and cursing' (James 
3: 9-10). When the heart lacks love, the word can become like a sword, and language 
the most powerful tool for destructive purposes. Confronted with this double-sided 
MARTIN HEIDEGGER, Unterwegs zur Sprache, GA 12 (Franlcfurt-am-Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 
1985), 255. 
2 3 T H . KOBUSCH, 'Name un Sein. Zu den sprachphilosophischen Grundlagen in der Schrift Contra 
Eunomium des Gregor von Nyssa', in L . F. MATEO-SECO & J. L . BASTERO (Eds.), El » Contra 
Eunomium I« en la production literaria de Grigorio de Nisa (Pamplona, 1988), 247-269, here 256: 
'Die Lehre [Gregors] von der Sprache ist in einer Philosophic der Freiheit begriindet, nach der Gott den 
Menschen als freies Wesen, mithin auch den freien Gebrauch der Vernunft und der Sprache will.' 
2 4 The expression belongs to Fr. Schleiermacher and does not do full justice either to hermeneutics, or 
to divination. 
2 5 M. HEIDEGGER, Sein undZeit, GA 2 (Frankfurt-am-Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), §35 , 244 
2 6 OTTO NEURATH, 'Protocol Sentences', in A . J . A Y E R (ed.), Logical Positivism (London, 1959), 201 
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constitution of our speech , those who look for perfection decide that silence is very 
often the best solution. Since Jesus himself, facing Pontius Pilate, remained quiet 
(Matthew 27: 14; John 19: 9), silence was regarded very often the golden virtue of 
Christian monasticism , though its valuation can be traced back to the age of the early 
Greek thinkers29. 
As we have already seen, Gregory of Nyssa 3 0 is not at all foreign to this 
apophatic tradition, which still does not regard language as pure negativity. As the 
light spot on a prism displays beauty in colours, silence makes possible the 
articulation of language. In Gregory we see at best how ordinary language is, in fact 
'fossil poetry' (R. W. Emerson), since the most ordinary words can be the sparkle of 
the most meaningful images in the laudatory performance, which again, cannot avoid 
silent awe in God's presence. 'Be still before the Lord, and wait patiently for him' 
(Psalm 37: 7), says David, while the Prophet Isaiah is told: 'Listen to me in silence' 
(Isaiah 41: 1). Being 'the contemplation of the invisible things', prayer is the greatest 
virtue31 that outlines the 'margins of silence' (VI. Lossky) 3 2 which speak of God more 
distinctly than 'thousands words in a tongue' (I Corinthians 14: 18). 
Angelic Silence and Human Speech 
Unlike Augustine (and even less than any of the Jewish medieval 
Kabbhalists), Gregory does not like speculating on the possible nature of the Adamic 
language. Yet, he allusively refers to the immediate character of the angelic speech: 
M . HEIDEGGER, op. cit., 232: '[Die Zweideutigkeit] spielt die Neugier immer das zu, was sie sucht, 
und gibt dem Gerede den Schein, als wurde in ihm alles entschieden'. 
2 8 Valuable references are to be found in P. MlQUEL, 'Silence', DS t. X I V (Paris: Beauchesne, 1990), 
830-42; IGNATIUS OF ANTIOCH, Magn. 8, 2 (SC lObis, Paris: Cerf, 19694, 86); G R E G O R Y OF N Y S S A , In 
Eccl. VII (SC 416, 375-387; GNO V. 410-416); D E N Y S T H E AREOPAGITE, Theologia mystica 1 speaks 
of 'silence initiatory into the mysteries' (PG 3, 997A-B); JOHN CLIMACOS, The Ladder XI; ISAAC T H E 
S Y R I A N (De perfectione 66) calls silence 'the mystery of the age to come'. For Ephrem the Syrian, see 
P A U L S. R U S S E L L , 'Ephraem the Syrian on the Utility of Language and the Place of Silence', JECS 8 
(2000) 1,21-37 
2 9 Cf. M. DUPUY, 'Silence', DSt. X I V (Paris: Beauchesne, 1990), 843-859. References are given for 
P L A T O , Parm. 142a; PLOTINUS, Enn. V, 8. 5; III. 8. 9; PROCLUS, Theol. Plat. IV, 9. 
3 0 NPNF V, 260a (GNO /. 254. 27) 
31 De or. dom. I. 1 (PG 1124C): 'meden tes proseuches einai ton kata ten zoen timion anoteron' 
3 2 V. L O S S K Y , In the Image and the Likeness of God (London: 1975), 151. An inspiring application of 
Lossky's expression is to be found in A. L O U T H , Discerning the Mystery. Essay on the Nature of 
Theology, Oxford: Clarendon, 19992) 91-95. 
3 3 On this, J . K. SMITH, The Fall of Interpretation: Philosophical Foundations for a Creational 
Hermeneutic (Downers Grove, IL: Inter Varsity Press, 2000). Smith draws heavily on Augustine's 
theory of language in his research on the paradisiacal language. 
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For, in case of immaterial intellectual nature (noeras physeds), the mental 
energy is speech (he kata ton noun energeia logos estiri), which has no 
need of material instruments of communication (hyperesiaf4. 
If the concept of speech is still appropriate for defining the communication among the 
angels, in respect to God such description is obviously absurd, since 'the True Life is 
an actuality actuating itself (energeia tis estin he ontos zoe eauten energousa)^5. In 
Thomas Aquinas' terminology, God is actus purus and, therefore, he does not need to 
make himself known. Like sexuality, divisive language appears to be the consequence 
of Adam's fall. Gregory is confident that 'we should have no need of using words and 
names if we could otherwise inform each other of our pure mental feelings (gymna 
[...] ta tes dianoias kinemata)'36. Purity of mind37, therefore, diminishes 
proportionally the use of verbose communication, and those who become similar to 
the angels (or, in human words, to children), can understand better the mystery of 
silence (infans). For immediate communication, which is realisable without words 
between minds of the same, one needs only purity of thoughts. When this level is 
achieved, either through words, or in silence, human mind can make a miraculous 
connection with the realm of the invisible. This explains how words invested with 
personal energy in which dwells the Holy Spirit can perform miracles, as one finds in 
the narratives of the Gospels38. It is very telling, from this viewpoint, that the biblical 
Greek language uses the word 'semeia' for 'miracle'. 
To reach the status of a holy receptacle, language - like body and sexuality -
needs language needs discipline. Gregory of Nyssa is fully aware that we are only in 
the possession of a broken instrument, which constantly needs correction, like our 
thoughts. He does not have the naivety of some of those theologians and humanists 
who believed that the roots of the primordial language are somehow traceable. 
Gregory thought that, apart from Adam's fall, another event marked the condition of 
human language: the Babelian confusion of tongues, which, in the variant of the 
3 4 NPNF V, 289b (GNO I. 340. 19-21) 
3 5 NPNF V, 287a (GNO I. 333. 26-27) 
3 6 NPNF V, 289b (GNO I. 340. 21-24) 
3 7 The concept of pure mind occurs also in Eunomius' First Apology (A I, 20. 3-4), but has a merely 
philosophical sense: it is required by the examination of the nature of the universe. 
8 D. M A G U E R A T , 'Magie, guerison et parole dans Les Actes des Apotres', Etudes theologiques et 
religieuses 72 (1997) 2, 197-208 
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biblical myth, tore apart also the ethnic unity of humankind . Gregory makes clear 
that language is necessary and performed only in a disrupted world, characterised by 
diastasis40. Since we are made ex nihilo, our knowledge is never substantial41, and, 
therefore, human language remains imperfect. Gregory does not seem to hope that a 
'return to the things themselves ' (Husserl's dictum: 'Zuriick zu den Sachen selbstr) 
could be, in any sense, possible. 'Things in themselves' are to be known only by God, 
while man can only grasp their contextual meaning. Man can acquire incomplete 
knowledge only since his very nature is ambivalent (spiritual and material). Aristotle 
has clearly established that one knowing subject and one known object cannot come 
together if their characters do not possess homogeneity42 (in hermeneutics, this 
sentence can be translated as such: every disagreement includes an agreement). 
Gregory leaves substantial knowledge to God, who is the infinite Creator of all things. 
But to man was allowed a deflected knowledge of the finite creatures (with whom we 
share materiality), and 'an affective knowledge'43 of God, in whose image man has 
been made. On both sides (horizontal and vertical), our thought and knowledge 
encounters limitations, and together with that, a call for infinite surpassing (epektasis). 
All 'divine names' derive from 'human names', and express tangentially God's 
immanence in the economy of creation44. 
From Babel to Pentecost 
3 S NPNF V , 275b-276a (GNO I. 300-301.7) 
4 0 T. P A U L V E R G H E S E , 'Diastema and Diastasis in Gregory of Nyssa. Introduction to a Concept and the 
Posing of a Problem', in H. D O E R R I E , M. A L T E N B U R G E R & U. SCHRAMM (ed.), Gregor von Nyssa und 
die Philosophie. Zweites Internationales Kolloquium tiber Gregor von Nyssa (Munster 18-23 
September 1972) (Leiden: Brill, 1976), 243-259. 
4 1 More on this point, see the remarkable monograph of A L C U I N A. WEISWURM, The Nature of Human 
Knowledge According to Saint Gregory of Nyssa (Washington DC: The Catholic University of 
America, 1952), 119-146; apart from his accuracy, Weiswurm is especially good in drawing 
comparisons between Gregory's and Aristotle's epistemology (read through the lens of Thomas 
Aquinas). 
4 2 A R I S T O T L E , De anima (I. 2), 204b8; Aristotle follows the famous principle of the ancient Greek 
philosophers, which defined knowledge as a homeopathic process (tois homoios ta homoia 
gignosketai). 
4 3 A. A. WEISWURM, The Nature of Human Knowledge according to St Gregory of Nyssa, Washington, 
1952, 194 
4 4 A word should be said about the divine creation, which in Gregory's eyes, is not 'out of necessity, 
but in the superabundance of love (ouk ananke tini pros ten tou anthropines physeos, all' agapes 
periousia)' (Or. Cat. V , NPNF V , 478b; ed. R. Winling, SC 453, 162. 32-33; ed. Muhlenberg, GNO III, 
4. 17. 3-4). 
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If one does not know the structure of Adam's idiom before the fall, it is even 
more senseless to attribute to God a language of designation, as Eunomius did. One 
cannot imagine in God a linguistic performance, 'who is at once (all' holon di' holou) 
sight, and hearing, and knowledge'45. One can speak, of course, about the Word of 
God (logos tou theou), but this tackles already the central problem of the Trinitarian 
theology, debated at length in CE I and CE II. With reference to the mystery of the 
Trinity, the divine and hypostatic Logos can be called also 'Son', 'Icon', or 'Wisdom 
and Power' of God (I Corinthians 1: 24) 4 6. The creative Word of God by whom 'the 
heavens were established' (Psalm 33: 4) is the One announced in the Prologue of St 
John and incarnated as Jesus Christ. He is the only 'language' of God that one could 
ever imagine, and the only ones who speak this language are the saints. There is, of 
course, a helpful analogy in the scriptural description of the Son as Word of God, 
which allows Gregory to pinpoint their indestructible unity. 'The Father of the Word 
needs to be thought of with the Word, for it would not be word were it not a word of 
some one'47. Language and thought are intimately connected as the Father (compared 
with the human mind) with the Son (called the Word). Words are intrinsically 
relational, and so are the divine Persons of the Trinity, says Gregory, without 
developing this analogy into an imagery that could be misleading or idolatrous. 
Stressing the natural connection between the vocal utterance of the words and 
the act of breathing, which are both invisible, Gregory suggests in an analogy of Stoic 
origin how the Holy Spirit is contiguous to the Word of the Father. The unity of 
Godhead is always expressed in the Scriptures, though the subject of theophany is not 
always explicit. Any scriptural reference to articulate speech by God has to be taken 
metaphorically, and yet, with the appropriate respect due to its inspired character. The 
Scriptures are part of the divine economy, but they do not express exhaustively the 
works of God in creation. The Gospels themselves do not record 'many other things 
which Jesus did; were every one of them to be written, the world itself could not 
contain the books that would be written' (John 21: 25). Obviously, Gregory does not 
deny the possibility of divine inspiration, but he stresses that the destination and the 
modality of expressing is 'proportional (to metro tes physeos ton logon emin) to the 
capacity of our nature, so that we might be able thereby to signify the thoughts of our 
4 5 NPNF V, 271b (GNO I. 287. 3-4) 
4 6 M. H A R L , 'A propos d'une passage du Contre Eunome de Gregoire de Nysse: aporroia et les titres du 
Christ dans en theologie trinitaire', RSR 55 (1967), 217-226 
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minds' . For Gregory, the Scriptures are the testimony of the divine philanthropy 
and, therefore, they should be understood as a kenotic manifestation of God. Although 
he does say expressis verbis that Scriptures are the first incarnation of God, one finds 
in Gregory's biblical theology some similarities to Origen's views. Our perception is 
gross, needing a steady point of reference, and continual pilgrimage in the land of 
'divine letters', since one can easily represent the Scriptures as an epistolary. Gregory 
puts it eloquently: 'in as much as human nature is in a sense (tropon tina) deaf and 
insensible to higher truths, we maintain that the grace of God at "sundry times" and in 
divers manners (polymerds kai polytropos) spoke by the Prophets.'50 Though deaf, 
when inspired by the Holy Spirit, the prophets and the apostle of God can look like 
'drunkards'. Gregory compares the process of inspiration of the Scriptures with the 
miracle, which happened in the day of Pentecost, this 'great feast of languages'51. 
Then, at Jerusalem, 'each man received the teaching of the disciples in his own 
language (en te idia dialekto) wherein he was born, understanding the meaning of the 
words by the language they knew (dia ton gnorimon auto hrematon).''52 
Since the plurality of dialects is preserved in the reception of the divine 
teaching (the process of understanding being shaped by the idiomatic profile of each 
one), Pentecost - the feast that harvests the catholic meaning of the Church - does not 
contradict, but fulfils Babel. Languages are landmarks on the fissiparous body of 
humankind, divided into cultures, habits, ethnic groups, etc. Of all these, Gregory of 
Nyssa seems entirely conscious, reading the myth of Babel as a description of a 
historical event. Stretched between the hypothesis (1) 'language of human origin', and 
the hypothesis (2) 'language of divine origin', the narrative of Babel could be 
interpreted either way. While Philo the Jew5 3 chose the second option, Gregory chose 
for the first one. Breaking the idiomatic unity of humankind was, certainly, God's will 
to punish the pride of the people. But he just gave an impetus to an innate possibility 
of human language, that of being divided and reproduced: 'God, willing that men 
47 Or. Cat. I . 2 ( N P N F V , 476b; ed. R . Winling, SC453, 151; G N O I I I , 11) 
4 8 N P N F V , 274a ( G N O I . 294. 22-23) 
4 9 N P N F V , 290a ( G N O I . 341. 14-21); N P N F V , 292a/b ( G N O I . 348. 27): dia touto en tais poikilais 
pros tous anthropous theophaneiais kai kata anthropon schematizetai kai anthropikos phtheggetai kai 
orgen kai eleon kai ta toiauta hypoduetai pathe 
5 0 N P N F V , 275a ( G N O I . 297. 6-9) 
5 1 W. SHAKESPEARE, Love's Labour's Lost (1595) act 5, sc. 1. 1 
5 2 N P N F V , 274b ( G N O I . 296. 6-8) 
5 3 PHILO, Leg. All. I I . 14-15. And the commentary of J . D I L L O N , The Middle Platonists 80B.C. to A.D. 
200 (London: Duckworth, 19962), 181 
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should speak different languages (allais glossais), gave human nature full liberty to 
formulate arbitrary sounds, so as to render their meaning more intelligible'54. Even the 
Hebrew language, in which the author of the book of Genesis writes (for Gregory, he 
is unmistakably Moses), is posterior to this event, though the historical circumstances 
in which it emerged as the idiom of the 'elected people', remain veiled in secrecy. 
Assuming that the birth of a nation coincides with the birth of its idiom, Gregory 
searched for an answer to the Jewish dilemma: how the people led by Moses from 
Egypt to Canaan could acquire Hebrew language in such a short time? To respond, 
Gregory takes refuge in the concept of miraculous intervention, which sounds more 
plausible and humanly speaking is much more acceptable than the imaginary thesis 
held by Josephus Flavius or even Origen, about the antiquity of the Jewish language. 
'To suppose that God used the Hebrew tongue, when there was no one to hear and 
understand such language, methinks no reasonable being will consent'55. 
The implications of this theological position are strong; there is no sacred 
language as such. The process of translation is not criminal since it follows the pattern 
of understanding by the human mind of divine commandments. At a closer glance, the 
Scriptures themselves - at least those used by the Christian Church - are a corpus of 
texts translated into an idiom almost foreign to the language of their subjects and, in 
part, of their authors. Yet, the Scriptures were sacred and enjoyed a broad veneration 
among Christians. Gregory's viewpoint, therefore, confirms the early Church's 
understanding of the importance and the necessity of translating the Scriptures into the 
idioms spoken by the gentiles. 
Acknowledging Cultural Diversity 
Going deeper into the substance of his argument, Gregory parries the blows of 
his adversary by referring to the evidence of cultural and linguistic diversity56. To 
claim that just one concept expresses the essence of God would lead to the conclusion 
that, since it supports no comparison, any attempt to translate it is doomed to failure. I 
think that the point made by Gregory is particularly strong. If agennetos indeed 
5 4 NPNF V, 276a (GNO I. 300. 23-26) 
5 5 NPNF V, 276b (GNO I. 301. 24-26) 
5 6 G. B A R D Y , La question des langues dans I'Eglise ancienne (Paris : Beauchesne, 1948) 
71 
captures God's essence, then the necessary conclusion is that agennetos can be 
regarded in itself as a separated ('idiomatic') essence, which accepts no synonym. The 
conclusion is peremptorily absurd and chauvinistic: only people speaking Greek 
would be able, in Eunomius' view, to know God's essence. 
Since Gregory did not allow Hebrew to represent God's thoughts, he had all 
the more reason to refuse Greek language any sacred authority over the other 
'barbarian' idioms. 'Things are named by the indication of the voice (dia tinos 
semantikes phones) in conformity with the nature and the qualities (kata ten 
engkeimenen hekasto physin kai dynamin) inherent in each, the names being adapted 
to the things according to the vernacular language of each several race (en hekasto to 
ethnei).'57 As Samuel Johnson one thousand years later, Gregory regarded languages 
to be 'the pedigree of nations', which cannot and do not need to be dissolved. What 
makes languages and ethnic origin irrelevant is only a life dwelling in the Spirit. As St 
Paul put it, 'there is neither Jew, nor Greek, there is neither slave, nor free, there is 
neither male nor female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus' (Galatians 3: 28). 
For Gregory, the 'divine names' complement one another like the words of a 
dictionary, but no one expresses the 'essence' of God. Gregory's vision about 
knowledge is close to the phenomenological hermeneutics of the 20 th century, which 
describes any process of understanding as an act of translation, which, therefore, is 
C D 
perfectly perfectible . 'Since the nature of most things that are seen in creation is not 
simple', words are necessarily multiple, and cover only patches of meaning, which 
themselves endlessly change. What words express are the qualities or, in other 
terminology, the energies of the objects described. An increase in qualities of an 
object determines the growth in quantity of appellations, which precision is 
proportional to their narrowness. Even if the defined objects are not composite, like 
God who is simple by essence, the two-fold character of human knowledge (rooted in 
the senses and processed by immaterial intelligence) makes inevitable the lapse into 
semantic multiplicity. Words can point out the meanings of the objects, but their 
functionality never describes their 'inner' rationality. 
In this respect, the most eloquent example is that of the Scriptures, which were 
written by different authors, and express in a variety of authorial styles the revelation 
5 7 NPNF V, 278a (GNO I. 305. 23-26) 
5 8 H.-G. G A D A M E R , Wahrheit und Methode (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1960), E T by G. Barden and J. 
Curnming (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975), 345-449 
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of one God. Despite God's simplicity, the Scriptures are intrinsically multifarious, and 
this fact receives from Gregory an interesting explanation. Referring to the Psalms, 
Gregory imagines their author (i.e.: David) being in the Spirit (en pneumati) and 
interpreting 'by voice and word (dia phonon kai hrematon) his own knowledge of the 
mysteries given him by God.' 5 9 Therefore, if the writing of the Scriptures can be 
imaged as a process of translation, following divine inspiration, one should admit the 
presence of a significant human contribution to the 'fabrication' of the material corpus 
of the Bible. 
It is also significant that not even the divine Scriptures escaped the process of 
idiomatic translation (the Septuagint, if not also some of the Gospels, like Matthew's, 
probably). The multiplicity of ethnic idioms reflects, on a larger scale, the organic 
plurality of appellations for a single object within a living language. If no particular 
language is 'better' than another, there is no right to say that a word is more privileged 
to utter meanings than another. Words, like languages, are not better, just different. 
'The Hebrew calls Heaven by one name, the Canaanite by another one, but both of 
them understand it alike (noei de hosautos hekateros), being in no way led into error 
by the difference of the sounds that convey the idea (ten katanoesin) of the object'60. 
The motives of this diverted state of affairs are obscure, and, apparently at least, there 
is no more logic in somebody's endowment with a language than in the arbitrary 
usage (kata to areskon) of a word61. It is true that Gregory emphasizes the human 
decision in giving words by calling the circumstances in which Moses ('from the 
water', in the language of the Egyptian) and Jacob ('the supplanter') received their 
name, which etymology provide 'the memorial of the occurrence'. But not all words 
follow this pattern, and even when onomatopoeic words are translated into other 
language, their original meaning becomes obscure (like from Egyptian to Hebrew, or 
from Hebrew to Jewish). Onomatopoeia is an exceptional phenomenon, and usually 
designates interjections in the vocative case. It might well be the case that Hebrew 
words tend to 'photograph' the realities they express (and the perfect example is 
dabar, which means both 'word' and 'thing'). Biased by this occasional behavior of 
the Hebrew language (exploited in full by the later Kabbhalist), Gregory is tempted to 
play upon, sometimes, specious etymologies, just for the sake of spiritual 
NPNF V, 290a (GNO I. 340. 19-21) 
NPNF V, 279a (GNO I. 310. 2-5) 
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interpretation (e.g. theos derived from theaomai, 'to see') . Yet, in Gregory's 
writings, this is not the rule, but the exception. It is very significant that the 
etymologies played upon by Gregory expose attributes revealed by God in his 
economy. The relative mobility of the etymologies given to a single word like theos 
shows that Gregory's interest was not philological, and that even the name of God 
remained relative63. Certainly, like Hermogenes in Cratylos, Gregory does not accept 
etymological investigations as an appropriate tool to understand the meaning of 
words. One passing note betrays Gregory's distrust of the pictorial language of the 
Egyptians, namely hieroglyphs. In John Milbank's words, 'what Gregory identifies as 
the "daemonic" in the hieroglyphic enigmas is their mixture of the half-human and the 
half-animal: this, he suggests, is effectively how Eunomius conceives of the divine 
logos - as an "intermediate" being who is constantly being "dragged down into a 
condition subject to passion'".64 
The Virtues of the Intellectual Pessimism 
Having clarified a philosophical point, Gregory recalls the purpose of his 
writings, which is to refute a bad understanding of the Christian religion (eusebeia). 
Suspending for a while his analytic response to Eunomius' ideas, Gregory reminds his 
reader that his points are not just mapping an intellectual controversy over some 
tedious questions, like the nature of language and the limits of human knowledge. 
There is much more, Gregory goes on, and it is all about salvation65. A 
subordinationist version of Trinitarian theology has not only problematic 
consequences from the cosmological viewpoint (placing the Son at the top of the 
angelic hierarchy), but also very grave soteriological consequences, by lessening 
In Ad Abl. (GNO III. 1.44. 7-45.5), Gregory of Nyssa provides also an alternative etymology, relating 
theos to theates ('beholder'). There were also other false etymologies played upon by the Church 
Fathers, indicating as possible sources the verbs theein (to run) and aithein (to burn). See G R E G O R Y 
NAZIANZUS, Or. 30. 18 (SC250, 262-264). 
6 3 Gregory of Nazianzus explicitly refers to 'God' as 'a relative name' (ibidem). 
6 4 J . MILBANK, "The Linguistic Turn as a Theological Turn' in Word Made Strange (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1997), 88 
6 5 NPNF V, 255a (GNO I. 240. 16-19) 
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Christ's power to save humankind . Though not strongly visible, there was a hidden 
connection, at least for Basil and Gregory, between their defence of the epinoia 
argument about language, and the redemptive task of defending Christ's majesty. 
Having behind them the heresy of Sabellianism and facing ahead a new variant of 
Trinitarian subordinationism, the Cappadocian theologians had to make sure that Holy 
Trinity is not notional, but real. In this respect, they pursued a critical interpretation of 
the limits and the tasks of theological language. 
Gregory's theoretical framework is remarkably consistent at all its levels of 
discourse, and one could say that ontology and cosmology are justly echoed in his 
theological anthropology. There are different realms of existence, situated somewhere 
in between the earthly topos of human beings and the God of heaven, called here by 
Gregory 'the majestic existing One' (to megaleion tou ontos ontos). One cannot 
achieve a proper understanding of God since there is a 'wide and insurmountable' gap 
between the uncreated nature (he aktistos physis), and the created world. 'There is no 
faculty in human nature adequate to the full comprehension of the divine essence (ouk 
estin en anthropine physei dynamis eis akribe katanoesin ousias theou)'67. 
Cosmological settings, also, reveal Gregory's rationales for epistemological prudence. 
Gregory returns to his dearest doctrine of God, whose measure is only the infinite (tes 
de metron e aperia estin). Conversely, God's creation is 'limited by time and space' 
(chrono kai topo perieirgomenef1!, or in J. Danielou's words, 'un passage du non-etre 
a l'etre' 6 9. Our empirical knowledge is necessarily confined within these boundaries. 
Gregory even concedes that ' in this life we can apprehend (epinoesai) the beginning 
and the end of all things that exist, but the beatitude (he makariotes) that is above the 
creature admits neither end, nor beginning (pute archen, oute telos).'10 This passage 
needs a correction, given in Gregory's commentary on the book of the Ecclesiastes, 
where he openly professes his pessimistic ideas about the competence of human 
knowledge: 
M. F. W I L E S ' defence of an Eunomius' soteriology is not very convincing, cf. 'Eunomius: hair-
splitting dialectician or defender of the accessibility of salvation?' in R. W I L L I A M S (ed.), The Making of 
Orthodoxy: Essay in Honour of Henry Chadwick (Cambridge, 1989), 157-172 
6 7 NPNF V, 257a (GNO I. 245. 19-21) 
6 8 NPNF V, 257a (GNO I. 246. 18; 20) 
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To my mind, the creation does not know itself yet and it has not 
understood what is the essence of the soul, what is the nature of the 
bodies, the origin of the beings (ta onto), how they are generated one from 
another, how what is not receives substance, how what exists is dissolved 
in non-existence (to on eis to me on), and what is the harmony among the 
contraries in this world. Thus, i f creation does not know itself, how may it 
declare about what is above itself?7 1 
It is noteworthy that, following the Alexandrine exegetical tradition, Gregory was 
very keen to give a commentary on the book of Ecclesiastes. Though not completed, 
Gregory's exegesis was very effective in shaping his mind about what Christian 
philosophy means. 
There are serious reasons to think that Gregory's attraction for this book of the 
Ecclesiastes is grounded in his biography. As somebody who was for a long time 
married, a successful advocate in Nyssa who, in his youth, refused to join Basil's 
passion for ascetic life, Gregory of Nyssa knew quite well what vainglory and worldly 
gratification could mean. The understanding of the book that reveals 'the vanity of the 
vanities' is best prepared by reading of Proverbs. The letter configures the moral 
understanding of the divine commandments, which being insufficient needs a spiritual 
complement. Grounded in the natural contemplation, the mind finds the world 
abundant in lessons about death, shame and futility. This worldly spectacle is 
inspiringly painted by a divine book, which in the Greek language bears the name of 
the Church (ekklesia). Gregory does not hesitate to see the divine inspiration of 
Ecclesiastes sealed by the authority of Christ, who like Ecclesiastes (1: 1), was called 
'the Son of David' (Matthew 1: 7). In doing so, Gregory opens the doors of the Old 
Testament with the key of the New Testament, which seems to be the only suitable 
way of understanding the Law. He carries out a very close reading, line by line, of the 
first three chapters of the book of the Preacher (Qohleth), which consists in a beautiful 
meditation upon the transient destiny of the man and of the cosmos. Our becoming is 
paralleled to the play of children who build castles out of sand.72 Nurtured by conceit, 
the appeal for vainglory of every human being brings forth, eventually, only the bitter 
taste of deceit. Neither physical beauty, nor worldly fame can make us truly happy, 
since mortality and oblivion rule over all human bodies. Over the vain glorification in 
In Eccl. V I I . 8 (5C416. 386.GNO V , 415. 17-23) 
The image is perennial and can be traced back in H O M E R (The Iliad X V , 363). 
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the eyes of the world (Ephesians 2: 10), the Apostle chose eternal glorification ' in 
Christ' (Romans 15: 17; I Corinthians 1:31; 15: 31). 
What is significant for Gregory's teaching is not just that he, predictably, 
spurns materialistic pleasures (tackling harshly the voyeuristic culture of his age, 
which, like ours, is ruled by concupiscentia oculorum), but that he finds no real 
consolation in mere intellectual activity. To know only in part man, history or cosmos 
hardly comforts anybody's heart. Discursive knowledge can be helpful, of course, 
mainly for two reasons. One is positive, when knowledge is directed to assist by 
technical products people's basic needs. It can engender charity and self-forgetfulness 
in working for others. The second reason is negative and not practical, but 
metaphysical. Since we do not know anything by essence, discursive knowledge can 
provide clues about another way of understanding reality. I f knowledge has no limits, 
vanity also is boundless. One knows that 'of making many books there is no end' 
(Ecclesiastes 12: 1), and this can only increase knowledge and sorrow (1: 18). Since it 
comes out of curiosity, knowledge decays very often in the experience of boredom, 
which is another mark of our mortality. Since Adam's fall, knowledge and life are 
divided, and this very often makes us captives to sorrowfulness. Knowledge is a 
wound, which only love can heal7 3. One needs to despair of everything he knows 
about creatures in order to start searching for the Creator, not by imaginative 
analogies, but through the uniting force of prayer. Dimmed knowledge about things 
brings no substantial remedy for death, but still it can teach us through its vanities. As 
T. S. Eliot put it: 'after such knowledge, what forgiveness? Think now, history has 
many cunning passages, contrived corridors and issues, deceives with whispering 
ambitions, guides us by vanities'.7 4 
For any solid mind, the uprising of boredom out of knowledge destroys 
intellectual certitude as an earthquake wipes out a city. Intellectual boredom begs 
fundamental questions and, although aroused by a particular experience of deceit, it 
can interrogate a totality of meanings. But the fundamental affection of boredom, 
perceived by moderns as Weltschmerz, reveals the idolatrous potential of knowledge 
within a life married to death. To feel bored and sick of everything is the first 
symptom - compared by St Gregory with the desert of Sinai - of soul's abandonment 
7 3 In Cantic. Cantic. 8 5 2 A - 8 5 3 A 
7 4 T S E L I O T , 'Gerontion ( 1920) ' in The Complete Poems and Plays (London: Faber and Faber, 1969), 
38 
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of the realm of the idols. Unhappiness is the beginning of exile. The easy satisfaction 
with regional and temporary certitudes is upset by the thirst to communicate with the 
One above ages. After all, the human being is driven by the innate desire to love and 
to be loved. The contemplation of being for its own sake, says Gregory, makes 
nobody happy 'without change'. Only the Lord Jesus taught us the divine beatitudes in 
the key of the paradoxes, an exegesis of which Gregory made in Orationes de 
beatitudinibus. Any sorrowfulness or distress experienced in the naked perception of 
the world indicates the separation of man from God, who alone is infinitely good. 
Nonetheless, one does not suffer distress and anxiety without being discreetly 
witnessed by the cloud of the Holy Spirit 7 5, which through shadows guides the pilgrim 
towards the promised realm of happiness. Tasting the vanities of the world, the soul 
feels, obliquely, that only the divine goodness could quench her thirst for love, 
communion, and meaningful knowledge. For Gregory, the true philosophy should 
mean, at last, to grow in love for Christ, who alone is 'the wisdom and the power of 
God' ( I Corinthians 1: 24). In a way, says Gregory, 'everything apart from God does 
not exist (pan de to exo autou theoroumenon anuparxia esti)'76. Only God is adequate 
in 'calling the non-beings as beings (kalountos ta me onta hos onto)' (Romans 4: 17). 
This is not a surprise i f one considers the difference between beings and not-beings 
only as an ontic difference, distinct from the ontological difference between the 
Creator and the creature. As with almost all early Christian authors, for St Gregory of 
Nyssa, to be or not to be is hardly an important question. Only love makes sense of 
being either alive or dead, but effectively sheltered by God. 'Love is the antithesis of 
evil', which itself 'must be not conceived as something existent, but rather as the 
absence of good'. 7 7 
Scientific Disillusionment and Spiritual Progress 
It is one thing to apprehend the formal limits of the world - more precisely, to 
grasp its finitude - and something different to understand the essence of the creature, 
which possibility Gregory specifically denies in all of his works. In CE III, a few lines 
Vit. Moys. II. 121 (PG 45, 361 B8-12; ed. J. Danielou, SC Ibis, 66) 
In. Eccl. VTJ. 7 (SC 416. 370-71; GNO V, 406. 27-28) 
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below his glosses on the ontological difference between the Creator and the creature, 
Gregory presents the science of astronomy, objects of which, unlike Aristotle, he 
regards as dynamic. Because of their never-ending motion, the objects of natural 
sciences provide no condition for a compact and definitive knowledge. Even less, 
Gregory concludes, can we know about the Creator of the world: 'we know that He 
exists (oti men estin oidamen), but of His essential nature we cannot deny that we are 
ignorant (ton de tes ousias logon agnoein ouk arnoumetha).,7S Though probably, 
would disappoint Stephen Hawking's dream of catching God's ultimate idea about the 
universe79, Gregory's epistemological position is of a modesty which, in our times, Sir 
Karl Popper would have probably been happy to applaud80. He defends the 
fundamental idea of falsification in the positive sciences, even leaving room for 
scepticism towards ill-tempered attempts of unification in physical theory. 'What is 
there to unite things so contrary by nature? And how can the harmony of the universe 
consist of elements so incongruous (dia ton heterophyori)V%x Still Gregory responds: 
' I f any one should interrogate us on these and such-like points, wi l l any of us be found 
so presumptuous to promise an explanation of them? No! The only reply that can be 
given by men of sense is this: - that He Who made all things in wisdom does alone 
know the reason/meaning of His creation (monos oide ton logon tes ktiseos).,S2 
Gregory does not only base his case on cosmological references. Anthropology 
too - with its thorny questions about the union between soul and body - serves 
Gregory's conviction that 'whosoever searches through the whole divine revelation 
(dia touto pasan tis theopneuston phonen), wi l l find therein no doctrine of the divine 
nature (tes theias physeos ten didaskalian), nor indeed anything else that has a 
substantial existence (ton kat'ousian hyphestekotonf. The conclusion drawn almost 
emulates the philosophical scepticism of late Antiquity: 'we pass our lives in 
ignorance (en agnoia) of much, being ignorant first of all of ourselves, as human 
beings (hoi anthropoi), and then of all things besides (epeita de kai ta alia panta).,S3 I f 
Scripture is silent in respect of what the faculties of the soul are, or the way body and 
soul are one, this means that such enquiries - which are obligatory in a philosopher's 
7 8 NPNF V, 257b (GNO I . 248. 2-3) 
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repertoire - are legitimate and acceptable, i f made under title of hypothesis and with 
methodological caution. I f the realm of the visible puts problems for comprehension, 
Gregory warns his challenger that the invisible is much less accessible to any human 
mind, limited in time and space: 
Al l that comes within our comprehension (hypo katalepsin hemeterari) is 
such that it must be of one of these four kinds: either contemplated as 
existing in an extension of distance (en diastematike tini paratasei 
thedresisthai ta onto), or suggesting the idea of a capacity in space within 
which its details are detected (topikou chorematos parechein ten ennoian), 
or it comes within our field of vision by being circumscribed by a 
beginning or an end (kata ten archen kai to telos perigraphe entos) where 
the non-existent bounds it in each direction (for everything that has a 
beginning and an end of its existence, begins from the non-existent), or, 
lastly, we grasp the phenomenon by means of association of qualities (dia 
tes somatikes ton poioteton sunthekes katalambanomen to phainomenon) 
wherein dying, and sufferance, and change, and alteration, and such-like 
are combined.84 
Gregory's division is not very systematic: the first two kinds of comprehension 
are related to the category of space, the third to the category of time, while the last one 
implies both of them. Interestingly enough, Gregory does not directly connect our 
limits of knowledge to our bodily constitution, but to our condition of created beings. 
In CE I , Gregory unleashed his most inclement attack on Eunomius' 
philosophical eclecticism85. Without calling himself a philosopher, Gregory 
recognises in the argument of Eunomius the main source of confusion. 'Acting like 
those who get their bread by begging'8 6, says Gregory, the bishop of Cyzicus provides 
a completely indiscriminate way of dealing with the ideas of the Greek philosophers. 
First, he implies that Eunomius has read uncritically Plato's Cratylus, on the meaning 
of names. 'Being struck by the beauty of the Platonic style (te kalliphonia tes 
Platonikes lexeos), he thinks not unseemly to make Plato's theory a doctrine of the 
87 
Church (dogma tes ekklesias).' Gregory criticises Eunomius more than Plato. 
Gregory is aware that a theory of language which claims that names mirror existing 
objects in reality, backs up etymological procedures as methods to unfold the original 
meaning. Gregory reasoned very simply: i f there is one signified thing, while the 
84 NPNFV, 308a/308b (GNO I. 395. 3-14) 
8 5 Gregory goes so far that considers Eunomius' writing to be 'unphilosophical' (GNO I. 81. 16-18) 
8 6 NPNF V, 291a (GNO I. 344. 17): homoion tipoion tois ten trophen ekprosaiteseos eautois 
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signifiers are many, it would be illusory to think that etymology can explain the 
genesis of language. There are here two at least two problems: first, the genesis of the 
individual practice of language, in which multiplicity dwells unrestricted. Secondly, 
there is the problem of genesis of the national idioms, which although they 
contaminate one another, are never entirely translatable. Gregory suggests that to 
imagine that language is reducible to a nomenclature of objective names would be 
very naive. Different actions cannot be expressed in static enunciation: language is not 
only about facts, but also about intentions, or values, or invisible passions. Obviously, 
the latter set does not consist in simple objects, and the way they are expressed is 
always linked not only to vocal articulation, but first, to bodily language (of which 
Gregory is very much aware). There are experiences irreducible to sharp linguistic 
qualifications, such as taste or smell (which are invoked heavily by St Gregory in his 
homilies on the Song of the Songs). A perfume can never be adequately described. To 
say that language mirrors reality is inconsistent, i f reality includes the realm of the 
invisible. In order to express the ineffable, language makes use of metaphors, as the 
Scriptures bear testimony. Gregory's epistemological ambitions remain modest, since 
he does not say how man has acquired, individually and collectively, the languages in 
which one can expresses his discursive intelligence. Gregory seems to reason that the 
positive sciences should be characterised by openness towards every novelty brought 
in time by further research, and that any dogmatism in this field would mean just 
contempt for human intelligence. 
Compared to Gregory's common sense, Eunomius' epistemology is at least 
bizarre, and completely unacceptable from the contemporary standards, though J. 
Danielou called his linguistic theory a theological 'inneisme'8 8. First, Eunomius 
tackled the realm of divinity with tools appropriate only to natural contemplation (or, 
in other words, positive sciences). Because of this inadequate methodology, he is 
drawn to refute the idea of progress in both fields of knowledge (divine and human). 
Eunomius' pretended understanding of the divine is frozen in the possession of a 
single word, and consequently, reduced to an empty meaning. Stuck in his obsessive 
reference to the concept of agennetos, Eunomius could stand up for the structuralist 
slogan, which accomplishes the reduction of life to narrative knowledge, and the 
NPNF V, 291a (GNO I. 344. 23-24) 
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diminution of understanding to mere possession of meanings . In short, stagnation is 
what characterises Eunomius' epistemology in both territories of knowledge, vertical 
(theological) and horizontal (pragmatic). While claiming that human language, closely 
related to the process of thinking, has been revealed by God and does not suffer 
change in time, Eunomius blocks the way for any dynamic approach towards reality, 
which requires adaptability and the invalidation of previous schemes of understanding 
(in Popper's words: falsification). Therefore, he is completely unable to admit any 
possible 'logic of discovery', and even less a pragmatic of knowledge. Theologically, 
Eunomius' theory is bankrupt as soon as it reaches the idea of 'ungeneracy', which 
leaves little room for the knowledge by prayer and, therefore, can hardly justify the 
need of worship9 0. Where inquiry is needed, Eunomius gullibly pretends that 
everything is obvious; where discreet silence is needed, the heresiarch conjures reason 
to speak. Almost everything in Eunomius' theology went against Gregory's 
understanding of reality, which was secured by his doctrine of divine infinity; the 
latter fosters the mystical theology (mystike thedria), in which an endless number of 
'divine names' absorb the unfathomable mystery of God. 
Yet, since it is made of joys and sufferings, life remains beyond text, while narrative knowledge does 
not exhaust the possibilities of paradoxical understanding 
9 0 'And prayer is more than an order of words, the conscious occupation of the praying mind, or the 
sound of the voice praying' - T. S. E L I O T , 'Little Gidding' in Collected Poems (J909-1962) (London: 
Faber&Faber, 1963), 215 
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IV. THINKING THE LANGUAGE 
Thought and Language 
In CE I , Gregory develops chiefly a logical and theological rejection of the 
concept of agennetos coined by Eunomius in his first Apologia. The third book against 
the heresiarch examines more interesting philosophical questions. Gregory's focal 
interest is entirely in the service of Basil's conception about language as human 
artefact. Yet, Gregory enriches Basil's position with various nuances that prove him to 
be a skilful thinker. One of the first things he has to plead for, is the effectiveness of 
linguistic conceptions, which though being invisible, are not equivalent to the 
production of some flatus vocis. Gregory has to establish a solid relationship between 
thought, language, and the objects of perception, and above all the reality of all these 
instances. Words don't simply dissipate at the moment of their moment of vocal 
utterance, since their meaning (i.e.: the content) can be stocked for good in the 
memory (hard-drive) of the intellect, exactly as the script retains the letters of a hand-
writer. 
For whatever comes into our mind, whether intellectually existing (kata 
ten synesin), or otherwise, it is possible for us at our discretion to store 
away in writing. And the voice iphthoggos) and the letters (grammati) are 
of equal value for the expression of thought (eis phanerdsin dianoiasY. 
Eunomius did his best to compromise any attempt to understand language in human 
terms. Conception is ephemeral, Eunomius wanted to say. Therefore, God's best name 
- agennetos - should not have been classified among the perishable thoughts of the 
human mind. While holding agennetos as a divinely inspired concept, he looked for a 
transcendental justification of the whole of language. He could probably say, together 
with the first Wittgenstein: 'die Grenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner 
Welt". I f of human origin, words were for Eunomius mere vocal, fleeting concepts; i f 
divinely authorised, words could, in principle, receive even a magic veneration (e.g. 
'agennetos'). In his turn, Gregory rejects any magic reverence towards either written 
1 NPNF V, 254b (GNO I. 239. 21-26) 
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or spoken words, which can nourish intellectual idolatry. To Eunomius' conviction 
that the purport of words vanishes instantly at the moment of their vocal utterance, 
Gregory replies by defending the reality of thinking. What really matters in dealing 
with words is not their conservation in script ('hardware'), but the processing of their 
meaning ('software'). The 'memory of the hearer's soul' (to mnemoniko tes tou 
akouontos psyches) is, in principle, the indispensable source of inspiration for any 
further intellectual operation. 
Though 'St Gregory does not explicitly distinguish between the inner word 
[logos endiathetos] and the outer, or the spoken word [logos prophorikos]' , he does 
belong to what J. Derrida called the 'logocentric' tradition of the Western 
metaphysics4: he regards writing as inferior to (audible or silent) speech in the 'inner 
receptacle' of the mind. In this respect, like many other Church Fathers (Origen, Basil, 
John Chrysostom or Augustine), Gregory is a good Platonist, who perceives the 
materiality of language as inappropriate for expressing the highest thoughts of the 
human mind about God5. Complaining about the non-symmetrical relationship 
between the intelligible and the material endowments of the human being becomes 
almost a leit-motif \n Gregory's writings, and affects his discussion of language. Since 
the only language we can practise bears the traces of a double 'ontological' fall (in 
Eden and at Babel, respectively), Gregory cannot regard happily the human mind's 
need to use words in order to express thoughts. The corporeality of language is 
obvious and unavoidable in speech, which needs to articulate sounds ('words') in 
order to convey meanings. But also the refined acts of thinking require the usage of 
more or less abstracted images (numbers are deducted images). St Gregory of Nyssa 
does not pay much attention to the morphological constitution of language: the power 
of mind is not exhausted in discursive thinking, and language is not consumed in 
semantic indication. 
Though he declares the arbitrary character of the words, Gregory does not 
provide further explanation, with the expected reference to the 'consensual argument'. 
Pace Mosshammer6, one could say that Gregory avoids enslaving meanings to any 
textual web, and even less, he refuses to imagine 'the true power, and authority, and 
3 A. A. WEISWURM, op. cit., 128, n. 21 
4 J. DERRIDA, De la grammatologie (Paris: Minuit, 1967); La dissemination (Paris : Seuil, 1972); 
sInEccl. I. 12(SC416, 138-141; GNO V, 293.5-294.20) 
6 A. A. MOSSHAMMER, 'Disclosing but not disclosed. Gregory of Nyssa as Descontructionist', in H . R . DROBNER 
(ed.), Studien zu Gregor von Nyssa und der christiichen Spdtanthike (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 99-123 
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dominion, and sovereignty of God consisting in syllables'7. In this respect, Gregory 
follows St Paul, who said that his apostolate resides 'not in words of wisdom, but in 
the demonstration of Spirit and power' (I Corinthians 2: 4), and that Christ is the 'the 
wisdom and the power of God' ( I Corinthians 1: 24). What makes appropriate and 
pious the usage of some words with respect to God is, first, the meaning that the 
author bears in mind, and the context of their application. To call God the 'first being', 
as Eunomius did, would not have appeared in Gregory's eyes as necessarily heretical. 
What makes any name susceptible of heresy is only the intention to give it an absolute 
character. When used in a narrow framework, an apparently refined concept like 
'being' could have blasphemous connotation in comparison with ' l ion' or 'leopard', 
which can be used freely in the liturgical song of praise for God. In fact, concrete 
terms can be used better for metaphorical constructions, being not only more vivid, 
but also stronger in connotation. Poetry cannot be done with general concepts, and the 
Scriptures confirm at best this law of existence for the metaphors. Gregory showed a 
special interest for the non-conceptual literary forms, which prevail in rhetoric and 
poetry. Free images are richer in content than any analytic qualification, which fade 
God's beauty and imperious presence. 
Abstraction 
In the famous philosophical dispute whose best description was given by Plato 
in Cratylos, the only two apparent solutions were either (/') to say that language 
reflects the nature of things (kata physin), and, therefore, to assume that etymology 
provides original knowledge, or (ii) to say that words are completely arbitrary (kata 
thesin), regardless of the nature or function of things, being subjected to change for no 
sensible reason. In the wake of Plato's exposition, the Stoics defended the essentialist 
account, whereas Aristotle and the atomists (Democritus, chiefly) held the 
conventionalist line. M . Canevet, who made a careful and reputable study of 
Gregory's biblical hermeneutics, situated Gregory in the proximity of Democritus' 
philosophy of language , while Th. Kobush placed him close to the Stoics . There are 
a few exceptions from Gregory's general commitment to the conventionalist 
7 NPNF V, 280a (GNO 1.312.9-11) 
8 M. C A N E V E T , op. cit.,3\ 
9 T. KOBUSCH, art. cit., 256 
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viewpoint. Sometimes, Gregory likes playing upon false etymologies, for which he 
does not pretend any scientific accuracy10. His constant purpose is to draw in all 
circumstances as many spiritual conclusions as possible, being ready to focus his 
allegorical reading not only on some scriptural fragments, but also on independent 
words (like theos or anthrdpos). Uncharacteristically, as the French scholar remarks in 
a note1 1, Gregory's terminology makes a distinction in the way of signifying 
(semainei). With respect to different objects, one can use either a proper name (kyrion 
onoma) which records the manifestation of things1 2 (kata to phaneri) - the example 
given is 'the sun' - , or just words, which have simply an indicative function. 
There is no strong confirmation in Gregory's extensive writings of any 
distinction between proper and improper names. Yet, he is able to distinguish between 
words of primary or secondary meaning, which demand certain abilities of reading 
and understanding. There are words which designate the individuality of the object 
(i.e. : 'sun', 'earth'), called nouns; there are words which express the qualities of an 
object (i.e.: 'hot', 'cold'), called adjectives; verbs express the transformation to which 
an object can be subjected, while adverbs qualify these transformations. But all words 
express the multiple relationships of an object in a system of reference. For the 
astronomers, 'sun' designates 'the central body of the solar system', while for the 
readers of the Christian Scriptures, it tells of God's majesty. The Scriptures use 
innumerable images conveying the attributes of God, but the only appropriate reading 
of these words (metaphors) refers to their secondary meaning. Usually, the secondary 
meaning expresses nuances and retains, in a parabolic context, the idea conveyed by 
the first meaning. No matter how vivid some biblical images are, it is obvious that the 
task of hermeneutics is to extract their global meaning. Since spiritual discernment 
can be compared to oenological art, this hermeneutical process could be compared to 
alcoholic distillation, consisting in the separation of persistent qualities from a 
perishable substratum. Projected into a spiritual horizon, these images become 
symbols of God's epiphanies. Read so, the images of the Scripture earn an iconic 
function. 
This process of abstraction is required not only in the anagogic reading of the 
Scriptures: the simplest logical procedures (induction, deduction) or mathematical 
1 0 NPNF V, 309a (GNO I. 397. 5-9) 
" M. C A N E V E T , op. cit., 39, n. 11 
1 2 NPNF V, 264b/265a (GNO I. 268. 19-20) 
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investigations require a similar method of abstraction of images into concepts: 'each 
kind of quality is separated from the substratum'. Gregory illustrates this with a 
common example: ' I f , for instance, some animal or tree is presented to our notice, or 
any other of the things that have material existence, we perceive in our mental 
discussion of it many things concerning the substratum, the idea of each of which is 
clearly distinguished from the object we contemplate: for the idea of colour is one, of 
weight is another; so again that of quantity and of such and such a peculiar quality of 
touch.' 1 3 Only by the constant movement of though towards the immaterial realm of 
meanings (and beyond), images are transformed into poetic symbols or scientific 
categories, turning their status of 'words about things' into 'words about words', and, 
thus, becoming concepts. Medieval theorists like Ockham spoke about words of first 
intention and concepts of second intention, the second category being always 
considered conventional (ad placitum). Gregory somehow anticipated this distinction. 
'We translate, as it were, into the form of a name the thought (noemd) about a subject 
that arises in us, and announce what we apprehended (to noetheri) by words, 
sometimes with one, sometimes with another. However, we do not make the thing, but 
only signify it by what we call it. For the things remain what they naturally are. But 
the mind, laying hold of existing things, reveals its thought by such words as it is 
capable of . ' 1 4 The words chosen to signify one reality change because reality itself is 
subject to temporal modification, and what language can grasp is always limited to 
one perspective. It is again noteworthy that Gregory thinks of the process of naming 
as an act of translation, and the fact than one usually needs more that one word to 
describe a single event shows that language is an improvable and alterable cultural 
construct, items of which can swap endlessly, since they have no substantial 
determination. It is the reason why one can learn the Greek language and still not 
become a Greek ( i f ethnicity is to be taken as an essential determination), and vice 
versa: one can be Greek and not be able to speak the language of one's ancestors. 
Reality and Imperfection of Knowledge 
1 3 'On the Making of Man' (24. 1), NPNF V, 414b 
1 4 PG 44, 760B-C 
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I f one only had to name an object in order to know it, any discipline or science 
would become extremely easy. Gregory prefers to imagine the relationship between 
'language' and 'thought' not in terms of priority, since they cannot be separated. 
Language is not defined, primarily, in terms of instrumental knowledge: as T. Carlyle 
put it, it is not the garment of thinking, but its body 1 5. Of course, like Plotinus, 
Gregory did not think that mind (nous) is exhausted in the exercise of discursive 
knowledge16. Meanwhile, he calls knowledge an activity (energeia) of the intellect 
(dianoia), which can have language as one of its products (ergd). Either vocal or 
written, language uses different appellations that are 'the shadows of the things (skiai 
ton pragmaton),ls, recording their constant movement19. Language is dynamic, and 
every word is therefore inappropriate to define the erratic movements of the things. 
God himself is infinite, and again, words can only hope to name his glory. 
Are we not clearly taught that the words (hai semantikai) which represent 
things are of later origin (epiginontai) than the things themselves, and that 
the words (hai phonai) which are framed to express the movements of 
things (tas kineseis ton hyphestoton) are reflections (hosper skiai) of the 
things (ton pragmaton) themselves?20 
In order to be well understood, this statement needs a close examination. Gregory's 
rejection of Eunomius' essentialist account of language does not make him declare a 
stark autonomy of language against reality. On the contrary, Gregory plays upon the 
dynamic character of both language and reality, which explains why our knowledge 
always can be perfected. Words are meant to reflect reality, but this does not imply an 
oppositive and static relationship. Words are 'shadows' (skiai) which have to grasp 
things in movement. Language is a happening, rather than a description. Both God and 
creation are known in their energetic dimension, since their essence (ousia) or 
substratum (hypokeimenon) remains hidden. Yet, Gregory adheres to the tradition of 
philosophical realism, and claims that 'no matter the way in which objects are 
signified by the words imposed to them, the knowledge we have [of them] remains 
1 5 T. C A R L Y L E , Sartor Resartus I. 11 (London: 1834), 57 
1 6 A. M E R E D I T H , "The Concept of Mind in Gregory of Nyssa and the Neoplatonists', SP 22 (1989), 35-51; see also 
V . HARRISON, 'Receptacle Imagery in St. Gregory of Nyssa's Anthropology', SP 22 (1989), 23-28 
17 De inf. (PG 46, 176B; GNO III, II. 80. 16-20): 'ei oun he gnosis ousia ouk estin, alia peri ti tes dianoias 
energeia, polu mallon e agnoia porro tou kat 'ousian einai homologetai.' 
1 8NPNF V , 265a (GNO I. 269. 13-14) 
1 9 NPNF V , 307b (GNO I. 393. 14): 'Every term (pas logos) - every term, that is, which is really such - is an 
utterance expressing some movement of thought (ton kat' ennoian kinematon phone)' 
2 0 NPNF V, 265a (GNO I. 269. 11-15) 
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21 unconfused.' Though imperfect, our knowledge of the world is not illusory. The 
same rules apply when God becomes the focus of the attention of the intellect, which 
disposes of innumerable words in order to describe the divine works in the world. Yet, 
since God is one and the same in his activities, 'all the names and the concepts worthy 
of God have the same value because their designation (semasia) of the object 
* 22 
(hypokeimenon) coincide.' 
Gregory explains the fall into multiplicity of names by appeal to the concept of 
'infinity' in God. This explains, on the one hand, the unfathomable character of God's 
essence, but, also, the inexhaustible resource for God's activities, which make 
'everything that breathes praise the Lord' (Psalm 150: 6). Gregory lets us understand 
that, since it is rooted in historicity, the contemplation of God's mighty works is open 
and subjected to change and encounters novelties, though God is one. In Kantian 
terms, the knowledge of God is a posteriori, though it surpasses the objective limits 
imposed by the general rules of perception (space and time). Consequently, the most 
befitting names that can portray God's activity are the negative ones, the use of which 
Gregory considers a 'sacred duty.' 2 3 He explains why: 
In order that the Supreme Being may not appear to have any connection 
whatever with things below, we use, with regard to His nature, ideas and 
phrases expressive of separation from all such conditions; we call, for 
instance, that which is above all times (to hyperand ton aidnori) pre-
temporal (proaionion), that which is above beginning unbeginning (kai 
hyper archen anarchon), that which is not brought to an end, unending (to 
me teleioumenon ateleuteton).24 
0 
The names used to extol God are not analytical predicates deduced from the concept 
of divinity. In Gregory's writings, there is no such a thing as the 'essential concept' 
for God. It is rather Eunomius' case that the statements of theology take the form of 
some analytic a priori propositions, making all the attributes of God convertible into 
the essential divine name, which is 'agennetos'.25 For Eunomius, when one had the 
concept of 'ungeneracy', all the other divine names become irrelevant or superfluous. 
They are concepts, which add nothing to our knowledge of God, which is not acquired 
21 AdAbl. (GNO III, I. 43.7-9) 
2 2 Ad Eust. (GNO III, I. 8. 8-10): panta gar ta theoprepe onomata te kai noemata homotimos echei pros allela to 
meden peri ten tou hypokeimenou diaphdnein semasian.' 
2 3 NPNF V, 308b (GNO I. 396. 3-4): 'It is a sacred duty to use of God names privative of the things abhorrent to 
His nature (eusebes an eie pantos tois choristikois ton apemphainonton hremasin ep 'autou kechresthaiy 
24 NPNFV, 308b (GNO I. 395. 14-20) 
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by a sort of intellectual intuition. But Gregory objects to this claim, saying: 'Thus let 
all God's attributes be convertible terms {outo kai ta kath' hekasta panta pros allela 
metachoreito), there being no special signification {idiazouses emphaseds) to 
distinguish one from another.'26 Gregory falsifies this theory by comparing two divine 
attributes, which the latter considered to be equivalent. 'What has no end' {to 
ateleuteton) cannot be reduced to 'what has no beginning' {to agenneton) because 'the 
term "without end" is common to all things whose life we believe capable of 
extension to infinity {diarkein te zoe pros to apeirori), while the term without 
beginning belongs to Him alone Who is without originating cause.'27 Gregory is keen 
on preserving the plurality of divine names, which already call for God's majesty. To 
highway to God is paved with surprises, and therefore, one can describe the 
knowledge of God as synthetic a posteriori, although, unlike the knowledge supplied 
by mathematics, it is not universally acknowledgeable. Living close to God, the soul 
perceives modulation in his understanding of the divine mysteries. There are times of 
apparent forsakeness, and times of great intimacy - the mystical poem of the Song of 
the Songs renders manifest this dialectic of presence and absence. The one who loves 
God feels obliged to use many words in his praise of the divine marvels28. 'The force 
{emphasis) of each of the terms used in connection with the Divine Being {toiaute 
estin ekastou ton epi tes theias physeos legomenon) is such that, even though it has a 
peculiar significance of its own, it implies no opposition to the term associated with it 
{medemian ischein pros to synonomazomenon enantiosin).,2g There is no conflict 
among the divine names because there is no hierarchy that could make one privileged 
as against another. Even less can one find in Gregory's writings a proper name of 
God, which includes analytically all the others. 
Epinoia 
NPNF V, 297a (GNO I. 364. 5-9) 
NPNF V, 297b (GNO I. 364. 20-23) 
NPNF V, 304b (GNO I. 384. 21-24) 
NPNF V, 309a (GNO I. 396. 19-20) 
NPNF V, 298a (GNO I. 365. 26-29) 
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Epinoia ('conception') is the watchword of Gregory's sui-generis treatise on 
language . It best explains why Basil and Gregory adopted an 'apophatic' approach 
in setting the principles of knowledge of God and of his creation. While dealing with 
the question of the origin of language, it was not enough for Gregory to say that 
language is a human product. Further clarifications were required, in the light of 
Basil's former attempt to define the two-folded aspect of knowledge, and therefore, of 
language. As we have seen, the senses take a ful l part in the constitution of any vision 
about physical or intelligible world. Since concepts convey ideas by abstracting or 
sublimating the primary meaning of raw images, one cannot expect to be able to allot 
any pertinent word in respect to God. Responsible for this process of mental 
abstraction is the faculty of imagination, defined by Basil and Gregory as epinoia. 
According to my account of it, says Gregory, conception is the method by 
which we discover things that are unknown (esti gar kata ge ton emon 
logon he epinoia ephodos euretike ton agnooumenon), going on to further 
discoveries by means of what adjoins to and follows from our first 
perception {dia ton prosechon te kai akolouthon te prote to 
spoudazomenon noesei to ephexes exeuriskousa). For when we have 
formed some idea of what we seek to know, harmonising what follows {to 
akolouthon) to the first result of our discoveries, we gradually conduct our 
inquiry to the end of our proposed research31. 
In other words, epinoia is the intellectual activity that targets the discovery of 
new concepts (noemata) which grasp the suspended realm of the unknown. As its 
etymology suggests, epinoia is what comes after a primary act of perception (or 
intuition), called noesis. Any intellectual prospect needs a focal point, and epinoia 
represents the way (hodos) on which the last synthesis of knowledge is done, 
delivering one view about the object researched. For Gregory, to give names means to 
stamp conceptually the reality grasped first by intuition 3 2. The linguistic fabric of 
human mind is under the administration of the discursive intellect. But apart from the 
production of language, epinoia is involved in a variety of intellectual activities and, 
though it explores the realm of imagination (rather in abstract than concrete form), it 
has no pejorative connotation (as in Epicurus' view 3 3, taken as such by Eunomius). 
For precious philological comments, see E . C . OWEN, 'Epinoeo, Epinoia and allied words', JTS 35 (1934), 368-
376 
3 1 NPNF V, 263a (GNO I. 277. 20-26) 
3 2 NPNF V, 290b (GNO I. 343. 26) 
3 3 NPNF V, 291b (GNO I. 345. 25-30) 
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Not only poetry or mythology are the product of epinoia, but also (and more 
important), the technological achievements of humankind, on the basis of which the 
pure sciences lay down their premises. 
In praising epinoia as the source of all the benefits of the history of humankind, 
Gregory goes so far that he appreciates 'this faculty [being] more precious than any 
other with the exercise of which we are gifted in this life by Divine Providence (para 
tes theias prometheias),3A. As with any other God-given gifts, man has the capacity to 
use this faculty of discovery either for good or for bad purposes. Gregory is aware that 
progress in technology is very often linked with the war machine, ruled over by 
various state men, and yet, he is keen on regarding epinoia as a gift from God given 
purely for good. Gregory mentions medicine as 'art of healing', which benefits from 
the outcomes of virtually all the sciences and the techniques invented by human 
intelligence (mathematics, geometry, biology, navigation, commerce, etc.). And since 
medicine, in contrast to war, can absorb all the results of human creativity, 
technological progress seems to be entirely legitimate in Gregory's eyes. It is an 
orthodox position, since by that time, the small advances in medicine35 did not raise 
ethical questions such as euthanasia, transplants of organs, etc. Medicine enjoyed a 
great prestige among the Cappadocians, among whom Basil, even in the hostile age of 
Valens, gained the illustrious reputation of the initiator of the first Christian hospices, 
in which people sick of leprosy were carefully looked after3 6. No doubt because of 
Basil's work in the field of medicine, Gregory was ready to praise the benefits of 
intellectual imagination, which is in charge of language as well as of arithmetic. 
Gregory's defence of epinoia as the faculty of imagination of human mind leads 
to some unexpected results. Since, like thought, human language is not only 
reproductive, but also creative, one has to justify the huge cultural diversity of 
humankind. Gregory refers not only to the higher branches of learning (ton 
mathematon ta hypselotera) - as geometry and arithmetic - , but also to 'the invention 
of the mechanical arts (eureseis ton mathematon)\ 'the marvels of measuring time', 
'the philosophy of being (he peri tou ontos philosophid)\ 'the contemplation of the 
intelligible things (he ton noeton theoria)', or less pretentious skills like 'agriculture 
3 4 NPNF V, 263a ( G N O I. 277.32-278.1-4) 
3 5 For a short overview, see R . PORTER, The Greatest Benefit to Mankind: a Medical History of Humanity from 
Antiquity to the Present (London: FontanaPress, 1999). 
3 6 B A S I L OF C A E S A R E A , Ep. 94 (ed. R . J . Deferrari, vol. II, 151-152); G R E G O R Y OF NAZIANZUS, Orat. 43. 63; 
SOCRATES, HE VI. 34 
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(he georgia), navigation (he nautilia)', and even the art of taming beasts . When 
confronted with such an astounding amount of sciences and techniques, one should 
find the reasonable source of inspiration for human beings. Surprisingly enough, 
Gregory's answer is very modern, since he does not make recourse to any 
mythological explanation. There is no invisible 'genius' or 'daimon' in charge of any 
of these technological innovations. The bishop of Nyssa tackles highly sophisticated 
questions even in contemporary epistemology, looking for the origin of scientific 
discoveries or, to put it differently, the relationship between novelty and human 
intellect. Translated into the contemporary philosophical jargon of the continental 
tradition, Gregory's understanding of the process of thinking would look extremely 
appealing even nowadays, as in the early modern times of Richard Simon or J. C. 
Herder. A contrario, Eunomius' undertakings would appear appalling to any reader 
interested in epistemology or cosmology. Gregory imagines thought as a way of 
approximation to what naturally discards essentialist description. Temporal 
differentiation affects all objects of thought, apart from the ideal entities (as the 
rational numbers). But since spatial difference occurs even in the latter situation, 
Gregory says that human thinking is more a way of approximation, than a pictorial 
capture of reality. It is hard to believe that Gregory ever imagined thought to be 
reducible to linguistic structures and the complexity of language to be entirely 
mirrored by logic. In its biblical application, language reveals itself to be an interplay 
between images and concepts, which can suffer almost an alchemical transformation 
in their meaning, during the hermeneutical process. 
To claim that one could assert essential predicates about God means to ignore 
not only the ontological cleavage between the Creator and the creature, but also the 
by-product of, respectively, Adam's fall and of the catastrophe of Babel3 8. Having a 
corrupted noetic and moral identity, human beings cannot say - like God addressing 
Moses - ' I am who I am' (Exodus 3: 14). We learn about things and about ourselves 
by experience, which literally means overcoming limits or in spiritual terms, 
temptations39. For Gregory, our supreme limit is God, whose measure is infinite. 
Though inexhaustible by nature, God is reflected in his works, in the same way in 
3 7 NPNF V, 263a (GNO /. 277. 5-15) 
3 8 About how the plurality of languages shape human perception, see G. STEINER, After Babel: Aspects of 
Language and Translation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976) 
3 9 In Greek, peirasmos stems fromperas while emperia (translated in Latin with experientia) plays the same 
etymology. In the Romanian philosophy, an enticing 'peratology' (or ontology of the limit) has been sketched by 
G. LIICEANU, Despre limita (Bucuresti: Humanitas, 1994). 
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which reality is expressed by language, in words that reflect the internal limitation of 
the human mind and the external activities of different entities (living beings, or 
inanimate objects). Therefore, Gregory is aware that the genuine desire for knowledge 
(which, pace Foucault, is not immediately convertible into power) remains, somehow, 
unquenchable, though the world is limited and aporetic, when not directly mysterious. 
The possession of intellectual certitudes is endangered by every new sensible 
acquirement and by the need of better formalisation. Our skills are always perfectible 
and any scientific knowledge acquired by systematic methods is challenged by 
temporality. Genuine knowledge must enlarge and surpass its previous horizon of 
determination, by a sort of readiness for self-annihilation. Living fully the 
consequences of Adam's fall, human intelligence is fragmented and our knowledge 
deficient. One cannot approach totality through discursive reasoning, and this failure 
already represents an invitation for other 'epistemological' lines of attack, which mean 
paradoxical elevation through faith and love, expressed at their best in prayer. Hans 
Urs von Balthasar identified in his shrewd reading of Gregory's writing 'une 
philosophic du devenir et du desir', which is developed in all the important parts of his 
theological doctrine. Anthropology - with its classical teaching about the soul as the 
'icon of God', and cosmology - which holds the divine Logos as the principle of the 
whole creation, thus make legitimate any cautious analogical deduction. 
'Incomprehensibility' is therefore the hallmark of God's infinity in the contemplation 
of man and of creation. 
Criticism of Semantic Univocity 
There is a certain epistemological confidence behind Eunomius' claim that 
'ungeneracy' is God's essence (and not that God's essence is - inter alia -
'ungenerate'),40 namely the confidence in the ability of language to express adequately 
the realm of the divine. To Basil's affirmation 4 1 of the human character of any 
linguistic expression, including agennetos, Eunomius replied with a series of 
unparalleled theological statements. In the first book of his second treatise Apologia 
Apologiae, Eunomius speaks of the natural meanings of the words4 2, claiming that 
4 0 NPNF V, 252b (GNO I. 233. 1 l-17a) 
41 Adv. Eun. I. 6 (PG 29, 524B) 
4 2 NPNF V, 91b (GNO I. 201.3-5) 
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God himself made of use of these words before the creation of man . In the second 
one, Eunomius pours scorn on Basil's 4 4 'relativistic' account of language, saying that 
he rejected the Scriptures for the benefit of pagan wisdom 4 5. Gregory's elder brother is 
labelled at once as a disciple of Aristotle, Epicurus46, and Valentinus47. In fact, Basil 
only claimed that the human mind has the freedom to choose the appropriate words 
which express better the activity of different real or imaginary entities. Contrarily, 
captive to a literal exegesis of Scripture, Eunomius supposes that, ab initio, God 
invented a catalogue of names befitting the essence of things4 8. He suggests that such 
ideas are implicit in the first two chapters of Genesis, but also in various other texts, 
like the Psalms49 or the Gospels. Unsurprisingly, Basil's assessment of the relative 
character of all the predicates uttered on behalf of God, provoked on Eunomius' part 
the habitual reflex of accusing his adversary of blasphemy. In short, Eunomius 
introduced the notion of divine invention of names50, without specifying i f it was only 
of agennetos or, of others names, as well. 'The Creator, says the heresiarch, by means 
of relationship, activity, and analogy, has appointed names suitable to each things' 5 1. 
It is not clear what words like 'relationship, activity, and analogy' do really mean, but 
this conclusion is for Eunomius the result of two kinds of enquiries: one is scriptural 
(of which Moses, David and the evangelists bear witness), while the other is the result 
of logical deduction from 'a law of nature [which] teaches us that the status of names 
derives from the things named, not from the authority of the one who does the 
naming' 5 2. Yet, Eunomius never managed to provide biblical evidence either for his 
prioritising of agennesia, or for his essentialist Trinitarian formula. At one point, he 
says that all names are divine products, and therefore no discrimination among them is 
acceptable. Then, Eunomius can claim that agennesia plays a top role, because of 
theological reasons. One of the notorious motives for this fixation on a single word is, 
ultimately, God's simplicity, acknowledged as such by Gregory53. Simplicity of God -
Eunomius suggests - should accommodate just one designation, namely agennetos. 
4 3 NPNF V, 277a (GNO I. 303. 1-6) 
"NPNF V, 248b (GNO II. 310. 25): '[Basil] has undertaken to write without any skill in logic'. 
4 5 NPNF V, 269b; 291b (GNO I. 281. 1-14; 345-346) 
4 6 NPNF V, 291b (GNO I. 345.9-346.11) 
4 7 NPNF V, 295a (GNO I. 356. 20-4); NPNF V, 297a (GNO I. 362. 7-11) 
4 8 NPNF V, 291a (GNO I. 345. 12-16) 
4 9 NPNF V, 298a (GNO I. 350. 6-9) 
5 0 NPNF V, 265 (GNO I. 270. 1-4) 
5 1 NPNF V, 284a (GNO II. 324. 1-4) 
5 2 NPNF V, 305a (GNO I. 385. 21-4) 
5 3 NPNF V, 252b-253a (GNO I. 238. 11-42); 
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Actually, by saying this, Eunomius acknowledges the instant donation of the concept 
of ungeneracy, and the one of simplicity, the semantics of which can hardly dovetail. 
In making agennetos prevail against all other divine names (like infinity, 
goodness, etc.), Eunomius proved to be, to say the least, inconsistent, since he wanted 
to demonstrate that, in fact, language is of divine institution. The natural consequence 
of this statement would be that not only agennetos, but also other names would 
necessarily enjoy the privileged status of concepts which reveal the essence of natures. 
Claiming that we are using a divine artefact, Eunomius arrived at a peculiar theory of 
univocal predication. To be sure, he did not say, like Duns Scottus one thousand years 
later, that 'to be' can be predicated in the same way of God as of any other creature. In 
this respect, he was too much a Neoplatonic thinker, asserting for 'the first essence' 
the right 'to be', in the proper sense of the word 5 4 . Instead, Eunomius spoke of 'words 
belonging naturally to God' 5 5 , which nevertheless, come into our intellectual 
possession. In this respect, it is legitimate to speak about a linguistic (or semantic) 
univocity, which means that in Eunomius' thought there was no distinction between 
God's treatment of words and the human usage of them. Eunomius could make even 
more bizarre statements, for instance that 'things which have one and the same name 
are themselves one' 5 6. Such a proposition is blatantly wrong even for the most profane 
observer of the living performance of any kind of languages, which include in their 
texture a considerable amount of homonyms (words which are identical in form but 
different in meanings). 
AGENNETOS: Privation and Correlation 
However, Gregory's objection is not just a moral one. He is very keen to show 
that the characterisation of God primarily as a 'ungenerate entity' is completely 
mystifies the understanding of the relationship between the Father and the Son, which 
was the object of Athanasius' theology57. In his CE I , Gregory spent a lot of energy in 
order to prove that the whole point of the biblical language about the Father and the 
Son is to stress in a paradoxical language - which, speaking of God, cannot be 
5 4 NPNF V, 225a (GNO II. 251. 18-20): 'He who is in the bosom of I A M [Ex 3: 14] does not possess existence 
simply or in the proper sense'. 
5 5 NPNF V, 305b (GNO I. 388. 6) 
5 6 NPNF V, 193a (GNO II. 166. 11-16) 
5 7 E . P. MEIJERING, 'Athanasius on the Father as the Origin of the Son' in God. Being. History. Studies in Patristic 
Philosophy (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1975), 89-102 
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suspected of literal connotations - the essential identity and the hypostatic 
58 
difference. This is what characterises the mysterious, and the unfathomable God 
worshipped in the 'true religion' (eusebeia). For Gregory, the whole point was clear: 
i f the Father always existed as a God, but not as a Father, then the Son would have 
come - the first among all creatures - though not 'ex nihilo', but out of divine w i l l 5 9 . 
In other words, i f one had to speak, like Eunomius, of God in terms of 'ungenerate 
essence', any explanation of the idea of 'fatherhood' would be done at the cost of 
introducing temporality into God. I f God is described primarily as an 'ungenerate 
essence' one should say that he only becomes a Father by 'begetting' a Son (since 
'ungeneracy' does not speak of 'fatherhood'6 0). Temporalisation of God is just the 
first step towards the restoration of mythology, which in Gregory's time had already 
began to be justified philosophically by various Neoplatonic thinkers61 (among whom 
one should count Iamblicus and, on a lower note, Julian the Apostate). Driven to 
despair, Gregory denounces Eunomius as a person who 'advocates the error of 
Judaism and takes part in the impiety of the Greeks {tes Hellenikes atheiasy62 
Yet, since the heresiarch does not wish to refute the Nicene dogma 
straightforwardly, pretending to establish his ideas on a logical platform of thought, 
Gregory brought out a semantic refutation. First, there is the question of synonymy 
drawn out between agennetos and anarchos, already made by St Basil in his Adversus 
Eunomium . Gregory comes out with a clear differentiation of the various meanings 
(polysemos) of the word 'origin' (arche), which stands behind the concept of 
agennesia ('ungeneracy')64. Greek language uses different verbs in order to express 
the act of coming into existence: with regard to the animal nature, one thinks of the 
NPNF V, 80a (GNO I. 165, 25-26): (mia physis omologeitai par'emon en diaphorois tas hypostasesi). Cf. S. 
GONZALES, 'La formula mia ousia treis hypostaseis en San Gregorio di Nisa', AnGr 21 (1939) 1-140; more 
generally, for the Cappadocian Fathers' Trinitarian theology, see the invaluable contributions of ANDRE D E 
H A L L E U X , \,Hypostase" et „personne" dans la formation du dogme trinitaire', and 'Personnalisme ou essentialismc 
trinitaire chez les Peres cappadociens', in ID. Patrologie et Oecumenisme (Louvain: Peeters, 1990), 113-214; 215-
268; also, L. A Y R E S , 'On Not Three People: The Fundamental Themes of Gregory of Nyssa's Trinitarian Theology 
As Seen in To Ablabius: On not Three Gods', MT18 (2002) 4, 445-474 
5 9 A I, 15. 8: 'we do not, however, include the essence of the Only-begotten among things brought into existence 
out of nothing, for no-thing is no essence (epeiper ouk ousia to me on).' 
6 0 AA I (VAGIONNE, 103; GNO I. 190. 20-193.1) 
6 1 Regarding Eunomius' relationship to Neoplatonism, some hints have been given by J . DANIELOU, 'Eunome 
l'Arien et l'exegese neoplatonicienne du Cratyle', REG 69 (1956), 412-432; Further research has been carried on 
by P. M. GREGORIOS, "Theurgic neo-Platonism and the Eunomius-Gregory Debate : An Examination of the 
Background', in "Contra Eunomium I" en la produccion literaria de Gregorio de Nisa (Pamplona: Ediciones 
Universidad de Navarra, 1988), 217-235. 
6 2 NPNF V, 25lb (GNO I. 231, 7-8) 
6 3 B A S I L , Adv. Eun. I . 15 (PG 29,545B ff) 
6 4 NPNF V , 78b (GNO I . 162, 7-8); Eunomius calls God the 'only font and source of all things [ten ton panton te 
aitian kai archen]' (A I, 22. 6). If, on the one hand, Eunomius is ready to render as synonyms concepts like 'origin' 
(arche) and 'cause' (aitia), he is inconsistent in claiming 'agennetos' as the name of God. 
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specific acts of, respectively, giving birth and begetting (tiktein - for female; gennad -
for male), then there is the specific act of creating (poied), and of fashioning 
(kataskeuazo). Gregory does not follow Aristotle's taxonomy of causation (divided 
into four general types of causa), but makes clear that 'ungeneracy' is just one 
category under the more general idea of 'unoriginateness' (to anarchon). 'Ungenerate' 
is a manner of being6 5, and since it is a quality (determination), it cannot embrace the 
divine absolute. It conveys literally the idea of existence without a father, and in this 
respect, Adam could be called agennetos, as well as God the Father. I f they can be 
designated with identical attributes, their meanings remain utterly different. Agennetos 
is also a non-biblical name, which by its own status shows itself to be an invention6 6 
or, in Boethius' later terms, an impositio. 
Eunomius finds his way towards the divine Monad trying to find a concept 
absolutely free of relation. He has difficulties in maintaining that, on the one hand, 
agennetos describes the essence of God, while, on the other hand, it conveys no 
negative meanings. I f agennetos had been out of privation (prescribed by alpha 
privativum), then God also would have to been discussed as a passive subject. Why? 
Because Eunomius takes for granted the absolute, immediate connection of language 
to reality . Yet, he calls God the 'only fount and source of all things [ten ton panton 
68 
te aitian kai archen\ . Accepting as synonyms words like 'origin' (arche) and 
'cause' (aitia), he is inconsistent in claiming 'agennetos' as the name of God par 
excellence. Theologically, one should be ready to withdraw all the sensible 
connotations of the word gennad, when it is said about God the Father. As Gregory 
very often repeats in his work, 'generation' tells of the mysterious relationship 
existing between the Father and the Son, which specifies simultaneously the 
hypostatic difference (diaphora without diastasis) and the community of substance in 
God, who is One. Therefore, one can be confident that 'while the Father is unoriginate 
and ungenerate, the Son is ungenerate [in the way we have said], but not 
. . ,50 
unonginate. 
It is clear that, from the beginning of the quarrel with Eunomius, there was at 
stake the understanding of 'generation', the meaning of which Eunomius regarded as 
NPNF V, 289a (GNO I. 339. 2-7) 
NPNF V, 305b (GNO I. 387. 3-4) 
A I. 12. 7-8: oukheteron men ten ousian noountes, heteron de tipar'auten to semainomenon 
A I. 22. 6 
NPNF V, 78b (GNO I. 162. 22-25) 
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equivalent to 'creation' or 'bringing into existence'. Briefly, it would be right to say 
that Eunomius understood 'ungeneracy' as the highest degree of existence ever 
conceivable, making of his God something less comparable to the late medieval 
summum ens. Eunomius' vocalism (or primitive nominalism) must have sounded 
attractive to at least one category of people, namely those belonging to upper-class 
society, being familiar with the Neoplatonic Theurgic jargon of that age (Porphyry 
tells us about Plotinus' success among members of the Alexandrian aristocracy of the 
3 r d century). Yet, one can suspect that the appeal of abstract discourse remained 
limited to an elitist category of people, which explains why Eunomius failed to 
capture with his rebarbative intellectual speech the imagination of his congregation. In 
order to substantiate this assertion, one could bring forth not only the Cappadocians' 
frequent charges of atheism against Aetius and Eunomius, but also some stances from 
his Second Apology. The first one echoes Exodus 3:14 and John 1:1, mixed up into a 
subordinationist vision of God: 'He who is in the bosom of I A M (ho en kolpois on 
tou ontos), and Who is in the beginning and with God (kai en arche on kai pros ton 
theon on), does not possess existence simply and in the proper sense (ouk on oude 
kyrios on), even i f Basil, neglecting the distinction, uses the title of 'existent' (ten tou 
ontos prosegorian), contrary to the truth' 7 0 . This rather cryptic sentence tells us that 
the Son does not possess existence in the proper sense of the word, which is only 
ascribable to the Ungenerate. To such a claim, Gregory protested harshly, saying that 
even for the pagan wisdom (e.g.: Aristotle), God was unimaginable under the category 
of quantity (more or less being). Refusing to apply any category of quantity or quality 
to God, Basil of Caesarea warned that the Trinity is not to be understood into a 
numeral sense: 'We do not count by addition, passing from the one to the many by 
increase; we do not say: one, two, three, or first, second and third. 'For I am God, the 
first, and I am the last' [Is. 44, 6]. Now we have never, even to the present time, heard 
of a second God; but adoring God of God, confessing the individuality of the 
hypostases, we dwell in the monarchy without dividing the theology into fragments'71. 
Eunomius missed this point and, therefore, introduced an ontological differentiation 
7 0 NPNF V , 225a (GNO II. 251. 18-23); VAGGIONE (1987) renders the fragment in a shorted version, translating ho 
on with 'I AM' (capitalised). 
7 1 B A S I L , De Spiritu Sancto, 45 (PG 32, 149B); Gregory of Nyssa enunciates in Oratio Catechetica (ch.III) the 
same idea: 'the same thing is capable of being numbered and yet rejects numeration' (NPNF V , 477b; PG 45, D2-
3: pos to auto kai arithmeton esti, kai diapheugei ten exarithmesiri). 
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among the divine hypostases, being compelled to speak of a 'second' and a 'third' 
god. Why one should stop at the third 'God' remained obscure. 
The second fragment seem to confirm the onto-theological constitution of 
Eunomius' metaphysics, in other words: 'For he who possesses existence and who 
lives because of the Father (ho dia ton patera on kai zon), does not appropriate to 
himself the status of the I A M , for the essence which rules even Him draws (elkouses) 
to itself the meaning of the existent (ten tou ontos ennoian)\n Pointing out that God is 
the essence, very nature which is to exist, Eunomius traces, again, a very similar logic 
of thought to that of Spinoza who imagined God as that essence 'whose nature can be 
conceived only as existing' . Consequently, Eunomius was obliged to treat Christ as a 
demigod by adoption. This typically Arian assumption triggered among the Nicene 
theologians a very prompt reaction. I f Christ was created in a time before which he 
was not, the divine logic of Incarnation would collapse lamentably. Following St 
Athanasius74, Gregory of Nazianzus insisted that 'what is not assumed is unhealed, 
and only that which is united to God is saved.'75 Once again, dogmatic theology 
cannot be separated from the practical adhesion to the proclamation of the Gospel and 
submission to the mystery of salvation. Eunomius' essentialist jargon left little room 
for such an understanding of salvation in Christ. It is significant that Eunomius' denial 
of Christ's divinity, whose participation in the goodness of the 'First Essence' (or 
'Supreme Being', tes anotato ousias) he considered to be not natural, but gnomic76, 
resembles very much the modern shift the Western thought.77 By implementing 
strongly ontologised concepts like 'Being' or 'Monad' in order to express the essence 
of God, many philosophers and theologians started to regard Christ as a model for 
moral perfection . This surprising convergence between Eunomius and the 
rationalistic ideology of the 17 t h and the 18 t h century becomes even more serious and 
arresting when compared in its epistemological application. The famous Fragment II 
included by Vaggione in Eunomius' Extant Works, provides a substantial argument in 
this respect. I f one can trust Socrates Scholasticus' report, Eunomius maintained that 
7 2 NPNF V, 227a (GNO II. 254. 27-255. 4) 
7 3 SPINOZA, Ethics I, First Definition: 'By causa sui I mean that whose essence involves existence; or that whose 
nature can be conceived only as existing' (ET: S. Shirley, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992). 
7 4 ATHANASIUS, On the Incarnation 43 
7 5 G R E G O R Y NAZIANZEN, Letter 101. 32 
7 6 A I. 15. 16: 'he became the perfect minister [teleiotatos hypourgos] of the whole creative activity and purpose of 
the Father' 
7 7 J. P E L I K A N , Jesus Through the Centuries: His Place in the History of Culture (Y ale, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1985), 182-194 
7 8 X. TlLLiETTE, Le Christ de la philosophic (Paris : Cerf, 1990) 
100 
'God does not know anything more about his own essence than we do, nor is that 
essence better known to him, and less to us; rather, whatever we ourselves know about 
it is exactly what he knows, and, conversely, that which he knows is what you wil l 
find without change in us' 7 9. With its conspicuous subjective touch, this sentence 
appears to be, again, very modern (avant la lettre). One just has to compare Aetius 
and Eunomius' claims not only with Aristotle's image about God (defined as 'the 
thought which thinks upon itself ), but also with Spinoza's or Hegel's philosophical 
statements, regarding the endowment of the intellect and its call for knowing God's 
Q 1 
essence . One encounters here the typically modern deduction of ontology from 
epistemology, namely the objective structure of being is isomorphic with the 
subjective apparatus of knowledge (the latter reduced to common perception and 
discursive reasoning). In actual fact, many of Hegel's Schwerpunkte - God as 
absolute, self-conscious subject (Gott als Selbstbewufitseirif2, or the motto: 'what is 
rational is real and what is real is rational' - could be easily applied to Eunomius' 
eclectic metaphysics. 
Contradiction and Contrariety 
7 9 SOCRATES, HE IV. 7 (PG 67. 473B-C), E T in V A G G I O N E (1987), 178; compare with THEODORET OF C Y R U S ' 
report: '[Eunomius] dared to assert such things as not one of the saints ever perceived, that he knows the essence of 
God perfectly {alia kai auten akribos epistatai tou theou ten ousia), and that he has the same knowledge about 
God, as God about himself (hen autos echeiperi eautou ho theos)' - cf. THEOD., Haer. IV. 3 (PG 83. 421 A), E T in 
VAGGIONE (1987), 169; see also EPIPHANIUS' account on Aetius' doctrine (Haer. 76. 4. 2, GCS III. 344. 22-23): 
'[Aetius] deluded himself to speak thus: "I know God" (ton theon epistamai), he says, "with perfect clarity, and I 
know and understand him to such an extent that I do not understand myself better than I know God (me eidenai 
emauton mallon hos theon epistamai).' 
8 0 Metaphysics, L , 7 (1072bl9-26); for Aristotle, theology represents, in fact, thephilosophia prima, or the 'science 
of the most eminent genus' (1026a21), which in the scholastic division of sciences will take the name of 
metaphysica specialis. When diagnosing as 'onto-theologicaP the Western metaphysics tradition, Heidegger 
thought that Aristotelian theology provided the foundational model of rationality, demanding for a relation of 
'mutual conciliation' (Austrag) between the 'Being as Being' and the divine (theion) or God, thought as the 'first 
essence' or the 'supreme being'. One finds here a web of circular determination (God conceived as a Being 
grounding the common being, to on). See, M. HEIDEGGER, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (GA 26) 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press); and also C. H A N L E Y , 'Heidegger on Aristotle's "Metaphysical" God', 
Continental Philosophy Review 32 (1999) 19-28; an important theological application of Heidegger's verdict has 
been pursued by J . - L . MARION, "The Marches of Metaphysics' in The Idol and the Distance, E T (with introduction) 
by Thomas A. Carlson (New York: Fordham University Press, 2001), 1-26 
8 1 SPINOZA, Ethica II, §47: 'Mens humana adaequatam habet cognitionem aeternae et infinitae essentiae Dei.' 
8 2 G. W. F. H E G E L , Phanomenologie des Geistes, S. 747 in Philosophic Schulerbibliothek (CD-Rom), S. 18515 (cf. 
Werke, vol. 3, p. 504); see for details, S A M U E L M. POWEL, The Trinity in German Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 104-141; and especially p. 116: 'The Trinity is according to Hegel neither a mystery, nor a 
secret in itself; "these relations of origin [ie: begetting of the Son and proceeding of the Holy Spirit] are pictorial 
ways of expressing the logical dialectics of differentiation and reconciliation"; p. 121: 'Trinity therefore is the 
religious version of what philosophers know as the logical form of spirit'. 
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There is no doubt that both Gregory and Eunomius used freely a philosophical 
concept like 'ousia', though by this word they referred to distinct realities. In the wake 
of the Nicene Trinitarian theology, Gregory tends to identify ousia (or physis) with the 
undivided Deity (theotes), the common nature shared by the Father and the Son, while 
hypostasis designates the individuality of the divine persons83. In his turn, Eunomius 
speaks of three substances (ousiai): His definition of the 'Holy Trinity' brings forth 
the following image: 'the highest and principal essence (tes anotato kai kyriotates 
ousias), the essence which exists through it but before all others, and in the essence 
which is third in terms of origin, and the activity which produced i t ' 8 4 . However, 
terminological differences had in the past important antecedents, among which were 
the controversy between Dionysios of Rome and Dionysios of Alexandria at the end 
o r 
of the third century , but which were not a sufficient condition for delimiting the 
borderline between orthodoxy and heresy. In the 360s, as Stuart G. Hall put it, 'the 
threat of persecution made some doctrinal arguments seem suddenly less important'8 6. 
The Homoians accepted the use of the ontological language of Nicaea (which did not 
make of the status of the Holy Spirit an issue), while Athanasius 'era limitato a 
riconoscere, nel Tomus ad Antiochenos, che si poteva parlare in senso accetabile, sia 
di una, sia di tre ipostasi della divinita' 8 7. 
But Eunomius remained, symptomatically, the enemy of both the 
'homoousians' and the 'homoiousians'. He articulated a theology of a hierarchic Triad 
of divine essences, considering the mode of origination as criterion for ontological 
dignity. Eunomius was right to see in the concept of agennesia a trait missing among 
the Son's attributes, but he was wrong to read it as a proof of ontological degradation. 
Basil put it accordingly: 'The difference between the "generated" (to genneton) and 
the "ungenerate" (agenneto) is not of more or less (kata to mallon kai hetton), as 
between of a more or lesser light, but the distance of one towards the other is so great, 
like that between two [attributes] incapable of coexistence (asynhyparkton),ss. 
Eunomius' mistake stemmed from the kind of logic he used: as Basil put it clearly in 
Adversus Eunomium, there is no necessary contrariety (enantiotetos) between two 
8 3 D. F. STRAMARA, 'Gregory of Nyssa's Terminology for Trinitarian Perichoresis', VC 52 (1998) 3, 257-263; see 
also C. STEAD, 'Why not Three Gods? The Logic of Gregory of Nyssa's Trinitarian Doctrine', in H . R. DROBNER & 
C. K.LOCK (ed.), Studien zu Gregor von Nyssa und der christlichen Spatanthike (Leiden: E J Brill, 1990), 149-163 
8 4 A A I (Vaggione, 102) (GNO / 71. 28-73. 15) 
8 5 For a short and clear account, see H. LIETZMANN, A History of the Early Church vol. Il l , 95-98 
8 6 STUART G. H A L L , Doctrine and Practice in the Early Church (London: SPCK, 1991), 148 
8 7 M . SIMONETTI, op. cit., 511 
88 Adv. Eun. II. 28, 1-4 (PG 29, 636 c-d) 
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terms standing in opposition (antithesis) . Between agennetos/gennetos there is 
contradiction, but not contrariety, and this point was emphasised by St Gregory of 
Nyssa in CE I , while working on the concept of 'beginning' and of the 'end'. He states 
that 'beginning' is contradictory to 'ending', but just contrary to 'beginningless'. 
'That which is without beginning, being contrary to that which is to be seen by a 
beginning, wil l be a very different thing from that which is endless, or the negation of 
end' 9 0. In other words, the 'ungenerate' is contrary to the 'generated', but not 
contradictory. In order to understand what 'ungenerate' means, one has to say what 
'generated' conveys. With respect to the Son, Gregory does not say that we know 
what the Father's act of begetting (gennao) means, and what we are left with is just a 
negative understanding of it. More precisely, since only one actor (excluding thus any 
mythological scenario) performs it, on a divine level, the act of begetting the Son 
entails nothing of what we know from the sensible experience of the world. 
Consequently, Eunomius' mistake of logic becomes a theological error, since he 
imagines the Son's generation as God's first act of creation91. 
Though opposing, and yet not contradicting one another, agennetos/gennetos 
stand in a mutual relationship. In Eunomius' logic of argumentation, i f one was to 
define God by his relationship to the 'third essence' (the Holy Spirit), then God should 
have been called the 'un-proceeded'. In principle, there is nothing wrong with this 
attribute, which is perfectly admissible. The problem is that Eunomius wanted to 
pinpoint 'the first essence' in relationship only to 'the second', while the third essence 
could have provided a negative concept, as well (i.e. 'the un-proceeded'). Being 
relative only to the Son's status, and not to the Holy Spirit, agennetos simply cannot 
be taken as an absolute name for God. Semantically, again, it also strange that one can 
claim to have an absolute name, which retains a privative meaning. Gregory counted 
in the large (and, potentially, infinite) class of 'divine names' both negative and 
positive terms, but none was ranked at the level that Eunomius' targeted for 
agennesia. 
ibidem 
9 0 N P N F V , 99a(GNOI. 221. 11-14) 
9 1 In Gregory's writings, the metaphysics of participation can be supportive of a cosmological doctrine of continual 
creation. 'By participation in the transcendent [the intelligible nature] continually remains stable in the good; in a 
certain sense, it is always being created while ever changing for the better in its growth in perfection' (In Cant. 
Cantic. GNO VI. 174, E T 127). 
103 
V. PRAGMATICS O F LANGUAGE 
Gregory's Pastoral Theology 
One of the most compelling reasons which determined Gregory to mount up his 
attack upon Eunomius' teaching lies not only in his great appeal for thoroughness (ie: 
he refuted all the books of Eunomius: Liber Apologeticus, Apologia Apologiae and 
Expositio Fidei), but especially in his understanding of his pastoral duties. This source 
of inspiration is clearly conveyed by the strong homiletic tone of his writings. 
Breaking for a while from his methodical questioning of Eunomius' heresy, Gregory 
explodes before his congregation: 
With what eyes wil l you now dare to gaze upon your guide? I speak to 
you, o flock of perishing souls! How can you still turn to listen to this man 
who has reared such a monument as this of his shamelessness argument? 
Are you not ashamed now, at least, i f not before, to take the hand of a man 
like this to lead you to the truth? Do you not regard it as a sign of his 
madness as to doctrine, that he thus shamelessly stands out against the 
truth contained in Scripture?1 
The way Gregory speaks - presumably in front of an ex-Eunomian parish in 
Constantinople - gives us a clue not only about the content of his argument, but also 
about its raison d'etre. The medium of Gregory's theology (the Church) is more than 
the message (the Gospel); it is also its firm justification. For the modern reader it is 
very important to reflect upon the enormous pastoral consequences involved in all 
theological disputations of the fourth century. It was a time when Christian believers 
regarded with much more concern the theological tenets of their leaders, than happens 
nowadays. Gregory of Nyssa spoke with the authority of a bishop (elected in 372), yet 
without showing off his ecclesiastical dignity. Gregory wants to fortify the Church 
against the strong waves of heresy. At least for those who accepted the resolutions of 
the Council of Nicaea, the concept of 'heresy' and 'orthodoxy' was clearly defined. 
Gregory feared, and probably with good reason, that the Church was under threat of 
losing her cornerstone, which is Christ. In the prologue of CE I , Gregory imagines 
taking Eunomius' manifesto and dashing it 'on the rock, as i f it was one of the 
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children of Babylon: and the jock is Christ (e petra de en ho ChrisMs).'2 Willing to do 
so, Gregory feels, 'by the written and the natural law,' 3 in communion not only with 
Basil the Great, but also with St Paul, whose prayers he invokes before setting off his 
theological arguments. Repeatedly, Gregory mentions that he does not speak for 
himself, but in the name of 'the Church of God' (ekklesia tou kyriou), whose bishop 
he was at Nyssa for almost ten years (by the early 380s). Obviously, what drives 
Gregory is his profound conviction that Christian orthodoxy makes the basic claim to 
be the true faith 4. Once again, it should be noticed that, for Gregory or Eunomius, 
religion was not a matter of 'private consummation'. Once again, for Gregory and for 
his ancestors, theology was a matter of death (to the 'old man') and life (in Christ), 
having thus an importance irreducible to what one would understand today by 
'ideology'. Gregory lived in a time which hardly knew distinctions between 
'religious' and 'secular', when theology was more than an exercise of 'imagination', 
sacramental life never reconciled with a symbolical conventionalism, Divine Liturgy 
more than a public spectacle, 'orthodoxy' less than an ideological construct. A battle 
for truth implied recourse to all literary resources, which, had to overwhelm 
Eunomius' hidden usage of syllogism in theology. Like Basil, Gregory needed to 
refute Eunomius' within his own settings of thought, but on the scriptural level and 
with recourse to the authority of the tradition. Gregory wanted to defend a general 
truth: not only consistent in its own terms, but also persuasive, beautiful, and credible. 
Having set this purpose, Gregory could make use of rhetoric and dialectic in the 
framework provided by the Scriptures. Gregory's plan was not only to refute point-by-
point Eunomius' ideas, but to prove what Christian theology genuinely means. It 
short, Gregory assured himself with the authority of the Church tradition (confirmed 
by the prestige of Basil's holiness), wrapping his argument in the body of the 
Scriptures. 
On the side of the orthodox, the pastoral implications were quite serious. 
Gregory mentions more than once that the Eunomians threatened the unity of the 
Church at the level of practice of the Christian virtues, affecting the orthodox 
understanding of prayer, Scripture and holy sacraments. One knows that, soon after 
Eunomius' consecration as bishop at Cyzicus, there were reports about his decision to 
1 NPNF V , 312b-313a (GNO 1.406. 5-13) 
2 NPNF V , 36a (GNO I. 24. 14-16) 
3 NPNF V , 36a (GNO I. 25. 6-7) 
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change the baptismal formula5, shifting from the triple immersion into water (fitting 
the expression 'in the name of the Father, of the Son and of the Holy Spirit') to just 
one immersion (symbolising Christ's death). Christ's commandment recorded by 
Matthew (28: 19) - 'Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in 
the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit' - speaks clearly of one 
name (eis to onoma) of the triune God in which the believers should be baptised. 
Since baptism was the act of initiation into the mysteries of the Christian life, the 
corruption of the formula of consecration (which means more than a conventional sign 
or a symbol) proved to be a very culpable arbitrariness on Eunomius' part. One knows 
that many credal documents in use before and after Nicaea I were the expression of 
the liturgical consciousness of the Christian Church, rather than an introduction to 
some specific issues of dogmatic theology6. Catechetical instruction and baptismal 
initiation, and not an extravagant interest in the theological speculation, set the 
framework for the composition of the credal confessions. When Eunomius' party 
rejected the content of the Nicene Creed, they were obliged, consequently, to alter the 
baptismal formula. Because of that, the second council of Constantinople was 
particularly severe with all the Eunomians willing to be received again in the 
Orthodox Church. If the Arians were expected only to anathematise their former creed 
before being 'sealed and anointed with holy chrism', the Eunomians (together with the 
Montanists and the Sabellians) were received 'like the Greeks' {ie: the gentiles). The 
seventh Canon of this Council states the following: 'On the first day we make 
Christians of them; on the second, catechumens; on the third we exorcise them by 
breathing three times into their faces and their ears; and thus we catechise them and 
make them spend time in the church and listen to the Scriptures; and then we baptise 
them.'7 
4 NPNF V, 37a (GNO I. 28. 11-13) 
5 In his last book of Apologia Apologiae, Eunomius explicitly says: 'we affirm that the mystery of 
godliness is not established by the sacredness of the Names, or the distinctiveness of customs, but by 
the accuracy of doctrine' (NPNF V, 239a; GNO II. 284. 20-5). As Vaggione rightly points out, 
'sacredness of Names' alludes to the baptismal formula. 
6 F. Y O U N G , The Making of the Creeds (London: SCM Press, 2002), 1-15 
7 Cf. N O R M A N P. T A N N E R SJ (ed.), Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, vol. 1 (Sheed&Ward: 
Georgetown University Press, 1990), 35 (ET) 
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Meaning of Rhetoric 
The structure of Gregory's major work against Eunomius is similar to some 
other of his polemical writings, and still the most distinctive one8. Gregory first quotes 
faithfully Eunomius' own words, and then counterattacks in full force, topping up his 
reasoning with unsurpassed literary effects, going from mild ironies to insidious 
rhetorical questions, then to conscious derision, very often culminating in fierce 
sarcasm9. Here, one should pay heed not only to the historical context of the 
emergence for Gregory's writings, but moreover, to his crafty and polyvalent usage of 
language10. On the one hand, Gregory is committed to spin up the gaudy arguments of 
his adversary, bringing into play his dearest method of reductio ad absurdum. With 
respect to Eunomius, he can easily maintain that 'strength of vituperation is infirmity 
in reasoning'11. Yet, Gregory bets on the power of words to make the truth 
triumphant. He is ready to elaborate an almost juridical phraseology, just to fulfil his 
strategy of persuading the Christian congregation. It is remarkable how, for example, 
each of St Gregory's homilies on the Song of the Songs, includes at the beginning and 
at the end a liturgical exhortation to virtues for his readers, and a short prayer to God. 
Like his 'master', Basil of Caesarea, the bishop of Nyssa is unscrupulous about using 
all possible literary effects, including le superflu (once called by Voltaire '««e chose 
tres necessaire'). Indeed, repetition is for Gregory not only the proof of self-
consistency, but also a weighty tool of persuasion. As in music and in prayer, the 
reiteration of words, every time slightly differently tuned, plays down emphatic 
effects of seduction. The circular movements in thought trace, ideally, the perfect and 
most enigmatic geometrical figure of the Greeks, which was the circle. Consciously or 
not, Gregory - who obviously trained himself in the art of oratory - used this 
procedure of repetition in all his writings against Eunomius. Instilled with refreshing 
humour, he could approach topics of immense importance for the Church of 
Cappadocia, which by St Basil's death lost one of her most solid 'pillars of truth'. 
E . C. E OWEN, 'St Gregory of Nyssa: Grammar, Vocabulary, Style', JTS 26 (1925), 64-71 
9 Gregory tells us that Eunomius' father was 'an excellent man, except that he had such a son', NPNF 
V, 40a (GNO I. 39.4-5) 
1 0 G. K E N N E D Y , Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern 
Times (London, 1980); B. ViCKERS, In Defence of Rhetoric (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) 
1 1 NPNF V, 313a (GNO I. 406. 21-23) 
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Gregory accepted with no reluctance the literary canon of the Second Sophistic 
School12 from Athens and, even as an old man, he could enjoy correspondence with 
representatives of the pagan rhetorical schools from Asia Minor . By doing so, St 
Gregory wanted to make himself 'all things to all men' (I Corinthians 9: 22), being 
'debtor both to the Greeks, and to the Barbarians; both to the wise, and to the unwise' 
(Romans 1: 14), so that he might 'by all means save some'. In just one shot, he can 
prove innumerable virtues: psychological acumen and beguiling rhetoric are cleverly 
assorted as to oppose any resistance. Besides inheriting from his brother the very deep 
pathos of a true pastor, Gregory displayed the sparkling dexterity of a lawyer and the 
accuracy of a philosopher. Therefore, his language takes explosive shapes and, when 
necessary, gives up any formal rule of consistency. Before finding out what Gregory 
says about the objective status of words in Scripture, the reader cannot help noticing 
how he profits from the pragmatic functions of language. 
Pondering upon the endemic harshness of Gregory's literary style, one could 
wonder what is the real motif of such an apparently wanton, polemical determination? 
To this question, many answers are ready. Among Gregory's personal reasons, one 
has to count, first, his passionate commitment to the memory of Basil the Great, 
whose personality deeply marked his biography. Basil was for both Gregory (of Nyssa 
and of Nazianzus) the very incarnation of the idea of holiness, 'an orator among 
orators, even before the chair of the rhetoricians; a philosopher among philosophers, 
even before the doctrines of the philosophers; highest of all, a priest among Christians, 
even before the priesthood'14. Few could have challenged Basil's credentials, and 
probably least of all Eunomius15. The latter hardly distinguished himself among 
monastic circles as a pastor, and the reputation of his master, Aetius, was even worse. 
Attacks ad personam were not excluded from Gregory's armoury, since he regarded 
theology as a 'science' that had to be incarnated and needed a living testimony. The 
theologian had to distinguish himself first as a holy man, and only secondly as a 
rhetorician or dialectical thinker. For Gregory, Basil personified all the virtues of the 
1 2 The standard monograph on this subject remains L . M E R I D I E R , L 'influence de la seconde sophistique 
sur I 'oeuvre de Gregoire de Nysse (Rennes: 1906) 
1 3 See letters to Libanius {Ep. 13; 14), and presumably to some of his disciples (Ep. 15), to a Sophist 
(Ep. 9, 27), to be consulted in the excellent critical edition SC (N° 363), with the translation and 
introduction of P. M A R A V A L . cf G R E G O I R E D E N Y S E E , Lettres (Paris: Cerf, 1990) 
1 4 Gregory Nazianzus, Or. 43. 13 (PG 36: 512) 
1 5 Gregory charges Eunomius of 'not knowing himself, and how great the distance is between the 
soaring Basil (tou hypsipetous Basileiou) and a grovelling reptile (kai tou chersaiou theriou). NPNF V, 
314a (GNO I. 409. 3-4) 
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Church tradition. Though he died prematurely (at the age of 49), Basil enjoyed an 
enormous reputation as teacher, pastor, ascetic, and bishop of the Church of 
Cappadocia. The fact that Eunomius attacked Basil shortly after his repose in God, 
Gregory's response was outrage. In a letter received from Gregory of Nyssa, Peter of 
Sebasta could read this locution: 
When our saintly Basil fell asleep, and I received the legacy of 
Eunomius's controversy, when my heart was hot within me with 
bereavement, and, besides this deep sorrow for the common loss of the 
church, Eunomius had not confined himself to the various topics which 
might pass as a defence of his views, but had spent the chief part of his 
energy in laboriously written abuse of our father in God - I was 
exasperated with this, and there were passages where the flame of my 
heart-felt indignation burst out against this writer16. 
This was the beginning of Eunomius' end. He succeeded to put on fire 
Gregory, who added moral distrust to his former intellectual disdain against Basil's 
enemy17. Secondly, Gregory sensed his obligation to carry on the mandate of Nicaea, 
dogmatic resolution of which he regarded as the most conclusive one for all previous 
contentions over Christ's divinity. As he put it, 'the main point of Christian religion 
(eusebias) is to believe that the Only-begotten God, Who is the truth and the true light, 
and the power of God and the life, is truly all that He is said to be, both in other 
respects and especially in this, that He is God and the truth, that is to say, God in truth, 
ever being what He is called, Who never at any time was not, nor ever will cease to 
be, Whose being, such as it is essentially, is beyond the reach of the curiosity that 
1 ft 
would try to comprehend it.' The 'truceless and implacable warfare (ton aspondon 
touton kai akerukton polemon),x9 against Eunomius defended the ideas that all the 
most important Nicene theologians hold with respect to Scripture and its right 
hermeneutics of Christ, who since the apostles was acknowledged as 'Lord and God' 
(John 20: 24). 
1 6 NPNF V, 33b (printed as Ep. 29 in SC 363. 311 -315, ed. P. Maraval) 
1 7 It is noteworthy that, if Gregory calls Eunomius 'the Antichrist' (NPNF V, 239; GNO II. 288. 17), 
Eunomius compares Basil to Gnostic authors like Valentinus, Cerinthus, Basilides and denies him the 
name of 'Christian' (GNO II, 284. 12-19; NPNF V, 238a) 
1 8 NPNF V, 251b (GNO I. 230.18-26) 
1 9 NPNF V, 250b (GNO 1.228. 7-8) 
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Gregory's appeal to rhetoric should not be understood as a proof for his 
inability to think systematically, as some contemporaries tended to argue . At stake 
was rather Gregory's conviction that there is not just one starting point in the process 
of theological thinking, which is ultimately resolved into the prayerful and 
doxological contemplation of Christ. Outside the Church and her authoritative 
tradition, the Scriptures cannot become what they actually are (the Word of God and 
not a collection of pious texts). In Gregory's case, rhetoric did not mean the usage of 
flashy style with a very shallow purpose to impress an audience. One has to remember 
that, by highlighting Basil's charismatic gifts, Gregory pointed to Christ's own 
enticing power to convert and to resurrect all those who gaze and encounter him 
through faith. This was done by 'words of life' and not by human wisdom (I 
Corinthians 2: 5). Gregory's rhetoric opposes the fluid conversation about the totality 
of God's revelation to the constipated theology of Eunomius, who encapsulated this 
majestic totality into one single word, 'borrowed from the Greeks' (ie: 'agennetos'). 
For Gregory, theological knowledge is built on the Christian virtues of faith, hope and 
love. Discursive reason is only the secondary effect of our primary call to resemble 
God in holiness and love. The fruits of faith and the outcome of reasoning do not 
overlap, though they are not necessarily at odds. Trusting rhetoric more than 
dialectics, Gregory acts first as a vigilant minister of his Church, and only secondly as 
an 'academic' theologian. One believes with the heart, which cannot be touched by 
compelling syllogisms of discursive reason. The faith is not certitude and is not the 
fruit of analytical deduction, as Eunomius' methodology suggests. I f rhetoric grounds 
anything, then it is this faith, which makes hope and love intelligent and effective. 
Since it is woven into the most complex web of life-circumstances, faith can start and 
collapse from every point. Gregory was aware that this 'hermeneutical circle' is the 
basic specification of our daily perceptions, skills, acts, or reflective attitudes. Trying 
to avoid the seduction of dialectical precision, Gregory becomes the champion of the 
Christian rhetoric of truth. He is the advocate of the narrative theology that addresses 
questions both for 'specialists' and the 'simple minded'. In fact, this is the natural 
genius of the poetry, closely followed by rhetoric. As the parables of the Gospel 
2 0 C . S T E A D , 'Ontology and Terminology in Gregory of Nyssa', in H . D O E R R I E , M . A L T E N B U R G E R , U . 
S C H R A M M (ed.), Gregor von Nyssa und die Philosophie. Zweites Internationales Kolloquium iiber 
Gregor von Nyssa, Munster 18-23 September 1972 (Leiden: Brill,1976) 107-119; ITANNHE 
AHMHTPAKOnOYAOS, <PIAOEO<PIA KAI niZTH. H AOflKH AllOAEIXIMOTHETA TON 
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always emphasise, the most important things are known by heart, which needs 
incessant repentance (metanoia). For Gregory, theology starts from anywhere and 
solicits every single act constituting our being. Theology includes worship, 
contemplation of the Scriptures, selfless gestures of philanthropy, and reasoning about 
the structure of the universe. I f only one of these pieces is taken away, the cohesion of 
theological knowledge would fall apart. Gregory's theology unfolds the striking 
multitude of the literary genres of the Scriptural books, including the cosmic narrative, 
prophetic lamentations, paraenetical discourses, words of wisdom, mystagogic 
catechesis, and pastoral letters. This diversity of linguistic performances shows in 
action Gregory's philosophy of names. 
Economical and Hypostatic Names 
What are the other implications of Gregory's doctrine of language for the 
Christians' daily life? How should we pray? What words can be used legitimately and 
why so? Gregory's doctrine allows us to draw important conclusions for questions of 
significant interest, both in the remote past and nowadays. 
First, one has to remember that meanings, like names, never come alone. In 
order to be understood, the names ascribed to Christ by the Scriptures need a careful 
contextualisation and, more than that, an orthodox framework of thought. Otherwise, 
the meaning of many scriptural words looks strange, i f not sacrilegious. The Lord is 
called by St Paul 'curse and sin' (Galatians 3: 13), while the Prophet Hosea uses 
images that are more picturesque, by calling Christ 'a Bear' or 'a Leopard' (Hosea 13: 
7) . What kind of names are these? Do they apply only to Jesus Christ - the incarnate 
One - or can they be also ascribed to God the Father? To illustrate God's works, the 
Scriptures employ a plurality of names, and it would be absurd to say that any of these 
can describe God's nature, which is one and undivided. An essential predicate would 
make derivative, and in the event useless, all the other appellations. Though Gregory 
does not stress enough the distinction between what one could call the 'hypostatic 
names' (Trinity ad intra) and 'economic names' (God ad extra), it is nonetheless clear 
XPIZT1ANIKONAOrMATONKATA TONTPHrOPIONYEEHIH TIDEDEPRECANS 
INTELLECTUM' ('Aflr/ra: Ylapovoia, 1996), The English Summary, 167-180 
2 1 NPNF V, 280b (GNO I. 314. 23-24) 
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that two categories cannot be confused. God is one in essence and in his energies and 
therefore, the names that call his activity in the world are interchangeable. God the 
Father has all the economic attributes of the Son, and all the similar names assigned to 
the Holy Spirit. Coming back to the words of the Prophet, God can be metaphorically 
understood as 'a bear' or 'a leopard' in his salvific economy. Even more, the name of 
'Christ' ('the anointed one') shows the economy of the Holy Trinity. 'The confession 
of this name [scil: Christos], says Gregory, contains the teaching of the Holy Trinity, 
because in this name each of the Persons in whom we believe is respectively 
22 • 
expressed' . More precisely, Gregory continues, 'in this name we recognize the 
Anointing One [scil: the Father], the Anointed One [scil: Christ], and the One through 
Whom He is anointed [scil: Holy Spirit].'2 3 Identity of nature is reflected by the unity 
of economical operations, and St Gregory sometimes compares this Trinitarian model 
with the plurality of activities of one human mind. Due to this essential unity of the 
Godhead (theotes), economical names as 'King' or 'Lord' can be shared among the 
Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, as one reads in Gregory's epistle to Eusthatius On 
the Holy Trinity1*. This mutual transference of dignities shows at best how in St 
Gregory's theology no hierarchical division among the divine names can be accepted. 
Although Gregory does not carry out all the possible conclusions of his 
thought, other Byzantine theologians did so, with remarkable courage25. Mention 
should be made especially of St Gregory Palamas26, who transferred the dignity of 
fatherhood upon Christ. The scriptural support for this outstanding distinction between 
the hypostatic fatherhood, which is unique and ascribable only to the Ungenerate God, 
and the economical fatherhood, which can be ascribed to Christ (and, therefore, also to 
the Holy Spirit), is given by the prophesy of Isaiah who calls Messiah as 'Wonderful 
Counsellor, Mighty God, Everlasting Father, Prince of Peace' (9: 6). The divine Logos 
also declares to Moses: 'Israel is my firstborn son' (Exodus 4: 23). On these grounds, 
Adv. Apol. (GNO III, 1. 220. 13-14): 'tes gar agias Triados didaskalian periechei e tou onomatos 
toutou homologia, ekastou ton pepisteumenon prosopon emphainomenou te prosegoria taute kata to 
prosphoron.' 
23 Adv. Apol. (GNO III, 1. 221. 3-5): 'toinun ho chrion estin o pater, to de christma to agion pneuma 
esti: 
24 Ad. Eust. (GNO IH, 1. 15-16.21) NPNF V, 329b-330 
2 5 For the further indications, I am indebted to Sister Anastasia from the Stavropegic Monastery of St 
John the Baptist (Essex, UK), who kindly offered me to read in manuscript the results of her research 
on this topic. 
2 6 See N I C H O L A S C A B A S I L A S , The Life in Christ, book IV. 40-48 (SC 355, 300-309), and P. N E L L A S , 
Deification in Christ: Orthodox Perspectives on the Nature of the Human Person with a foreword by 
Kallistos Ware (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir's Press, 1987), 116 sq 
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St Gregory Palamas could speak in his first homily to the Thessalonians, in the 
following terms: 'Not only is He our God but He was well-pleased to be our brother, 
our Father, and our Head, bringing us all together into his Body and making us 
members of Himself.'27 By sacramental initiation and new birth, the Christian 
becomes a brother, a sister, a friend, and a son of Christ, as the Gospel does not 
hesitate to present him (Mark 2: 5: 'My son\ Jesus says to the paralytic, 'your sins are 
forgiven'). This profound meaning of Christ's fatherhood is obviously denuded by any 
psychological connotation, having to do only with the spiritual initiation in the 
mysteries of God. 'Christ is also our Father', says Gregory Palamas, 'because He gave 
us new birth through Holy Baptism and His divine grace. He calls His disciples His 
children and when He comes to His saving Passion He promises not to leave them 
orphans' . Though St Gregory of Nyssa does not refer in the most paradoxical terms 
to the economical fatherhood of the Son, it is certain that by his theological doctrine of 
the essential and energetic unity of God29, he made viable the distinction between 
'economical' and 'hypostatic' (or Trinitarian) fatherhood. It is an important aspect 
which, on the one hand, again emphasises Christ's redemptive power, and, on the 
other hand, explains the liturgical addressing of Christ in prayers, which 
acknowledges him as 'God', 'Lord' and 'Father of the age to come'. 
Gender Issues 
The same distinction between 'hypostatic' and 'economic' fatherhood could 
help us to understand better the disputed issue of 'gender language' within the 
Patristic theology . Gregory, being a perfect son of his age, was probably not aware 
of any possible feminist attack upon the orthodox Trinitarian doctrine. But does his 
theology contain elements that can help us discharge any of these accusations as 
pernicious and meaningless? Gregory's insistence on the non-representable character 
of God makes clear that the Son's generation is not passible of any sexual 
2 7 G R E G O R Y P A L A M A S , 'Homily I . 1', The Homilies vol 1, E T by Ch. Veniamin (St Tikhon Seminary 
Press: 2002) , 1 
2 8 G R E G O R Y P A L A M A S , 'Homily I . 2', op. cit., 1 
2 9 E . D. M O U T S O U L A S , '«Essence» et «energie» de Dieu selon St. Gregoire de Nysse', JECS 8 (2000) 4, 
517-525 
3 0 L . B O U Y E R , he Pere invisible : approches du mystere de la divinite (Paris: Cerf, 1976); P. 
W I D D I C O M B E , The Fatherhood of God from Origen to Athanasius (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 
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connotation, being just beyond comprehension as Jesus' virginal birth. Unlike in the 
Greek mythology, the divine Father needs neither a receptacle to plant his 'seed', nor 
a temporal interval to see his Son born. Christ is not only the Son, but also the Icon or 
the Word of God (Colossians 1: 15; John 1:1), beyond any sexual implications. In his 
essence, God is neither father, nor son. The Scriptures use these names to describe the 
ineffable relation (schesis) between the divine Persons of the Holy Trinity. Describing 
a relation, these names are relative, as the Scriptures clearly show: the eternal Christ 
can be called Son, or Icon of God, and the same consubstantiality is designed by these 
words. The Holy Spirit is called also 'Comforter', which shows that, with respect to 
one Person, even the hypostatic names can be plural. Yet, this relativity is limited to 
the usage of the Scriptures. One should refrain from inventing new words in order to 
express the mystery of the Trinity, the knowledge of which is beyond comprehension. 
On the Trinitarian level, analogies are far less acceptable than on the economical one. 
God is the Father of his eternal Son, and this 'fatherhood' cannot be referred to the 
Holy Spirit. But on the economical level of discourse, the 'fatherhood' of God can be 
easily paralleled by his divine 'motherhood', i f these terms are exempted from too 
narrow psychological connotations, which ultimately could turn out to be idolatrous. 
'As one whom his mother comforts, so I will comfort you; you shall be comforted in 
Jerusalem' (Isaiah 66: 13). To his people, God can be like a 'mother' or like a 'father', 
but these appellations are only metaphors of his providence, and, in principle, they are 
interchangeable. 
But why the Trinitarian names were fixed in the sequence 'Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit'? First of all, Jesus addressed God as his 'Father', and Gregory says that 
this 'indicates the cause of what exists through him [scil.: Christ]'31. God is father of 
the whole creation, but in a very specific sense Father of Christ. In the latter case, the 
name 'Father' indicates the ineffable relationship between the ingenerate God and his 
Son, and we can recognise God as Father only in Jesus Christ, who through his 
passion restored our divine kinship. Because of all that, the hypostatic name 'Father' 
is irremovable. Gregory says over and again that the scriptural ground is crucial for 
the Christian theology, and that one has to treat this formula as a given fact of God's 
self-revelation. I f one feels free to substitute the God's Trinitarian name, why should 
he accept the dogma of Trinity at all, when the scriptural testimony is not regarded 
3 1 'Our Lord's Prayer', E T 39. 
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compulsory? Gregory refused to substitute the Trinitarian names with, apparently, 
Eunomius' more neutral onto logical concepts, which introduced in God hierarchy and 
division. Nowadays, as in the past, it would be against the authority of the Scripture to 
change these hypostatic names by inverting their (textual) gender. On the other hand, 
it would be heretical to claim that the eternal Son, as a divine hypostasis, has a 
masculine gender, though he was historically incarnate in Jesus Christ. Being the 
Word of the ingenerate God and the Creator of all worlds, the Son retains only a 
nominal, and not a real masculine gender. Human language, and therefore worship 
and prayer, at least in the Indo-European idiomatic family, is sexually specified, and 
any option would be discriminative against one or another gender. This becomes even 
clearer i f one contemplates Gregory's doctrine of creation, which is divided, and his 
theory of sexuality. Within God, although there is real and not nominal difference 
(diaphora), still there is no division {diastasis), to which pointed the mythological 
speculations of the Gnostics. Pace Burrus32, to imagine the divine Persons possessing 
a gender qualification would mean to impose not only difference, but also division 
within the one God who is beyond all names (Philippians 2: 9). To described God's 
essence in sexual terms would mean to represent him into a finite and disruptive 
language, which cannot be but blasphemous33. 'Any concept made in order to touch or 
to circumscribe the divine nature does not succeed but to form an idol of God, without 
making him known {pantos noematos, tou kata Una perileptiken phantasian en 
perinoia tini kai stochasmo tes theias pyseos ginomenou, eidolon Theou gindskein).^ 
Divine darkness, contemplated by Moses on the Mountain of Sinai, is a call not only 
to intellectual modesty, but to 'iconoclastic approach' of God in imageless prayer. 
Probably St Gregory's teaching about prayer35 was at best taken over and developed 
by Evagrius of Pontus36, the great patriarchs of the Egyptian desert. Close disciple of 
Gregory Nazianzus, Evagrius was very probably known to Gregory of Nyssa's 
V. B U R R U S , "Begotten Not Made". Conceiving Manhood in Late Antiquity (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2000), 108: 'he [Gregory] could well be charged with "monoanthropism".' 
3 3 More on this, see V. H A R R I S O N , 'Male and Female in Cappadocian Theology', JTS 41 (1990), 441-
471; 'Allegory and Asceticism in Gregory of Nyssa', Semeia 57 (1992), 113-130; 'Gender, Generation, 
and Virginity in Cappadocian Theology', JTS 47 (1996) 38-68. 
34 Vit. Moys. II. 165 (PG 44, 337 B 14-16; ed. J. Danielou, SC Ibis, 34) 
3 5 W. V O L K E R , Gregor von Nyssa als Mystiker (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1955), 264-265. 
Volker traces Gregory's teaching about prayer back to Origen, who obviously played a major role in 
forming the spirituality of the Cappadocians. 
3 6 On Evagrius' spirituality, see G. B U N G E , 'On the Trinitarian Mysticism of Evagrius of Pontus', 
Studio Monastica 17(1986), 191-208 
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ecclesiastical circle of friends, and had learned a lot from the Trinitarian theology of 
the Cappadocians, which became the real basis of his monastic spiritual teaching37. 
Desire of Infinity and Infinity of Desire 
The unfathomable character of God and the innumerable divine names hold 
together and can be explained only by reference to St Gregory's doctrine of infinity. It 
is an important aspect of St Gregory's dogmatic and spiritual theology, which alone 
can frame the doxological usage of language that surpasses both dialectics and 
rhetoric since, as we shall see, it requires to 'honour God in silence'. 
T O 
Much has been written on St Gregory's defence of the idea of divine infinity, 
which, in its compelling presentation, certainly was a novelty among the Christian 
theologians. Within the Greek tradition, with the unique exception of Anaximander 
and Plotinus39, the idea of infinity had a bad reputation40. The Platonic doctrine about 
'uncreated matter' shaped the horizontal and negative meaning of infinity as 
something 'indefinite' and 'chaotic'. For Aristotle, the couple 'form'-'matter' played a 
crucial role in giving an explanation to the unity of our experience of the physical 
world4 1. Knowledge was often considered only an intellectual sublimation of the 
visual perception42, which could never become active in the absence of a horizontal 
delineation. To draw this horizon in the study of nature (physica) meant for Aristotle 
to avoid the pernicious regressum ad infinitum and to postulate an entity with the 
mechanic function of causation {proton kinouri). In short, for Plato and Aristotle, 
fixing borders within any physical or metaphysical research singled out the very 
The name of Evagrius occurs in Ep. 28 (ed. P. M A R A V A L , SC 363, 308-309) in the expression 'koinos 
adelphos emon Euagrios\ In a footnote (op. cit., 308, fh. 2), P. M A R A V A L says: 'on ne peut identifier 
cet Evagre, bien que plusieurs personages de ce nom apparaissent dans la correspondance des 
Cappadociens'. It is not impossible that, as a former deacon in Constantinople, Evagrius was known to 
Gregory, Basil and Gregory of Nazianzus altogether. 
3 8 J. E . H E N N E S S Y , The Background, Sources and Meaning of Divine Infinity in St. Gregory of Nyssa 
(Fordham: Dissert, microfilm, 1963); E. M U H L E N B E R G , Die Unendlichkeit Gottes bei Gregor von 
Nyssa. Gregors Kritik am Gottesbegriff der klassischen Metaphysik (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1965) 
3 9 P L O T I N U S , Enneads IV. 3. 8 
4 0 E . L E V I N A S , 'L'infini' in Encyclopaedia Universalis (Paris, 1995). Levinas's historical treatment 
simply fails to mention Gregory of Nyssa. For the most comprehensive dossier of this subject, see L. 
S W E E N E Y , Divine Infinity in Greek and Medieval Thought (New York : Peter Lang, 1992) 
4 1 A R I S T O T L E , Physics m . 207al4 
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criteria of rationality . Behind this logical refutation of the idea of infinity stood also 
the classical principles of the Greek civic morality, for which the absence of limit 
represented the origin of hybris. Starting with Socrates who, i f one is to believe 
Nietzsche, killed the Dionysian spirit of the poets44, the ethical principles of the 
Greeks (at least in Pericles' era) were generally defined by proportion and measure 
(kata metron)45. 
In the Christian tradition, there are some precedents for Gregory's doctrine 
of the divine infinity. Yet, the references existing in Clement of Alexandria's and 
Hilary of Poitiers' writings are rather 'occasional'46. In Origen's treatise Contra 
Celsum41, one can find a surprising limitation of God following the Platonic principles 
of rationality. St Athanasius postulated the incomprehensibility of God because of his 
transcendence48, while Basil of Caesarea often referred to God's infinite power.49 Yet, 
as E. Muhlenberg has demonstrated at length50, Gregory's whole theology relies 
heavily on the doctrine of divine infinity, which plays a decisive role in all of his 
writings. As with all the previous Christian theologians, Gregory takes his legitimacy 
in theologising about God's infinity from the Word of the Scriptures. 'Great is our 
Lord', says the Psalter, 'his understanding is beyond measure' (Psalm 147: 5). This 
has important consequences for the understanding of the inner life of the Holy Trinity, 
which was still described by Eunomius using a subordinationist grid. While writing 
his first treatise of dogmatic theology (CE I), Gregory found a powerful argument 
against the neo-Arians by appealing to the idea of infinity. 
When he [scil. : Eunomius] pronounces that the life of the Father is prior to 
that of the Son, he places a certain interval between the two; now, he must 
mean, either that this interval is infinite (apeiron), or that it is included 
within fixed limits. But the principle of an intervening mean will not 
4 2 P L A T O , Alcibiades, 132d-133a; A R I S T O T L E , Met. A, 980 a 21-26; P L O T I N U S , Enneades HI. 8. 15. 
4 3 A R I S T O T L E , Met. A, 994b 22; P L A T O , Philebos, 17 e. 
4 4 F . N I E T Z S C H E , Birth of the Tragedy. The Genealogy of Morals (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956) 
4 5 J . P. V E R N A N T , Myth and Thought among the Greeks (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983) 
4 6 H E N N E S Y , op. cit., 178 
4 7 O R I G E N , De princ. IX. 1: 'we must maintain that even the power of God is finite, and we must not, 
under pretext of praising him, lose sight of his limitations; for if the divine power were infinite, of 
necessity could not even understand itself, since the infinite is by nature incomprehensible' (ET by G. 
W. Butterworth, ed. Koetschau, London: 1936, 128) 
4 8 A T H A N A S I U S , Contra gentes II. 35 
4 9 B A S I L , De Spiritu Sancto IX. 22; 23. 54 
5 0 There has been also a justified criticism against Muhlenberg's thesis. Cf. K A N N E N G I E S S E R , 
'L'infinite divine chez Gregoire de Nysse [Review article of E . Muhlenberg, Die Unendlichkeit 
Gottes]", RSR 55 (1967) 1, 55-65; R. S. B R I G H T M A N , 'Apophatic Theology and Divine Infinity in St 
Gregory of Nyssa', GOTR 18 (1973) 1-2, 97-114 
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allow him to call it infinite; he would annul thereby the very conception of 
Father and Son and the thought of anything connecting them, as long as 
this infinite were limited on neither side, with no idea of a Father cutting it 
short above, nor that of a Son checking it below. The very nature of the 
infinite is, to be extended in either direction, and to have no bounds of any 
kind. Therefore i f the conception of Father and Son is to remain firm and 
immoveable, he will find no ground for thinking this interval is infinite: 
his school must place a definite interval of time between the Only-
begotten and the Father.51 
Gregory's appeal to infinity is sound and unrecorded in Athanasius' defence of the 
eternal generation of the Son by the Father. One cannot imagine, says Gregory, any 
spatial or temporal mark within God, which would imply ontological difference. The 
principle of individuation of the divine Persons cannot be material (subject to change), 
and only the internal act of causation from God the Father provides the eminent 
distinction of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. In one of the few passages where 
Gregory defines the life of the triune God, he seems to give an interpretation of the 
famous definition of God as love (I John 1: 14). He says: 'The divine nature exceeds 
each good, and the good is wholly beloved by the good, and thus it follows that when 
it looks upon itself it desires what it possesses (ho echei, thelei) and possesses what it 
desires (kai ho thelei, echei), and receives nothing from outside itself One finds here, 
though in a subdued version, the theology of actus purus: God's inner acts are 
unfolded by his perfect and, therefore, generous self-sufficiency. 'The life of that 
transcendent nature', Gregory continues, 'is love, seeing that the Beautiful is 
necessarily loveable to those who know it (and God does know it), and so this 
knowledge becomes love (e de gnosis agape ginetai)52, because the object of his 
knowledge is essentially beautiful.'53 God is life eternal and goodness by excess, and 
this overflow of life and goodness cannot be expressed, save in negative terms. 'It is a 
sacred duty to use of God names privative of the things foreign to His nature (eusebes 
an eiepantos tois choristikois ton apemphainonton hremasin ep 'autou kechresthai).'54 
Infinity (to aoriston) is one of the most probative among the privative names of God, 
5 1 NPNF V, 67b (GNO I. 129.1-17); 
5 2 It is the motto of P. F L O R E N S K Y , The Pillar and Ground of Truth, E T by B. Jakim (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1997) 
53 De an. et. res. NPNF V, 450b (PG 44, 153-156) 
5 4 NPNF V, 308b (GNO I. 396. 3-4) 
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which befits his inner life of overwhelming love, which does not know 'the insolence 
of satiety'55. 
Following this Trinitarian argument, the cosmological argument suggests 
that since the experience of division, fragmentation and corruption is specific to the 
material realm of creation, it would be absurd to ascribe boundaries to the Creator.56 
'But i f the Divine and unalterable nature is incapable of degeneracy, as even our foes 
allow, we must regard it as absolutely unlimited in its goodness: and the unlimited is 
the same as the infinite (to de aoriston to apeiro tauton estiri)."51 Furthermore, in CEI 
Gregory uses an ethical argument to endorse the idea of infinity, claiming that 'Good, 
as long as it is incapable of its opposite, has no bounds to its goodness.'58 Within the 
spiritual realm of goodness, increase or contradiction is impossible59, and therefore, 
one has to understand it as being infinite. Thirdly, Gregory cannot imagine the process 
of spiritual growth being limited by anything60, confirming again the voice of the 
Apostle who said that 'love never ends' (I Corinthians 13: 8). God is the zenith of our 
incessant search for knowledge, unity and love, and his nature being infinite, 'it 
follows of necessity that the participation in the enjoyment of it [the First Good] will 
be infinite also, for more will be always being grasped, and yet something beyond that 
which has been grasped will always be discovered, and this search will never overtake 
its Object, because its fund is as inexhaustible as the growth of that which participates 
in it is ceaseless.'61 These theological principles, already set up in CE I , were 
confirmed by Gregory's spiritual treatises on the 'Life of Moses' and on the 'Song of 
the Songs', which depict with brilliant minutiae the nature of this journey towards 
God. In the introductory passage to his sixth homily on the Song of the Songs, St 
Gregory ascribes infinity not only to God as such, but to the whole intelligible world, 
'and consequently also to angels and human souls'.62 Being made in the image of God 
(Genesis 1: 27; Colossians 1: 16) - man is the iconic reflection of the uncreated 
5 5 NPNF V, 450b (PG 44, 153-154) 
5 6 NPNF V, 60b (GNO I. 106. 12-15) 
5 7 NPNF V, 51b (GNO I. 77. 18-20) 
5 8 NPNF V, 51b (GNO I. 77. 8) 
5 9 NPNF V, 51b (GNO I. 77. 20-23): 'But to suppose excess and defect (pleonasmon kai elattosiri) in 
the infinite and unlimited is to the last degree unreasonable: for how can the idea of infinitude remain, 
if we posited increase and loss in it?' 
60 De an. et res. NPNF V, 450a: 'For this teaching we have the authority of God's own Apostle, who 
announces a subduing and a ceasing of all other activities, ever for the good, which are within us, and 
finds no limit for love alone.' 
6 1 NPNF V, 62b (GNO I. 112. 16-20) 
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infinity, apt to participate without satiation in the goodness of God. We see here that 
the second way of sharing God's infinity is not passive but active, and means for the 
human mind growing up into the life of virtues, which brings us close to the source of 
all Goodness. Only God is good by nature, all other being are good only by 
participation. Yet, it is important to observe also that 'the transcendent source of 
perfection is not diminished by being participated, and is in a true sense totally present 
in all participants. Yet each of these partakes of the perfection "more or less" 
according to its free dispositions'63. 
Doxological Icons 
The consequences of the doctrine of divine infinity for Gregory's theology of 
language are vast. First, one can understand better St Gregory's apophatic teaching 
with respect to the 'names of God'. Being infinite, one cannot adequately predicate 
about God, and this is a statement reappraised in the recent French philosophy by 
religious authors as E. Levinas or J.-L. Marion64. 'La relation a l'lnfmi', says Levinas, 
'n'est pas un savoir, mais un Desir et du besoin par le fait que le Desir ne peut etre 
satisfait: que le Desir, en quelque maniere, se nourrit de ses propres faims et 
s'augmente de sa satisfaction ; que le Desir est comme une pensee qui pense plus 
qu'elle ne pense, ou plus que ce qu'elle pense.'65 Although God is infinite, infinity is 
just one among many names. Pace E. Muhlenberg66 - the concept of 'infinite' should 
be included among the 'negative' attributes of God. Doctrine of infinity also grounds 
the discourse about incomprehensibility, which characterises both God and his 
spiritual creation. But most importantly, the doctrine of infinity lays out the premises 
for the liturgical application of Gregory's theory of names. 
Since God is infinite, the names ascribed to him should be innumerable, and 
have an iconic function. Thus, words can resemble the revelatory function of Christ, 
D. B A L A S , METOYIIA 0EOY. Man's Participation in God's Perfection According to Saint Gregory 
of Nyssa (Rome: Herder, 1996), 135 
6 3 D. B A L A S , op. c i t , 134 
6 4 J.-L. M A R I O N , God Without Being. Hors-Texte translated by Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 23 
6 5 E . L E V 1 N A S , Ethique et Infini (Paris: Fayard, 1982), 86-87; see also 'Philosophy and the idea of 
infinity' in E . L E V I N A S , Collected Philosophical Papers (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993) 
6 6 E . M U H L E N B E R G , op. cit., 28: „Der Begriff des Unendlichen mufi die negative Theologie uberbieten 
konnen; sonst, beruht es ja auf einem reinen Zufall, dafi er in die Reiher der negativen Gottespradikate 
vor Gregor nicht aufgenommen wurde." 
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who as the Word of God is also called 'the icon of the Father'. At their best, 'divine 
names' are icons of the invisible, opening our mind to an infinite realm of knowledge. 
The infinite distance between man and God needs to be adequately traversed. The 
means of transportation consist in love, which is the driving force, and in the very 
'divine names', which are the noetic vehicles of the prayerful desire. Words are 
engulfed in this infinite openness and bridge the invisible realm of glory in which God 
dwells and contemplates us67. I f God was a fixed object laid at an accessible distance, 
one could have found an appropriate concept to grasp his essence. But concepts are 
helpless when they have to envisage God: trying to grasp (capio, capere) the infinity 
of God, they can only fail. Even when Gregory speaks about God as 'ho ontos on', he 
does not identify, as Philo, the famous 'ego eimi ho on' (Exodus 3: 14) with the 
revelation of the true name of God68. I f Eunomius confines the absolute sense of 
Being to the Father, the only true God for him, Gregory refers it to Christ as well as to 
the Holy Spirit. (Exodus 3: 14 can be also read as a tautology that expresses the 
refusal of God to decline his name). For Gregory, the attribute of existence does not 
prevail over the attribute of goodness. In his Trinitarian theology the predicate of 
'existence' never competes with the notion of 'generation' or 'procession'. One 
cannot imagine the Son in other way than 'being generated', the meaning of which, as 
the Father's way of existence (tropos hyparxeos), remains unknown to any human 
mind (no matter how clever, or even holy, could it be). 
E. Muhlenberg was right to claim that 'das Gedanke des endlosen Fortschrites 
wird sich als die wichtigste Folgerung aus der Unendlichkeit Gottes.'69 Speaking of 
'die Zahllosigkeit der Namen Gottes als Voraussetzung der unendlich fortschreitenden 
Erkenntnis', the German scholar rightly emphasized the importance of 'wonder' (to 
thauma) in Gregory's theology. Yet, in this sentence one reads more Luther's thoughts 
than, as it were, Gregory's mystical theology: 'Worin drtickt sich dieses Erstaunen 
aus? Es muB nicht mit dem Schweigen enden, sondern die Spannung des Glaubens, 
die zwischen dem denkbaren Begriff und der GroBe Gottes besteht, kann sich 
On this, see the excellent books of J.-L. M A R I O N , God Without Being. Hors-Texte translated by 
Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 7-24; La croisee du 
visible (Paris: P U F , 1996 3 ) ; De surcroit (Paris: P U F , 2001) . 
6 8 On this topic, see the excellent surveys of E . S T A R O B I N S K I - S A F R A N , 'Exode 3, 14 dans l'oeuvre de 
Philon d'Alexandrie' in Dieu etl'Etre (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1978), 47-55; M . H A R L , 
'Citations et commentaries d'Exode 3, 14 chez les Peres grecs des quatre premiers siecles', op. cit., 87-
108 
6 9 M U H L E N B E R G , op. cit., 23 
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mitteilen'70. Trying to sack Gregory's 'sogennante Mystik'71, Muhlenberg refuses to 
accept that there is enough room in Gregory's writings both for 'the tension of faith' 
(which is an incomplete translation of Gregory's epektasis) and the call for 'union 
with God' through prayer72 and charity73. Though never abandoned, faith is absorbed 
into paradoxical (mystical) knowledge: surrounded by the divine clouds, one knows 
God without necessarily understanding him. 
It is remarkable, indeed, how the continuous spiritual progression 'from glory 
to glory' {epektasis), being pledged by God's infinity, is described mainly through 
non-visual metaphors. The very doxological language used by Gregory in his stunning 
interpretation of the Song of the Songs unfolds its rules like a subtle game. The most 
important thing about it is to be played: only being in movement, words can 
accomplish their function. The existence of grammar does not limit, but rather makes 
creativity possible; there are always exceptions from the general rule of interpretation. 
The major feature of his hermeneutical application is the usage of the paradox, which 
to those who lack love, appears as a nonsensical discourse. Yet, the difference 
between contradiction and paradox is beyond question. The meanings of words 
depend very much on their narrative context, and on the intention, that brings them 
forth: love can turn out words of shame into words of glory, while lack of love can 
transform beautiful icons into harmful idols. Christ the Word can be perceived like a 
'sword'74, which wounds the soul with divine love, or like 'wine'75, which provokes 
the blessed and 'sober drunkenness' of the mind. Indeed, Gregory twists what J. 
Derrida called - following the late Heidegger76 - the 'metaphysics of presence'77 
dominating the Western tradition of thought. The objectifying tendency of human 
mind, determined by the optic representation of the world, is fully undermined by 
Gregory of Nyssa throughout his exuberant homilies, which were paralleled, during 
the fourth century, only by the theological poetics of St Ephrem the Syrian and St 
MUHLENBERG, op. ext., 185 
7 1 Muhlenberg debates explicitly with J. Danielou and V. Volker, who maintained that Gregory is the 
initiator of the mystical theology in the Church tradition. This claim was tempered by H. CROUZEL, 
'Gregoire de Nysse est-il le fondateur de la theologie mystique?', RAM 33 (1957), 191-202 
7 2 GREGORY OF NYSSA, The Lord's Prayer, ET by Hilda C. Graef (New York/Mahwah: Paulist Press, 
col. "Ancient Christian Writers", 1954), 24 sq 
7 3 ' I f love is taken from us, how shall we be united with God?' in De an. et. res (NPNF V, 443a) 
74 In Cant. V (GNO V I . 193. 2; ET, 135) 
75 In Cant. X I V (GNO V I . 403. 6, ET 246) 
7 6 M . HEIDEGGER, Zeit undSein (1962) ET by J. Stambaugh, On Time and Being (NY: Harper and 
Row, 1972). 
7 7 J. DERRIDA, La Voix et le phenomene (Paris: PUF, 1967), 9 
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Gregory of Nazianzus. The ordinary function of the senses collapses for their 
integration into a superior realm of perception . The Homilies to the Song of the 
Songs retain the central image of De Vita Moysis, which is the paradoxical darkness of 
God. Once again, as Andrew Louth perceptively pointed out, 'for Gregory, intellectual 
seeing - theoria — is no longer possible in the darkness, gnophos, where God is 
encountered, and so, with every encouragement from the Song of the Songs, he turns 
to the other senses, smell, taste, touch (not hearing, especially) to characterize the 
experience that takes place in the darkness. It is an experience of immediacy and 
presence, which is undeniable but very difficult to objectify'79. This is the way of the 
mystical theology (mystike theoria), which is open only to those purified in their 
hearts from all wicked desire and vainglory, through prayerful repentance and ascetic 
struggle. Those who undertake this task and acquire God's holiness can perceive him 
as 'perfume', 'fragrance' and 'taste', not by means of poetic imagination, but within 
the inner cavity of their hearts, and through the sacramental food. Therefore, the call 
to 'taste and see that the Lord is good' does not illustrate with a metaphor a remote 
and inaccessible transcendence, but describes an experience that, in many Christians' 
heart, is real and enduring. 
Only the 'hymnic psalmody (en hymnois psalmosy (Psalm 6:1), which sets in 
motion words of praise, breaks down the propensity of the intellect to objectify God in 
passive concepts. Only being in movement the words of praise can acquire 
transformative power: whether positive or negative, 'divine names' can exist only as 
icons in a symphonic discourse of praise.80 All the images used in the 'hymnic 
psalmody' are transitory, although repetitive. In fact, as in music and rhetoric, the 
non-identical repetition of words is indispensable in prayer, because at every time they 
reveal different aspects of God's mystery. Repetition in doxology ingests moments of 
silence. As we have seen, there is the perennial silence, which can be also called 
'agnostic' and should be always kept in respect to what and how God is 8 1 . The 
'perennial silence' is the continuum of every doxological act. Its sublime pendant is to 
K . RAHNER, 'Le debut d'une doctrine des cinq sens spirituels chez Origene', RAM 13 (1932), 113-
145. As Gregory himself acknowledges, his commentary on the Song of the Songs is largely indebted 
to Origen, though in many respects anew. 
7 9 A. LOUTH, 'Eros and Mysticism. Early Christian Interpretation of the Song of the Songs', in J. RYCE-
M E N U H I N (ed.), Jung and the Monotheisms. Judaism, Christianity, Islam (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1994), 252 
80 Inscr. V I , 37. 15 (ed. J. Reynard, SC 466. 306) 
81 In Eccl. \OI . 8 (SC 416, 375-387; GNO V. 410-416) 
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be found in the 'wonderful silence', overloaded with awe, marvel and love for God's 
glory. This second moment of silence can last just for a second, igniting the heart with 
new prayerful thoughts of love. One stops only in order to start again with 
reinvigorated forces. Silence of wonder is spontaneous and occurs when the soul 
reaches the climax of praise. As Gregory tells us in his fifteenth homily on the Song of 
the Songs, 'the bride's praise is not made known by words', since 'anything belonging 
to silence is beautiful; it is ineffable and more wonderful than words.'82 
In Cant. Cantic. XV, ET 270-271 (GNO V I . 456. 4; 456. 12-15) 
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Conclusions 
The quarrel between Gregory and Eunomius was, therefore, more than a 
'godless chat'. Their issue was not philological, but doctrinal. The polemic between 
Eunomius and Gregory epitomises the established deaf relationship between two 
different ecclesiastical parties who had different understanding of Christ. This 
divergence shaped their subsequent comprehension of the Scriptures, and the 
framework of its exegesis. For Gregory, theology preserved her radical and somehow 
primordial meaning, which is - in the words of the apologist Athenagoras (second 
century AD) - to speak in words from God (para Theou), and not just about God (peri 
Theori)} Like St Paul, Gregory regarded the Word of God incarnated in Jesus Christ 
as the first theologian, whilst he first made the exegesis of the Father (John 1: 18). 
One should not lose sight of the pragmatic implications of St Gregory's 
polemic with Eunomius. His Trinitarian approach, the recourse to Scripture and 
tradition and his very solid spirituality, teach us about a way of doing theology. 
Gregory's appeal for rhetoric is very significant in contrast with Eunomius' 
fascination by the dialectical method. It is noteworthy that Gregory's massive 
dogmatic text takes the form of a letter, whose beginning is a panegyric to his brother 
Basil. Therefore, at stake is neither a domestic sense of solidarity, nor a parochial 
ideology, but rather Gregory's intention to preserve and to carry on the mandatory 
tradition of the Church, which revolves around what he often calls the 'mystery of 
faith'. Given the lavish style and the reverential manner of address, one is struck by 
its affinity with the biblical deposit of spiritual epistolary, hidden especially in Paul's 
letters. For Gregory, theological ideas must enact a soteriological drama and, in this 
respect, prayer and worship are the unmistakable signs of his championship of 
orthodoxy. 
Apart from this important matter of style, there is much to be drawn from the 
substance of Gregory's argument. One should ponder seriously upon Gregory's 
implicit distinction between the 'Trinitarian' and the 'economical' names of God. 
Many feminist theologians confuse, nowadays, this crucial difference among the 
'divine names', falling consequently into the heresy of modalism. Gregory's emphasis 
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on God's ineffable nature can help us to avoid any form of idolatry, which occurs 
when our mind projects in God thoughts emerging sometimes from our inner 
psychological conflicts. Gregory's orthodoxy of teaching was perfectly confirmed by 
the monastic spirituality of the desert, especially in the person of Evagrius of Pontus, 
who stressed the importance of imageless prayer. 'Father, Son and Holy Spirit' is 
referred to the mystery of the Holy Trinity (which, being non-numeral, is beyond 
imagination), and should be understood as one name for the triune God. It expresses 
the ineffable relationship (schesis) between the Persons of the Trinity, who being 
eternal, cannot be ascribed any real gender. In this respect, Gregory holds the hard-
line of those theologians who found the Scriptures as a very compelling argument 
against innovations. On this basis did he reject Eunomius' theories, since they had 
dramatic consequences for the understanding of the tenets of the Christian faith, 
especially for prayer and the sacramental life: 
If the confession of the revered and precious Names of the Holy Trinity 
(he ton semnon te kai timion tes agias triados onomaton homologia) is 
useless, and the customs of the Church unprofitable (ta ethe tes ekklesias), 
and if among these customs is the sign of the cross (he sphragis), prayer 
(he proseuche), baptism (to baptisma), confession of sins (he ton 
hamartion exagoreusis), right ordering of character, sobriety of life (to 
kata sophrosunen bioun), regard to justice, the effort not to be excited by 
passion, or enslaved by pleasure, or to fall short in moral excellence, - if 
he says that none of such habits is cultivated to any good purpose, and that 
the sacramental tokens (ta mystika symbola) do not, as we have believed, 
secure spiritual blessings, and avert from believers the assaults directed 
against them by the wiles of the evil one, what else does he do but openly 
proclaim aloud to men that he deems the mystery which Christians cherish 
a fable, laughs at the majesty of Divine Names (katagelan tes semnotetos 
ton theion onomaton), considers the customs of the Church a jest, and all 
sacramental operations idle prattle and folly?2 
Gregory is one of the best examples for theologians who kept the balance 
between conservatism and creativity. His theory of language broke seriously with the 
Alexandrian tradition (Philo, Origen) and opened an important chapter in the history 
of the Christian thinking upon language3. For Gregory, names could never acquire a 
1 apud. J.-L. M A R I O N , « Theologiques », in A. JACOB, (ed.), L'Univers Philosophique (Paris: PUF, 
1990), 17-25 
2 NPNF V. 238b (GNOII . 285. 25-286.13) 
3 On the history of St Gregory's reception in the late medieval and early modern thought, see T. 
KOBUSCH, 'Name un Sein. Zu den sprachphilosophischen Grundlagen in der Schrift Contra Eunomium 
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magic, or not even a protreptic power4: what makes words effective is not an intrinsic 
attribute of language, but the mental energy that supports them in prayer. Gregory 
would have never said, as Origen5, that the translation of one idiom into another 
would diminish the magic power of the words. There is no sacramental automatism 
within the articulation of language, and, from a theological viewpoint, Gregory 
dismisses the idea that Hebrew or Greek could be regarded as 'sacred languages'. For 
us, this is a sensible point, but it became an evidence only recently in the history of 
humankind. At the beginning of the 18th century, there were still some respectable 
Hebraist scholars who believed sincerely in the possibility of tracing back the roots of 
Adam's language. Living by the end of the fourth century, St Gregory was highly 
revolutionary, and Th. Kobusch did not hesitate to call him 'ein Aufklarer'. The early 
Christian Church adopted Gregory's very pragmatic viewpoints on language and 
spread the Gospel to the Gentiles in as many idioms as possible. Unlike for many 
romantics of the 19th century, for Gregory there was no language that could provide a 
'more original' access to reality. For Gregory, language is a broken mirror of a 
broken creation. A double-fall affects its usage: Adam's lapse into self-
misunderstanding and the disaster of Babel, which was only prophetically repaired at 
Jerusalem, on the day of the Pentecost. The restoration of language has to start with 
the unification of the divided human nature in each person. Only then, the usage of 
language can acquire the virtues of a spiritual exercise. 
Gregory can be compared with Augustine and, as the bishop of Hippo, he 
could refresh many contemporary debates about semiotics or hermeneutics. Drawing 
on the relationship between language and manual skills, Gregory advanced a theory 
nowadays confirmed in by many scholars of anthropology or psychology. On the 
other hand, although he emphasises the essential contribution of the human being in 
the creation of language, Gregory does not confine thought to the realm of mere 
discourse. Language can nourish badly many forms of conceptual idolatry, and only 
the purification of heart and the spiritual love for the infinite God can transform the 
'divine names' into icons of his invisible. St Gregory, as Alexander Golitzin has 
des Gregor von Nyssa', in L. F. MATEO-SECO & J. L. BASTERO (Eds.), El» Contra Eunotnium I« cn la 
production literaria de Grigorio de Nisa (Pamplona, 1988), 247-267 
4 JOHN G. COOK, "The Protreptic Power of Early Christian Language: From John to Augustine', VC 48 
(1994), 105-134. Unsurprisingly, Gregory of Nyssa does not occur in Cook's lists of authors. 
5 ORIGEN, Contra Celusum V. 45-46 (ET by H. Chadwick, 299-301) 
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already shown6, anticipates theological themes worked out later by Denys the 
Areopagite. Gregory was an apophatic thinker, although not so systematic as the 
Areopagite (who was more seriously affected by the Neoplatonic theology). Yet, he 
belongs to the celebrated generation of the Church Fathers who, from Justin the 
Martyr up to Gregory Palamas, taught that, above all, language is limited in 
comparison with the task of theology. Having an eschatological orientation, theology 
is obliged to grasp the ineffable, and the best way to do it is by 'sacrifice of praise'. 
The persistent temptation of conceptual idolatry, which made of Eunomius a prophet 
of the modern age, can be dissuaded only by setting words into motion: in prayer, 
hymns and psalmody ad infinitum. 
Driven by the infinite desire to draw nearer to God, the soul cannot help 
becoming a 'musical instrument' and actor into a 'cosmic symphony', completing 
thus the liturgy of the angels. While praising God, human being returns the gift 
received from above in Christ's incarnation as Word of God. In Greory's viewpoint, 
only by adopting the divine kenosis, our language, as well as our body, can be 
sanctified and redeemed. 
6 A . GOLITZIN, Et introibo ad altare Dei: the Mystagogy of Dionysius Areopagita, with special 
reference to its predecessors in the Eastern Christian tradition (Thessalonike: 1994), passim 
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